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I. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case. 
Bob and Rhonda Backman ("Backmans") own a piece of property in Bonner County that 
is not accessible by any public road or easement of record; it is legally landlocked. This property 
is more particularly described as the S 112 of the NW 114 and the S 112 of the NW 114 of the 
NW 114 of Section 8, Township 57 Nortb, Range 2 West, Boise Meridian (the "Backman 
Property"). While legally landlocked, the record in this matter reflects that the Backman 
Property has been accessible via roadways across the adjacent Section 7 since at least the 1950s. 
Presently, the properties through which these roadways pass in Section 7 are owned by 
Defendants-Counterclaimants-Respondents, who collectively belong to the Pend Oreille View 
Owners' Association, Inc. ("POVE") (Defendants-Counterclaimants-Respondents and POVE are 
collectively referred to as "Defendants"). In April 2005, POVE recorded a Declaration of 
Non-Access that stated the roads through Section 7 were "private" and deemed that there is 
"absolutely no right" to use the roads to access property located in Section 8. 
With this litigation, Backmans seek access to their legally landlocked property. 
Backmans claim a right to access their property pursuant to condemnation of a private roadway, 
an easement by necessity, a prescriptive easement, or some combination of these theories. 
B. Proceedings Before The District Court. 
On February 24, 2006, Backmans filed a Complaint against Defendants Spagon, Rogers, 
Lloyd, Johnson, Lawrence, Schrader, Millward and POVE, asserting a right to cross over 
Defendants' property to gain access to the Backman Property. R. Vol. I, p. 19. Backmans 
asserted three theories pursuant to which they were entitled to cross over Defendants' properties 
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to access the Backman Property: Prescriptive easement, court declaration of a public road and 
private condemnation. Id. As discovery progressed, Backmans dismissed their claim seeking 
declaration of a public road. R. Ex. Post-Trial Brief filed September 26, 2007~'~ p.3. 
On August 21, 2006, Backmans filed a First Amended Complaint adding additional 
Defendants over whose property Backmans needed to cross to access the Backman Property. 
R. Vol. I, p. 44. The additional Defendants included Gregory and Theresa Zinves, Christopher 
Bessler, Robert and Lynn Walsh, and Patrick and Michelle McKenna. Id. The First Amended 
Complaint alleged new causes of action for access to the Backman Property based upon the 
theory of easement by necessity, as the recorded documents reflected previous common 
ownership between Section 7 and Section 8, and that the partition of Sections 7 and S left the 
Backman Property landlocked. Id. Prior to trial, Victoria Rogers granted an easement to 
Backmans to access the Backman Property over and across her property, and was dismissed from 
the litigation. R. Ex. Post-Trial Brief filed September 26, 2007, p. 3. Dr. and Mrs. Lawrence 
also conveyed an easement over and across their property to the Backman Property. ldZ' 
At the time of trial, Defendant Schrader sought to file a cross-claim against the other 
Defendants. R. Vol. I, p. 173. Schrader is the owner of twenty (20) acres that is adjacent to the 
Backman Property and that Randy Powers ('"Powers") and all other previous owners had 
commonly owned with the Backman Property. Id. The District Court permitted Schrader's 
11 All references to "Post-Trial Brief filed September 26, 2007," refer to the brief filed by Plaintiffs 
following the District Court trial of this matter, and which Brief is also an exhibit to the Clerk's 
Record on Appeal. 
31 Based upon a stipulation between the parties, as is referenced in the District Court's 
Memorandum Opinion (R. Vol. 11, p. 263), a parcel of property owned by the City of Sandpoint 
("City") and located between Baldy Mountain Road and Defendants' properties was excluded 
from the lawsuit because the City has granted access over its property to all parties subject to 
certain restrictions common to all parties. 
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cross-claim against the Defendants to obtain access under the same legal theories, along the same 
routes, and for the same purposes as Backmans. R. Vol. 11, p. 259-60. 
Trial was held from September 4 to September 7, 2007. R. Vol. 11, p. 260. In the post- 
trial briefs, Backmans stated that they "seek a judgment from this Court granting access to their 
Property for use by one (1) residence on each of the twenty (20) acre parcels owned by 
Backmans, for a total of five ( 5 )  residences." R. Ex. Post-Trial Brief filed September 26, 2007, 
p. 4. Backmans limited their access claims to the roads named Turtle Rock RoadJSyringa Creek 
Road, and three of their extensions referred to as the Upper Road, the Middle Road and the 
Lower Road. R. Vol. 11, p. 264.31 Backmans claimed access based upon the following theories: 
1. A prescriptive easement east over Turtle Rock RoadISyringa Creek Road from the 
City property, north over Turtle Rock RoadSyringa Creek Road, and east over either the Upper, 
Middle or Lower Road into Section 8; 
2. A privately condemned easement east over Turtle Rock RoadSyringa Creek 
Road, north over Turtle Rock RoadISyringa Creek Road, and east over either the Upper, Middle 
or Lower Road into Section 8, with just compensation to the landowners; 
3. An easement by necessity east over Turtle Rock RoadISyringa Creek Road, north 
over Turtle Rock RoadSyringa Creek Road, and east over either the Middle or Lower Road into 
Section 8; or 
4. An easement by necessity north of the Lawrence property on Turtle Rock 
RoadSyringa Creek Road, and east over either the Middle or Lower Roads, coupled with either 
a prescriptive easement or privately condemned easement over Turtle Rock RoadISyringa Creek 
Road between the City property and the Lawrence property. 
21 A map of the roads at issue is attached to Appellants' Brief as Exhibit A and is the map 
referenced as part of the District Court's Memorandum Opinion. R. Vol. 11, p. 299. 
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R. Ex. Post-Trial Brief filed September 26,2007, p. 4. 
The District Court filed its Memorandum Opinion on November 14, 2007. R. Vol. 11, 
p. 258. The District Court denied Backmans' claims for prescriptive easement, easement by 
necessity, and to condemn a private roadway over Defendants' properties, and declined to 
combine the theories to provide access to the Backman Property. R. Vol. 11, p. 297-98. 
The District Court entered its Judgment on January 2, 2008, denying Backmans' claims 
for a prescriptive easement, easement by necessity and to condemn a private roadway, and 
dismissed Backmans' and Schrader's claims with prejudice. R. Vol. 11, p. 300-02. The 
District Court awarded Defendants their costs on March 10, 2008. R. Vol. 11, p. 367-68. 
Backmans appeal the District Court's decision denying the Backmans legal access to their 
landlocked property. 
C. Statement Of Facts. 
Backmans own one hundred (100) acres of landlocked property in Bonner County, Idaho. 
R. Ex. Post-Trial Brief filed September 26, 2007, p. 1. McKenna, Bessler, Lawrence, Zirwes, 
Johnson, Lloyd, Grant, Millward, Spagon and Schrader all own property in Section 7 through 
which Backmans seek a right of access. Plaintiffs' Exhibit 46.*' 
Prior to 1904, all of the properties at issue in this dispute in Sections 7 and 8 were owned 
by the United States Government. The property adjoining the Backman Property to the west in 
Section 7 was patented by the United States Government in individuals from 1904 through 1907. 
(Haroldson in December 1904 [Plaintiffs' Exhibit 301; Gould in May 1905 [Plaintiffs' 
4/ All references to "Plaintiffs' Exhibit. . ." refer to those Exhibits offered by Plaintiffs and 
admitted into evidence at the District Court trial of this matter, and which Exhibits are also 
exhibits to the Clerk's Record on Appeal. 
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Exhibit 311; and Fobert in May 1907 [Plaintiffs' Exhibit 201.) Since the time the Backman 
Property was patented by the United States Government, it has been landlocked. Id. 
On September 11, 1907, the United States Government patented the Backrnan and 
Schrader Properties to McKenna. Plaintiffs' Exhibit 2. On August 20, 1908, McKenna 
conveyed the Backman Property to the Humbird Lumber Company ("Humbird"). Plaintiffs' 
Exhibit 3. Until 1943, Humbird owned the Backman and Schrader Properties, as well as portions 
of Section 7. Plaintiffs' Exhibit 22. In 1943, Humbird conveyed its property in Section 7 to 
Modig. Id. The Modig parcel consists of the properties currently owned by Lawrence, Johnson, 
Lloyd, Grant and Millward. Plaintiffs' Exhibit 46. Upon Humbird's conveyance of the 
properties in Section 7 to Modig, the Backman Property remained landlocked. The only access 
to a public road at the time of that severance was through Section 7. Plaintiffs' Exhibit 42. 
The chain of title to the Backman Property in Section 8 is more particularly set forth in 
Exhibit B attached hereto and incorporated herein by this reference. 
The Backman Property is located near Syringa Creek, which drains in a southerly 
direction from Section 7 into Section 8, down a mountainside. R. Vol. 11, p. 260. Syringa Creek 
crosses a small portion of the southwestern corner of the Backman Property as it descends into 
the Pend Oreille River. Plaintiffs' Exhibit 49. 
The Backman Property is steep. An examination of the 1968 United States Geological 
Survey topographical map presented at trial reveals elevation variations of approximately 
1,000 feet within the Backman Property. Plaintiffs' Exhibit 49. Compared to the property to the 
west of Syringa Creek, the Backman Property to the east is steeper and more rugged. R. Vol. 11, 
p. 266. 
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Historically, the Backman Property, as well as the property located in Section 7 to the 
east of the Backman Property were used for logging. R. Vol. 11, p. 260. Logging operations 
created roads that crossed Syringa Creek from the west in Section 7 to the higher ground east of 
Syringa Creek in Section 8. R. Vol. 11, p. 266. The record reflects that roads through Section 7 
provided access to the Backman Property in Section 8 since at least 1933. Plaintiffs' Exhibit 42; 
Tr. p. 342, L. 10-13. 
Turtle Rock Road has been in existence since the 1930s; its exact location over Section 7 
has changed only slightly over the years. Plaintiffs' Exhibit 42. Originally, Turtle Rock Road 
entered Section 7 from Baldy Mountain Road further to the southwest, but was later relocated to 
its current location in the 1950s. Id. Turtle Rock Road runs from the public Baldy Mountain 
Road east across a portion of property owned by the City, and continues east through the 
McKenna, Bessler, Zinves and Lawrence properties. Plaintiffs' Exhibit 46. Turtle Rock Road 
then turns north across the Johnson, Lloyd, Millward, Grant, Spagon and Rogers properties. Id. 
The portion of Turtle Rock Road travelling north from the Millward property to the intersection 
with Inspiration Way and the Upper Road (discussed below) is what the District Court 
referenced as the old Syringa Creek Road. R. Vol. 11, p. 266. 
Heading east into Section 8 from three points along Turtle Rock Road are three branch 
roads that historically provided access to Section 8. Plaintiffs' Exhibits 42,46. These roads are 
designated as the Lower, Middle and Upper Roads. The Lower Road runs northwest from Turtle 
Rock Road over the Lloyd, Johnson and Grant properties into the Backman Property in 
Section 8. Id. The Middle Road runs east from Turtle Rock Road across the Millward and Grant 
properties into the Backman Property in Section 8. Id. The Upper Road runs from the 
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intersection of Inspiration Way and the old Syringa Creek Road east over the Rogers and 
Schrader properties into the Backrnan Property in Section 8. Id. 
Redtail Hawk Road runs off of Turtle Rock Road to the north at an intersection near the 
borders of the Bessler and Zirwes properties. Plaintiffs' Exhibit 46. Redtail Hawk Road was 
constructed some time between 1981 and 1992. Tr. p. 338, L. 17-19. Redtail Hawk Road 
appears in the real property records in 1994 with the recording of a Record of Survey. Plaintiffs' 
Exhibit 27. Redtail Hawk Road intersects with Inspiration Way on the Gillespie property, and 
then heads northeast through the Harris, Marley and Spagon properties. Plaintiffs' Exhibit 46. 
Inspiration Way connects to the Upper Road at the intersection with the old Syringa Creek Road 
on the Rogers property. Redtail Hawk Road and Inspiration Way are private roads under the 
ownership and control of POVE. Plaintiffs' Exhibits 36, 39. 
Between 1958 and 1975, and 1992 and 1998, Turtle Rock Road and the Upper, Middle 
and Lower Roads were used to access the Backman Property for logging. Plaintiffs' Exhibit 42. 
From 1994 to 2004, Turtle Rock Road and the Upper, Middle and Lower Roads were used to 
access the Backman Property for monitoring erosion control and timber growth, hunting, 
camping and other recreational pursuits. Tr. p. 225-27,261-67. 
Powers purchased the Backman Property in 1994 (Plaintiffs' Exhibit 1 I), and extensively 
logged the Backman Property from 1994 to 1996, using Turtle Rock RoadlSyringa Creek Road 
and the three extensions for access. R. Vol. 11, p. 271. Powers continued to maintain and use the 
subject roads in Section 7 after 1996. R. Vol. 11, p. 271-73. Powers testified that he used the 
subject roads to remove certain wooden bridges used in his logging operations. Tr. p. 221, 
L. 18 - p. 222, L. 10. Powers installed a culvert on the Middle Road. Tr. p. 222, L. 17 - p. 223, 
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L. 25. Powers performed "driving maintenance" and periodically graded the roads. Tr. p. 224, 
L. 1-5. He also built a skid trail off of the Middle Road. Tr. p. 224, L. 14-16. 
After 1996, Powers used the Backman Property for recreational purposes, such as hunting 
and camping, continuing to use the subject roads in Section 7 for access. R. Vol. 11, p. 273; 
Tr. p. 225, L. 21 - p. 227, L. 14. Powers continued to use the subject roads until he sold the 
Backman Property to Backmans in 2005. R. Vol. 11, p. 261-62. 
By the 1990s, logging activities declined and landowners in Sections 7 and 8 were selling 
their property to individuals and developers for the purpose of building residences. R. Vol. 11, 
p. 267. The property to the west of Syringa Creek in the east half of Section 7 is divided into 
ten (10) and twenty (20) acre parcels with a single residence on most parcels. Plaintiffs' 
Exhibit 46. The Backman Property and other land in Section 8 remains undeveloped. 
Backmans purchased the Backman Property in 2005 desiring to duplicate the type of 
residences existing in Section 7. R. Vol. 11, p. 259. Backmans subdivided the 100-acre Backman 
Property into five (5) separate parcels of twenty (20) acres each. Id.; Plaintiffs' Exhibit 16. 
Backmans purchased the Backman Property believing they had legal access. Backmans 
purchased a title policy insuring access. R. Vol. 11, p. 287. Backmans commenced this litigation 
after they were prohibited from using the roads in Section 7 to access the Backman Property in 
Section 8, and after their discovery that there was no deeded, recorded legal access to the 
Backman Property. 
Attached hereto as Exhibit A is a map depicting the roads and properties at issue in this 
case. The map is a copy of a portion of Plaintiffs' Exhibit 46. Backmans' counsel has identified 
the roads on the map to aid this Court in its analysis. 
APPELLANTS' BRIEF - Page 8 
1:\1547.11 liAPPEALiAppetlants' Brief 1.doc 
11. 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
A. Easement Bv Necessity. 
Should this Court overturn the Court of Appeals' decision in Roberts v. Swim, 117 
Idaho 9 (Ct.App. 1989), and hold that common ownership in the United States Government 
satisfies the requirement of unity of title for the purpose of establishing a right to an easement by 
necessity? 
B. Private Condemnation. 
Did the District Court err by ruling Backmans were not entitled to condemn an easement 
over and across an existing road on Defendants' property to access the Backman Property? 
C. Prescriptive Easement. 
Did the District Court err by improperly applying obsolete "presumptions" and "burden 
shifting analysis" to Backmans' prescriptive easement claims? 
D. Combination Of Easement By Necessity. Private Condemnation And/or 
Prescriptive Easement. 
Did the District Court err in declining to combine easement by necessity, private 
condemnation andlor prescriptive easement theories to provide Backmans access to the 
landlocked Backman Property? 
E. District Court's Award Of Costs To Defendants. 
Did the District Court e n  by awarding Defendants their costs of litigation? 
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111. 
ARGUMENT 
A. This Court Should Overrule Roberts v. Swim, 117 Idaho 9 (Ct.App. 1989). And Hold 
That Common Ownershia In The United States Government Satisfies The Unity Of 
Title Element For An Easement Bv Necessity Claim. 
At trial, Backrnans sought an easement by necessity to gain access to the Backman 
Property. In denying Backrnans' claim, the District Court made the following rulings: 
The parties agree that, without some access afforded through this 
lawsuit, the one-hundred twenty (120) acres in question in the 
northwest quarter in the northwest quarter of Section 8 are legally 
landlocked. The term "legally" means that the one-hundred twenty 
(120) acres is not served by any public road and has no written 
right of easement access. The one-hundred twenty (120) acres is 
surrounded by ground held in other ownerships. 
At the time of the U.S. Patents, the north half of the northeast 
quarter of Section 7 was within a U.S. Patent of 1905. The 
southwest quarter of the southeast quarter in Section 7 was part of 
a second separate U.S. patent of 1904. The Modig parcel and the 
one-hundred twenty (120) acres in the northwest quarter of 
Section 8 (the Humbird property as of 1943) were in two (2) 
patents as of 1907, separate from the 1904 and 1905 patents. 
Therefore, but for the original common ownership of the United 
States, there has never been a unity of title of common ownership 
for the original Humbird Lumber property in question (the 1907 
patents for the Modig parcel, and for the one-hundred twenty (120) 
acres in the northwest quarter of section 8) and for either the 
property now owned by Spaeons (in the southwest quarter of the 
northeast quarter of the northeast quarter of Section 7; a part of the 
1905 patent) or the property now owned by McKenna's and 
Besslers (in the southwest quarter of the southeast quarter of 
Section 7; a part of the 1904 patent). Defendant Exhibit KK. 
Plaintiffs candidly acknowledge existing Idaho case law indicating 
that unity of title cannot be established by relying upon the original 
ownership of the United States. Roberts v. Swim, 117 Idaho 9 
(Ct.App 1989). Backmans set forth a reasonable legal argument as 
why another rule of law might he better (at least for their purposes 
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in this case). However. this Court will follow existing Idaho case 
law. Easement by necessity as a "stand alone" legal theory, simply 
-
does not apply, because unity of title is lacking as to the properties 
covered by the entire length of the road access necessary to 
physically connect the Backman parcel to Baldy Mountain Road. 
R. Vol. 11, p. 282-83 (emphasis added). 
The District Court ruled that Backmans established unity of title in the United States 
along the entire length of Turtle Rock RoaaSyringa Creek Road, and the three extensions, 
sufficient for an easement by necessity; however, the District Court determined that it was bound 
by the Court of Appeals' decision in Roberts v. Swim and for that reason denied Backmans' 
claim. 
This Court should overrule the Court of Appeals' decision in Roberts v. Swim; hold that 
common ownership in the United States satisfies the unity of title element for an easement by 
necessity; hold that Backmans are entitled to an easement by necessity; and, remand the case 
back to the District Court for a determination as to the scope of the easement. 
1. Common owners hi^ in the United States is Sufficient to Satisfy the Unitv of 
Title Element of an Easement by Necessitv Claim. 
A party claiming an easement by necessity over another's land must prove: 
1) unity of title followed by separation of the dominant and servient estates; 2) necessity of the 
easement at the time of separation; and 3) great present necessity for the easement. Hughes v. 
Fisher, 142 Idaho 474,483 (2006). An implied easement by necessity is grounded in the "sound 
public policy that lands should not be rendered unfit for occupancy or successful cultivation." 
Cordwell v. Smilh, 105 Idaho 71, 79 (Ct.App. 1983) (quoting Burley Brick & Sand Co. v. Cofer, 
102 Idaho 333, 335 (1981)). Idaho has long recognized the principle that where a tract of land is 
conveyed that is separated from the highway by other lands of the grantor or surrounded by his 
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lands or by his and those of third persons, there arises by implication, in favor of the grantee, a 
way of necessity across the grantor's property to the highway. Id. 
An easement by necessity does not depend on use of roadways existing at the time 
of separation. Cordwell, 105 Idaho at 79. An easement by necessity may arise where no roads 
exist across the grantor's property at the time of separation. Id. "Thus, a remote grantee of land 
not being used at the time of severance . . . may nevertheless, when the use becomes necessary to 
the enjoyment of his property, claim the easement under this remote deed." Id. 
A way of necessity arises from public policy considerations. It 
is, literally, a creature of necessity. The necessity must exist at 
the time of the severance by the common owner, and the 
person claiming such an easement must also show there is a 
present necessity for it. Once established, a way of necessity 
exists only so long as the necessity lasts, for it is the policy of 
the law not to burden a servient estate more or longer than is 
necessary. 
Id. An easement by necessity arises by implication to protect and promote the dominant estate 
owner's use and enjoyment of his or her property. Idaho's public policy is against landlocking 
property and in favor of the occupation, cultivation, and full beneficial use and enjoyment of 
land. Hughes, 142 Idaho at 482-83; Burley Brick& Sand Co., 102 Idaho at 335; Cordwell, 
105 Idaho at 79. 
One justification for the easement by necessity is that the 
grantor is "presumed to have intended" to retain or to have 
conveyed to grantees "a means of access to the property in 
question, so that the land may be beneficially utilized." It 
arises "by implied grant" when property is severed in a way 
that leaves part of it landlocked. Another, and perhaps the 
better, iustification is that public policy prohibits land from 
being conveyed away in a manner that renders it useless, and 
the easement by necessity arises to cure that problem. The 
public poiicy iustification for the way of necessity often 
contravenes the intent of the original grantor or grantee; it 
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"ariscs 'to nleet a special emergency. . . in order that no land 
kkfiinggce~sible for the purposcs of cultivation. . . ."' 
[Emphasis added; citations omitted.] Thomuson on Real Proper@, $ 60.03@)(5)(i). 
In Roberts, the case relied on by the District Court to deny Backmans' claims, the 
Court of Appeals dismissed Roberts' claim for an easement by necessity on the grounds that 
Roberts could only prove unity of title in the public. The Roberts court remanded the case to the 
district court to craft more particularized findings with respect to Roberts's prescriptive easement 
claim. Roberts, 117 Idaho at 15. In dismissing Roberts's easement by necessity claim, the Court 
of Appeals stated without any analysis that "Roberts has established only that the land was at one 
time originally under public ownership. Original ownership by the public or state is not 
sufficient to constitute the necessary unity of ownership." Id. (quoting Annot., Unity of Title for 
Easement by Implication or Way of Necessity, 94 A.L.R.3D 502, 517-18 (1979)). The Court of 
Appeals did not explain its citation to the ALR, nor did it give any analysis for its decision. The 
Court of Appeals' statement in Roberts should be overruled. 
First, the Court of Appeals' decision in Roberts was dicta; it was not necessary to 
a resolution of the case. The court remanded the case to determine if a prescriptive easement 
existed and should never have addressed the easement by necessity issue. If a prescriptive 
easement existed, or was found to exist on remand, the "necessity" required for an easement by 
necessity would not exist and the issue of easement by necessity moot. Therefore, the Roberts 
court never needed, and should not have, ruled on the issue of unity of title until the district court 
ruled on the prescriptive easement issue on remand. 
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Second, Idaho's public policy calling for the full use of lands and sound legal 
analysis favors allowing the unity of title element to be satisfied by a showing of common 
ownership in the United States Government. 
Several courts, based on sound legal analysis, have held that common ownership 
by the United States is sufficient to satisfy the unity of title element. Kellogg v. Garcia, 
102 Cal.App.4th 796, 799 (Cal.Ct.App. 2002); Utah v. Andrus, 486 F.Supp. 995, 1002 
(D.Utah 1979); Kinscherff v. US.,  586 F.2d 159, 161 (10" Cir. 1978). 4 Powell on Real 
Property agrees with the holding in those cases as sound public policy. 
The public policy favoring land utilization applies to cases 
where ownership was in the state as well as where the original 
unity of ownership was in a private person. Similarly, the 
bases for attributing to the parties a fictional intent to create 
such an easement are no less present when one of the parties 
was the government. 
4 Powell on Real Property, § 34.07 at 34-59 (2000). 
In Kellogg v. Garcia, the court held that the unity of title element of an easement 
by necessity claim could be proved with evidence of common ownership in the government. 
Kellogg, 102 Cal.App.4th at 799. The court explained that "current case law holds that the 
federal government may be the common owner of the properties whose conveyance gives rise to 
the strict necessity that justifies an easement by way of necessity." Id. In that case, the plaintiff 
was entitled to an easement by necessity to access its private property where the unity of title 
element was proved with evidence of common ownership by the government. Id. at 81 1.  The 
court reasoned that: 
Since an easement by way of necessity is based on the 
presumption that a conveyance seeks to transfer whatever is 
necessary for the beneficial use of that property, there is 
absolutely no reason to impute a different intention to the 
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federal government when conveying western lands (failing an 
expression of intent to the contrary). After all, particularly in 
the 19'~  century-when the West was being settled- the federal 
government has no reason to render the land it conveyed unfit 
for occupancy or cultivation. Quite the opposite. 
Id. at 807 (internal citations omitted) . 
The court in Kellogg also addressed the arguments against unity of title being 
proved with government ownership. The court noted that: 
The opposing concern is that an easement by necessity over 
former federal land would permit every remote grantee of a 
portion of the public domain to have an easement by way of 
necessity over surrounding lands. This argument overlooks the 
special terminability aspect of easements by necessity upon a 
change of circumstances. The changed circumstances 
effectively eliminate the necessity. 
Id. at 808 n. 5 (internal citations omitted). The court found that the public policies and rationales 
behind easements by necessity would not be served by the creation of a "categorical exception" 
for ownership by the federal government. Id. at 808. 
As the court noted in Kellogg, proving unity of title in the government serves the 
purposes of easements by necessity. In addition, the proverbial floodgates will not open if 
government ownership satisfies the unity of title element of an easement by necessity claim. An 
easement by necessity exists only so long as the necessity exists. Even where government 
ownership satisfies the unity of title element of an easement by necessity claim, a claimant will 
not be entitled to an easement by necessity where there is no need for such easement (i.e., where 
the claimant has other legal access to the subject property). A claimant still must prove the other 
required elements for an easement by necessity: Necessity at the time of separation of the 
dominant and servient estates, and great present necessity for the easement. 
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In Utah v. Andrus. the United States District Court for the District of Utah held 
that an easement for access could arise by implication upon a grant of land by the federal 
government. 486 F.Supp. at 1002. There, the court examined whether access could be had to 
school trust land that was granted by the federal government to the State of Utah, but landlocked 
by other federal property. Id. at 999. The court found that the purpose of school trust lands 
granted by the federal government to the states was to provide the states with a revenue source 
from which to support public schools. Id. at 1002. The court reasoned that "unless a right of 
access is inferred, the very purpose of the school trust lands would fail. Without access the state 
could not develop the trust lands in any fashion and they would become economically worthless. 
This Congress did not intend." Id. The court noted that traditional property law theories 
supported a finding of access to the school trust lands. Id The court stated that "under the 
common law it was assumed that a grantor intended to include in the conveyance whatever was 
necessary for the use and enjoyment of the land in question." Id Therefore, in consideration of 
the revenue-producing purpose of school trust lands and the common law policies supporting the 
cultivation and use of landlocked property, the court ruled that the State of Utah and its lessees 
had access to the school trust lands. Id at 101 1. 
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals has also held that the transfer of a patent by 
the United States may give rise to an implied easement for access. Kinscheif v. US., 
586 F.2d 159, 161 (loth Cir. 1978) . 
This Court should also hold that the unity of title element for an easement by 
necessity may be proved with evidence of common ownership by the government. Such a 
holding would promote Idaho's "sound public policy that lands should not he rendered unfit for 
occupancy or successful cultivation." Cordwell, 105 Idaho at 79 (quoting Burley Brick& 
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Sand Co., 102 Idaho at 335). Such a holding would not open the floodgates to every property 
owner seeking an easement by necessity. On the contrary, a claimant would still need to prove 
necessity for the easement at the time of the separation of the dominant and servient estates, as 
well as great present necessity. Hughes, 142 Idaho at 483. Moreover, an easement by necessity 
would only exist as long as there is adequate necessity for the easement. 
2. There is Necessity For the Easement Claimed bv Backmans. 
Backmans proved, and the District Court found, that the properties relevant to this 
litigation were commonly owned by the United States. R. Vol. 11, p. 282. If this Court holds that 
common ownership by the United States is sufficient to establish unity of title, then the 
examination turns to whether necessity for an easement existed at the time of severance and 
whether there is a great present necessity for the easement. 
As noted, above, the District Court made a factual finding that the Backman 
Property is legally landlocked and has always been legally landlocked. R. Vol. 11, p. 268. 
Backmans submit that the District Court's findings are sufficient to establish the "necessity" 
element for an easement by necessity. 
In Cordwell, the Court of Appeals examined the burden of proof for establishing 
the elements of necessity at the time of severance and great present necessity. The court stated 
that a claimant must "establish by competent evidence that the [proposed] route. . . was at the 
time of severance - and still is - the only reasonable means of access to" the claimant's property. 
105 Idaho at 81. The court explained that this burden entailed proof that another route at issue in 
the case "was not reasonably adequate." Id. Mere inconvenience is not sufficient. Id. The court 
stated that in its analysis, "substantial inconvenience may be an important factor, but it must be 
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weighed against the inconvenience and possible damage that could result to the [servient estate 
owners] as a result of imposing an easement across their property." Id. 
Backmans proved their property has always been "legally landlocked" and set 
forth an existing route that had been used for over seventy (70) years to access the Backman 
Property. Backmans proved there has never been legal access to the Backman Property since the 
date the Backman Property was first patented by the United States Government. The 
District Court found the Backman Property was historically and is presently landlocked, and that 
unless the District Court ordered access, the Backman Property would remain landlocked. 
R. Vol. 11, p. 268. This Court should hold that Backmans' proof and the District Court's factual 
findings are sufficient to establish the "necessity" element and hold that Backmans are entitled to 
an easement by necessity over and across Turtle Rock RoaUSyringa Creek Road, and the three 
extensions, onto the Backman Property and remand to the District Court to determine the scope 
of the easement. 
B. The District Court Erred In Denying Backmans' Private Condemnation Claim. 
At trial, Backmans sought legal access to their landlocked property through private 
condemnation. The District Court denied Backmans' claim on the grounds that access to the 
Backman Property was not "reasonably necessary" and that there was evidence of other 
"physical" routes- not legal or available routes- to the Backman Property. R. Vol. 11, 
p. 291-93. The District Court's rulings were in error and the case should be remanded. 
In Idaho, there is a two part test to determine if access can be condemned by a private 
party. Erickron v. Amoth, 99 Idaho 907, 910 (1979). First, a party must establish that the 
condemnation is for a public purpose. Second, condemnation of an access must be 
reasonably necessary, in that there are no other reasonably convenient and adequate routes that 
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can be used to access the property. Id. If these elements are satisfied, the court should determine 
the scope of access to be condemned and compensation. 
Article I, Section 14 of the Idaho Constitution provides that private property may be 
taken for a public use, which includes any "use necessary to the complete development of the 
material resources of the state, or the preservation of the health of its inhabitants, is hereby 
declared to be a public use and subject to the remlation and control of the state." 
[Emphasis added.] The Idaho Legislature adopted Idaho Code § 7-701 defining, pursuant to the 
Idaho Constitution, the public uses for which condemnation could and should be utilized. 
Idaho Code § 7-701 provides that the "right of eminent domain may be exercised in behalf of the 
following public uses: . . . Bvroads, leadine. from highways to residences and farms." 
[Emphasis added.] Idaho Code 5 7-701(5). Idaho courts have specifically endorsed a private 
party's right to condemn a right-of-way from a public highway to landlocked residences and 
farms. Ericlwlon v. Amoth, 99 Idaho 907 (1979) ; McKenney v. Anselmo, 91 Idaho 118 (1966); 
Eisenbarth v. Delp, 70 Idaho 266 (1950); Cordwell v. Smith, 105 Idaho 71 (Ct.App. 1983) . 
Idaho Code § 7-704 states that before a taking of a right of access can occur, ihe access 
must be necessary. Idaho courts have interpreted this statute to mean that a col~denlnor owning 
other properties abutting public roads must prove strict necessity for the access. Cordwell, 
105 Idaho at 80. On the other hand, a condemnor whose property is legally landlocked must 
prove only the requested access is reasonable necessity for a taking. Id.; Erickson, 
99 Idaho at 910. 
In this case, the District Court ruled that condemning access to the Backman Property so 
that one (I) residence (house) could be built on each of the five (5) 20-acre parcels was not 
reasonably necessary. R. Vol. 11, p. 297. In making that ruling, the District Court confused the 
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stated two part test and improperly focused on whether the intended use of the Backman 
Property was "reasonably necessary7'- not whether access to the Backman Property was 
reasonably necessary for the public purpose. This was in error. 
Idaho law unequivocally provides that if the use of the property for which access is 
sought is for residences, it is a public purpose. Idaho Code 9 7-701(5). The District Court 
should have focused on whether access was reasonably necessary to get to the proposed 
residences - not whether the use of the Backman Property for residences was necessary. The 
District Court should have only decided whether there was any other access into the property that 
would preclude condemnation of an easement. 
In finding that Backmans' proposed development is not "reasonably necessary," the 
District Court noted that the Backman Property is currently vacant land and that Backmans 
desired to build more than one (1) residence on the Backman Property. R. Vol. 11, p. 291-92. 
Idaho Code § 7-701(5) , however, is not limited to providing access to existing residences. 
In fact, such a limitation would be illogical. A claimant is not able to build a residence without 
access. To limit Idaho Code 5 7-701(5) to permit access to only existing residences would be to 
condone trespass for the purposes of building residences on vacant property. Further, 
Idaho Code 5 7-701(5) states that byroads to "residences," not the singular "residence," is a 
public use justifying condemnation. Backmans' proposed use of the Backrnan Property is no 
more invasive and no more dense than the use of Defendants' properties in Section 7; both 
Section 7 and Section 8 would contain single family residences on ten (10) to twenty (20) acre 
parcels. 
Idaho public policy supports the cultivation and occupancy of lands and is against leaving 
properties landlocked. Cordwell, 105 Idaho at 79 (quoting Burley Brick& Sand Co., 
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102 Idaho at 335). Backmans proved that they intended to utilize their property for residences, 
an acknowledged public purpose, and sought an easement for that purpose. Their stated purpose 
is allowed under Idaho law. The only question left for the District Court to decide was whether 
there was alternative access, compensation - which the District Court never reached - and the 
scope of the easement - which the District Court never reached. 
1. There Are No Alternative Routes Available to Access the Backman Property. 
The District Court also denied Backmans' claim to condemn an easement because 
it characterized Redtail Hawk RoadIInspiration Way as an "available altemate route." R. Vol. 11, 
p. 294. The District Court erred in determining that Redtail Hark Road/Inspiration Way is an 
alternative route that is available to Backmans because the record conclusively establishes that 
the route is not available to Backmans. 
As is set forth above, a condemnor must prove that alternative means of access 
are not available or are not reasonably adequate or sufficient for the condemnor's purposes. 
Erickson, 99 Idaho at 910. Idaho courts have denied condemnation claims based on available 
altemate routes where a condemnor had a license to use an alternate route, Erickson, 
99 Idaho at 910; where a condemnor had a legal right-of-way for ingress and egress that was 
"reasonably convenient," Eisenbarth, 70 Idaho at 270; and where a condemnor did not have an 
easement over two alternative existing roads, but had never been denied the right to use them, 
McKenney, 91 Idaho at 122. 
In Cordwell, an easement by necessity case, the court analogized the standard 
used for establishing necessity in an easement by necessity case to the standard employed in 
cases seeking private condemnation. Cordwell, 105 Idaho at 80. The court in Cordwell quoted 
from Erickson, 99 Idaho at 910, in stating that "the burden of proving necessity for taking land is 
APPELLANTS' BRTEF - Page 21 
1:\1547.11 iWPEALMppellants' Brief i.doc 
upon the condemnor, but he need only prove a reasonable and not an absolute, [sic] necessity.. . . 
It was then incumbent upon [claimants] to prove that the alternative means of access were not 
available to them or that such means of access were not reasonably adequate or sufficient for 
their purposes." Id. In Cordwell, the court found that the claimant had reasonable alternative 
access justifying the court's denial of claimant's easement by necessity claim. I05 Idaho at 81. 
There, the alternative access consisted of a series of public roads that circumvented the property 
the claimant sought to condemn. Id. at 81. 
In all of the cases discussed above, alternative access was legally available to the 
claimant. In this case, however, the uncontroverted evidence was that Backmans are barred from 
using Redtail Hawk Road. Defendants have not advocated, and do not advocate, Redtail Hawk 
Road as an available alternative access to the Backman Property. The evidence produced at trial 
was that Defendants maintained Redtail Hawk Road as a private road. Plaintiffs Exhibits 36, 39. 
The Defendants owning property along Redtail Hawk Road who testified at trial all testified that 
Redtail Hawk Road and Inspiration Way are private roads. Tr. p. 301, L. 17-25, p. 302, L. 1-3; 
p. 453, L. 9-23, p. 463, L. 9-25, p. 562, L. 15-25, p. 563, L. 1-5, p. 617, L. 11-21. Moreover, 
Defendants have explicitly prohibited Backmans' use of Redtail Hawk Road by recording 
instruments in the public record and by sending correspondence to Backmans. Plaintiffs' 
Exhibits 36-41. 
This Court has never characterized access that a claimant is barred from using as 
"reasonable alternative access." Such a holding would contravene the strong public policy of the 
State of Idaho against landlocked property. Thus, the District Court's characterization of Redtail 
Hawk Road as available alternative access is a misapplication of Idaho law. 
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C. At Trial, The District Court Erred As A Matter Of Law Bv Misapplying 
"Presumptions" Not Relevant to Backmaus' Prescriptive Easement Claim. 
Backmans presented evidence to the District Court sufficient to satisfy the elements of a 
prescriptive easement claim. Backmans proved that Powers's use of Turtle Rock RoadlSyringa 
Creek Road, and the three extensions, was open and notorious, continuous and uninterrupted, 
adverse and under a claim of riglit, with the actual and imputed knowledge of the owners in 
Section 7 for over five (5) years. The District Court correctly recognized the basic elements of a 
prescriptive easement claim, but misapplied numerous presumptions not relevant to the facts in 
the record and denied Backmans' prescriptive easement claim. 
1. This Court Disfavors the Use of "Presumptions" and "Burden Shifting" in 
Prescriptive Easement Cases. 
This Court recently decided two prescriptive easement cases in which certain 
"presumptions" were applied. Beckstead v. Price, ID S.Ct. June 17, 2008 (see, Addendum, 
w); Hughes v. Fisher, 142 Idaho 474 (2006) . In both Beckstead and Hughes, this Court 
emphasized a need for courts to focus "simply on whether the five prescriptive easement 
elements have been satisfied based on the facts before them," rather than focusing on whether 
certain presumptions applied, burdens shifted, and whether burdens were met considering the 
application of multiple presumptions. Beckstead, p. 6; Hughes, 142 Idaho at 481. Thus, rather 
than engaging in a cumbersome analysis of various presumptions that may arise in light of the 
evidence, the Court in Beckstead and Zfughes simply considered whether the elements of a 
prescriptive easement had been proved. 
As in Beckstead and Hughes, the District Court in this case engaged in a 
cumbersome analysis utilizing several presumptions to reach its decision. As is set forth herein, 
the District Court improperly applied those presumptions and improperly shifted the burden of 
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proof. This Court, therefore, should remand the District Court's decision to the District Court for 
a decision as to whether Backmans presented evidence sufficient to prove the elements of a 
prescriptive easement claim without resort to obsolete "presumptions." 
2. The District Court Erred in Characterizing Powers's Use of the Roadways in 
Ouestion After 1996 as "Public." 
The District Court ruled that Powers (Backmans' predecessor-in-interest) 
conducted an "extensive and fairly continuous logging operation" on the Backman Property Erom 
1994 through 1996 by way of access from Turtle Rock RoadISyringa Creek Road, and the three 
extensions. R. Vol. 11, p. 273-274. The District Court, however, characterized Powers's use of 
the roadways in question after 1996 as "public" and, therefore, not "open and notorious." Id. 
While not stated in the District Court's decision, the District Court appears to apply the "public 
use exception." The District Court, however, did not make any findings that persons besides 
Powers used the subject roadways after Powers's purchase of the Backman Property in 1994. 
The District Court made no finding that the "public" was using the roadways in question. The 
District Court's findings were in error. 
In Hughes, the Court reviewed the district court's application of the "public use 
exception" to a prescriptive easement claim. Hughes, 142 Idaho at 481. The Iiughes Court 
explained that the "public use exception" pertains to the prescriptive easement element that the 
owner of the servient estate has actual or imputed knowledge of the claimant's use. Id. 
The Court quoted Hall v. Stuawn, 108 Idaho 11 1, 112 (Ct.App. 1985): 
Where, as here, the same degree of use upon which the adverse 
claim is based has been exercised indiscriminately by the 
general public, individual acquisition of prescriptive easements 
has generally been held impossible. In such a case, the 
claimant must perform some act whereby the adverse nature of 
the claim is clearly indicated to the owner of the servient estate. 
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Id. The Court reasoned that a claimant must somehow differentiate its use of the claimed 
easement from the use made of the easement by the general public as a matter of common sense 
and fairness. Id. The Court explained that "[wlhen the claimant is using the land along with 
members of the general public, it would simply be unfair to impute knowledge to the landowner 
that the claimant is making an adverse claim." Id. 
The Court noted the testimony at trial that evidenced that use of the claimed 
prescriptive easement by the public was "common knowledge," "common practice," and that 
"everybody did it." Hughes v. Fisher, 142 Idaho at 481-82 (2006). The easement was regarded 
as "neighborhood access" to a ski mountain. Id. at 482. The Court held that "the district court's 
finding that there was public use of the path was based on substantial and competent 
evidence. . ." The Court reasoned that once public use of the easement is established, a claimant 
must present evidence of some "independent act signifying the adverse claim to the owner." 
Id. at 482. 
Here, the District Court erred in characterizing Powers's use of Turtle Rock Road/ 
Syringa Creek Road, and the three extensions, after 1996 to get to his own private property as 
use by the "public." The District Court incorrectly focused on Powers's use of his property and 
not his use of the easement. There was no evidence presented of any person other than Powers 
using the roadways after 1994. Thus, there was no evidence of any "public use" to which the 
District Court could compare Powers's use in determining whether or not Powers's use was, in 
fact, of a public nature. 
As the Court's analysis in Hughes directs, application of the public use exception 
must be predicated upon some findings as to the use of the subject property by members &the 
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general public. Hughes, 142 Idaho at 481-82. It is only upon a finding of use by the general 
public that corresponds with the claimant's use that the burden then shifts to the claimant to 
prove some independent act indicating to the owner that the claimant is making an adverse claim 
to the subject property. Id. at 482. In the case at hand, there is an absence of any evidence, let 
alone evidence that could be characterized as substantial and competent, supporting the 
District Court's finding that Powers's use of Turtle Rock RoadSyringa Creek Road, and the 
three extensions, was "public" or that the "public" used the road. 
Further, even if evidence of use by the public had been presented, the 
uncontroverted evidence regarding Powers's use proves that, unlike members of the public at 
large, Powers used Turtle Rock RoadSyringa Creek Road, and the three extensions, in a unique 
manner - to access his private property, now the Backman Property. In Hughes, members of the 
public had used the path to access property that was open to the public- the ski mountain. 
Hughes, 142 Idaho at 481-82. There was no evidence in the record that members of the general 
public were using the subject roads to access someone else's private property or any public 
property. 
The District Court improperly focused on the nature of Powers's use of the 
Backman Property, rather than his use of Turtle Rock RoadSyringa Creek Road and the three 
extensions. The public use exception applies to the requirement that a servient owner have 
actual or imputed knowledge of a claimant's adverse claim.# Hughes, 142 Idaho at 481. The 
test for establishing a prescriptive easement can focus only on the use a claimant makes of the 
servient owner's property, not his own property. To hold otherwise would impose a burden on a 
31 As noted, above, the District Court appears to have applied the public use exception to the open 
and notorious element of a prescriptive easement claim. R. Vol. 11, p. 273-74. Later in the 
Memorandum Opinion, however, the District Court applied the public use exception to the 
elements of notice to the sel-vient owner and adverse and hostile use. R. Vol. 11, p. 274. 
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servient owner to discover activities occurring outside the boundaries of his or her property. 
Powers's use of his own property is relevant only to the determination of the scope of the 
prescriptive easement once it has been held to have been created. Gibbens v. Weisshaupt, 
98 Idaho 633, 638 (1977). The District Court's consideration of Powers's end use of the 
Backman Property to make a finding concerning Powers's use of Turtle Rock RoadISyringa 
Creek Road, and the three extensions, was in error. 
3. The District Court Erred in Applying the Wild and Unenclosed Lands 
Presumption in Finding That Use of Turtle Rock RoadISvringa Creek Road, 
and the Three Extensions, Prior to Powers's Ownership Was Permissive. 
Under Idaho law, if a claimant establishes use that is open, notorious, continuous 
and uninterrupted for the statutory period, even without evidence of how the use of a claimed 
easement began, the use by the claimant is presumed adverse. Wood v. Hoglund, 13 1 Idaho 700, 
702-03 (1998). The District Court ruled that use of the claimed easement by Powers and his 
predecessors was permissive. The District Court made that finding not by looking at any 
evidence of how the use of the roadways in question began, but by applying presumptions that 
were not applicable. 
The District Court ruled that "at least prior to the 1990s, the Court finds that the 
relevant portions of the Syringa Creek drainage consisted of wild and unenclosed land." 
R. Vol. 11, p. 278. Thus, the District Court applied the rebutlable presumption that use of wild 
and unenclosed land is permissive. Id. Applying this presumption, the District Court stated: 
Because the land in question was essentially open to anyone, 
and was freely and openly used by members of the general 
public; and because a logging operation, in and of itself, and 
particularly in wild and unenclosed timberlands, does not 
establish an adverse use; there is insufficient evidence in this 
record of independent, decisive acts indicating separate and 
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exclusive use of Syringa Creed Road by owners of the one- 
hundred twenty (120) acres in Section 8 sufficient to rebut the 
presumption of permissive use. 
Id. The District Court's focus on the use of Turtle Rock Roadsyringa Creek Road, and the three 
extensions, prior to 1994 - prior to Powers's ownership of the Backman Property - is in error. 
The fact that the lands in Sections 7 and 8 were wild and unenclosed prior to the 1990s is 
irrelevant to the determination as to whether Powers's use from 1994 satisfied the elements of a 
prescriptive easement claim. 
Where an alleged easement crosses wild and unenclosed lands, there is a 
rebuttable presumption that use of such lands is permissive, and the burden of proving adversity 
with evidence of "independent, decisive acts" shifts to the claimant. Hodgins v. Sales, I39 Idaho 
225, 232 (2003). Here, the District Court applied the wild and unenclosed lands presumption 
and found that any use prior to Powers's use was permissive. The District Court limited its 
finding, however, stating that the wild and unenclosed lands presumption would only apply prior 
to the 1990s. R. Vol. 11, p. 278. After the 1990s, Section 7 was being privately developed and 
was not wild and unenclosed. Thus, when Powers bought the Backman Property in 1994, the 
wild and unenclosed lands presumption would not apply. 
The District Court relied upon its finding that the relevant lands in the Syringa 
Creek drainage were wild and unenclosed prior to the 1990s to hold that Powers's use of Turtle 
Rock RoadISyringa Creek Road, and the three extensions, commenced as a permissive use. 
Such reliance is in error. Use of Turtle Rock Roadsyringa Creek Road, and the three 
extensions, after 1990 cannot be presumed to be permissive. This Court should reverse the 
District Court's decision and remand the case for a determination as to whether Powers's use of 
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the subject roads after 1994 satisfied the elements of a prescriptive easement claim, free of the 
application of any presumptions. 
4. The District Court Erred in Aaplving the Common Use Rule in Determining 
That Use of Turtle Rock RoadISvrin~a Creek Road, and the Three 
Extensions, Prior to Powers's Use Was Permissive. 
The District Court erred in applying the common use rule to determine that any 
use of Turtle Rock RoadISyringa Creek Road, and the three extensions, was permissive prior to 
Powers's purchase of the Backman Property in 1994. The District Court cited Melendez v. Hintz, 
111 Idaho 401 (Ct.App. 1986), for the proposition that "where a road has been built on the 
servient estate, and then used by the dominant estate, such common use is not adverse." 
R. Vol. 11, p. 279. The District Court's application of the common use rule on the facts of this 
case is in error. 
The Melendez reasoning does not apply to the facts of this case. Melerzdez 
involved a neighbor's claim for a prescriptive easement over the owner's driveway. 11 1 Idaho 
at 138. The Court of Appeals cited to Simmons v. Peukins, 63 Idaho 136 (1941), for the 
proposition that "the rule would seem to be that where the owner of real property constructs a 
way over it for his own use and convenience, the mere use thereof by others which in no way 
interferes with his use will be presumed to be by way of license or permission." Id. at 140. 
The Court of Appeals in Melendez explained this presumption of permissive use in an effort to 
define the limits of its application. The Court of Appeals reasoned: 
There should be no presumption that the use originated 
adversely to the owner unless the use itself constitutes some 
invasion or infringement upon the rights of an owner. Where 
one person merely uses a roadway in common with his 
neighbor, without damage to the roadway, without interfering 
with the neighbor's use of the roadway, and where the 
neighbor has established and maintained the roadwav on his 
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property for his own purposes, only the most minimal intrusion 
is made into the owner's dominion over his property. 
Id. at 141 (emphasis added) . 
Here, there is no evidence that the owners in Section 7 constructed the roads in 
Section 7 for their own benefit. The District Court did not make any findings as to the original 
purpose for the construction of the roads in Section 7. In fact, the District Court stated that "the 
history of the spur road construction is vague," and that "whether the roads were built to log 
Section 7 first and then extended to Section 8 is a logical assumption, but only an assumption." 
R. Vol. 11, p. 279. The common use finding that gives rise to a presumption of permissiveness is 
predicated upon a finding that an owner has constructed roads for its own convenience on its 
own property. Melendez, 11 1 Idaho at 140. Although the District Court stated that it may be 
"logical" to assume that the roads were built to log Section 7 first, and thus for the convenience 
of Section 7 first, such a finding would be merely an assumption. Thus, the opposite could be 
true; that the roads were built first to log Section 8. The fact that Turtle Rock RoadlSyringa 
Creek Road, and the three extensions, may have later been used by owners in Section 7 and 
Section 8 are not sufficient facts that give rise to application of the rule that common use is 
presumptively permissive use. Rather, there must be a finding that the roads were established 
first for the convenience ofthe owner of the servient estate. 
For these reasons, the District Court's finding of common use is unsupported by 
the evidence in the record. This Court should reverse the District Court's decision and remand 
the case for a determination as to whether Backmans proved the elements of their prescriptive 
easement claim, free of the application of any assumptions. 
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5. Backmans Proved the Elements of Their Prescriptive Easement Claim. 
The record contains ample evidence to support a finding that Powers's use of 
Turtle Rock Road/Syringa Creek Road, and the extensions, was open and notorious, continuous 
and unintempted, adverse and under a claim of right, with the actual and imputed knowledge of 
the owners in Section 7 for at least five (5) years. 
Powers's use was open and notorious. The requirement that use be "open and 
notorious" serves to afford the owner ofthe servient estate reasonable notice to challenge the use 
of the servient estate owner's properly. 4 Powell on Real Property, 5 34.10[2][fJ (2000). The 
use must be sufficiently open and notorious that a reasonable person would have discovered its 
occurrence. Id. 
Following the initial logging operation (which the District Court did find was 
open and notorious [R. Vol. 11, p. 16]), Powers continued to maintain and use the roads accessing 
the Backman Property. Powers testified that he did a lot of "driving maintenance" on the roads 
and periodically graded them. Tr. p. 224, L. 1-5. The State of Idaho required Powers to remove 
the wooden bridges over Syringa Creek from the Lower and Middle Roads. In order to pull the 
bridges out, Powers hauled in a backhoe. Tr. p. 221, L. 20 - p. 222, L. 10. Powers also planted 
willows in the slide area. He testified that for approximately one year, he would use the roads 
twice a week to access the Backman Property to water the willows. Tr. p. 226, L. 14-17. 
Powers also installed a culvert on the Middle Road after the end of the initial 
logging operation. Powers testified that he installed the culvert because "I wanted to be able to 
drive onto the property through that middle road." Tr. p. 223, L. 24-25. Approximately one and 
one-half year after the initial logging operations, Powers built a skid trail off of the Middle Road 
into the northeast corner of his property. Tr. p. 224, L. 14-16. He testified that he brought in his 
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bulldozer to build this skid trail from the Middle Road all of the way into Section 8. Tr. p. 224, 
L. 14 -p. 225, L. 3. 
Powers testified that he used the roads to access the Backman Property to burn 
slash piles and to monitor erosion control measures he had implemented. Tr. p. 226, 
L. 11 - p. 277, L. 14. Beyond logging, Powers continued to use Turtle Rock RoaaSyringa Creek 
Road, and the three extensions, to access his property for recreational pursuits until he sold it. 
Tr. p. 261. L. 18 - p. 264, L. 23. Powers routinely picked berries, hunted on the property and 
also camped on the property on at least two occasions. T. p. 225, L. 17 -p. 226. L. 10. 
He testified that from 1996 to 2004 he hunted white-tail deer on the Backman Property. 
Tr. p. 262, L. 16 - p. 262, L. 13. He also hunted grouse on the property intermittently during late 
fall each year. Tr. p. 263, L. 14-17. Powers testified that from 1998 to 2004, he would visit the 
Backman Property at least once per month. Tr. p. 264, L. 18-23. 
The same evidence supporting characterization of Powers's use of Turtle Rock 
RoaaSyringa Creek Road, and the three extensions, as open and notorious supports a finding 
that Powers's use was contiuuous and uninterrupted for the statutory period. "For a use to be 
'continuous' does not mean that it must be 'constant.' . . ." 7 Thomvson on Real Property, 
$60.03(b)(6)(viii) at 477 (1994). "Continuity requires use often enough to provide notice to the 
potential servient owner, and 'uninterrupted' means that the use is not 'interrupted by the act of 
the owner of the land or by voluntary abandonment by the party claiming the right."' Id. 
Powers's testimony supported the continuity of his use of Section 7 to access the Backman 
Property and that his use was not interrupted for over five ( 5 )  years. 
The evidence in the record also supports a finding that Powers's use was adverse 
and under a claim of right. Adverse use "under a claim of right" refers to "use without 
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recognition of the rights of the owner of the servient estate." West v. Smith, 95 Idaho 550, 557 
(1973). In Hodgins, the Supreme Court stated that the analysis must focus on the nature of the 
claimant's use of the subject property. Hodgins, 139 Idaho at 231-32. Powers's trial testimony 
regarding his use of Turtle Rock Roadsyringa Creek Road, and the three extensions, supports a 
finding that this use was without recognition of the right of the owners in Section 7. Powers 
believed he had a right to use the roads in Section 7 and acted accordingly. 
The owners in Section 7 had actual and imputed knowledge that Powers claimed a 
right to use Turtle Rock Roadsyringa Creek Road, and the three extensions. The actual or 
imputed knowledge of the owner of the servient estate requirement is closely related to the 
requirement that the use be open and notorious. In essence, the owner must either have 
"knowledge and acquiescence" or the use must be sufficiently "open, notorious, visible, and 
uninterrupted that howledge will be prestuned." 7 Thomoson on Real Property, 
5 60.03@)(6)(viii) at p. 445 (1994). Indeed, the District Court seemed to analyze jointly whether 
Powers's use was open and notorious, with the actual or imputed knowledge of the owner of the 
servient estate. 
Powers testified that he told Dr. Lawrence that he would be bringing in equipment 
when he started working on the roads in Section 7. Tr. p. 255, L. 12-19. Powers unloaded all of 
the heavy equipment he used for road work and logging on Dr. Lawrence's property. Tr. p. 213, 
L. 15 -p. 215, L. 15. Powers also introduced himself to Mr. Sowders, who lived near Syringa 
Creek Road in the northern part of Section 7. Tr. p. 253, L. 8-14. These owners certainly had 
actual knowledge of Powers's use of the roads in Section 7. Regarding Powers's use of land in 
Section 7 owned by others, the record contains sufficient evidence to impute knowledge based 
on Powers's extensive use and maintenance of the roads across Section 7. Again, the evidence 
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showing that Powers's use was open and notorious should also be applied to find that Powers's 
use of Turtle Rock RoadlSyringa Creek Road, and the three extensions, was with the actual or 
imputed knowledge of the owners in Section 7. 
For the reasons set forth herein, this Court should remand the case to the District 
Court with instructions that it refrain from applying any presumptions and determine whether the 
evidence in the record supports a finding that Backmans proved the elements of their prescriptive 
easement claim. 
D. The District Court Erred In Failine To Combine Easement By Necessity. Private 
Condemnation And/or Prescriptive Easement Theories To Provide Access To The 
Landlocked Backman Property. 
The District Court erred in declining to combine easement by necessity, private 
condemnation andlor prescriptive easement theories to provide Backmans with access to the 
landlocked Backman Property. The District Court did not cite to any authority prohibiting the 
combination of legal theories to provide access. The District Court stated simply that "the Court 
declines to apply a combination of the three theories of the plaintiff to provide an access where 
no access can be established under a single theory." R. Vol. 11, p. 297-98. The District Court 
erred in declining to combine easement by necessity and prescriptive easement theories because, 
contrary to the District Court's reasoning, such a combination would not impermissibly expand 
the scope of either theory. In addition, the District Court erred in analyzing only whether 
Backmans could combine the theories of prescriptive easement and easement by necessity. The 
District Court should have also considered private condemnation, and whether that theory could 
be combined with an easement by necessity to provide the best and most reasonable access to the 
Backman Property. 
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The Backman Property was landlocked when the United States Government patented the 
land and remained landlocked when Humbird owned the Backman Property and sold its adjacent 
lands. In 1943, Humbird conveyed its lands in Section 7 to Modig. Plaintiffs' Exhibit 22. The 
District Court stated that "[all1 parties agree that, at the very most, the easement by necessity 
claim for Section 8 is limited to crossing the Modig parcel (in the east half of the east half of 
Section 7). Because of the unity of title requirement, easement by necessity fails as to the 
McKenna and Bessler properties in the southwest quarter of the southeast quarter of Section 7." 
R. Vol. 11, p. 295-96. Thus, the District Court found that there was unity of title in the Modig 
parcel in Section 7 and the Backman Property in Section 8 until Humbird sold the Modig parcel 
in 1943. As the District Court notes, the McKenna and Bessler properties were never included 
within the Modig parcel. Therefore, an easement by necessity premised on the unity of title in 
Humbird would not afford access across the properties presently owned by Defendants Bessler 
and McKennas. However, access across these properties could be provided by either a 
prescriptive easement or by private condemnation. 
In declining to "bridge the gap" between the Modig parcel and the public Baldy 
Mountain Road with a prescriptive easement, the District Court cited to Roberts v. Swim for the 
proposition that "easement by necessity is based upon the severance of a parcel from a common 
ownership parcel that deprives the severed parcel of legal access to a public road." R. Vol. 11, 
p. 296 (citing 117 Idaho 9 [Ct.App. 19891). The District Court continued by stating that 
"[wlhen Humbird sold the Modig parcel in 1943, the Modig parcel did not have direct access 
upon a public road. The access out to Baldy Mountain Road would only be prescriptive, and, on 
this record, for logging only." R. Vol. 11, p. 296. The District Court appears to have declined to 
combine an easement by necessity over the old Modig parcel with a prescriptive easement over 
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the McKenna and Bessler properties based on its determination that such combination would 
improperly expand the scope of both theories. Id. Easement by necessity would be improperly 
expanded because there was no public road providing access to the Modig parcel. Prescriptive 
easement would be improperly expanded because a prescriptive easement, if it existed, would be 
limited to logging, and Backmans claimed a prescriptive easement for access to residences. 
First, the District Court's refusal to combine easement by necessity and prescriptive 
easement theories is in error. The District Court's citation to Roberts does not accurately state 
the law applicable to easements by necessity. A public road need not exist at the time of 
severance of the dominant and servient estates. The portion of Roberts cited by the District 
Court cites to Cordwell v. Smith, 105 Idaho 71 (Ct. App. 1983) . Cordwell stated that: 
[Tlhe existence of a way of necessity does not depend upon what 
use the common owner was making of the roads existing at the 
time of severance. Such easement could arise even if at the time of 
severance there was no road across the mantor's wrowerty to the 
part conveyed. Thus, a remote grantee of land not being used at 
the time of severance-as in the present case-may nevertheless, 
when the use becomes necessary to the enjoyment of his property, 
claim the easement under this remote deed. 
105 Idaho at 79 (emphasis added) . Easement by necessity does not depend on the existence of 
access from the Modig parcel to a public road. Therefore, combination of easement by necessity 
with a prescriptive easement over the McKenna and Bessler properties would not impermissibly 
expand the scope of an easement by necessity. For the reasons set forth in the section analyzing 
Backmans' prescriptive easement claim, whether the facts in the record supporl Backmans' 
prescriptive easement claim, as well as the scope of such easement, would be determined upon 
remand of the case to the District Court, 
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Second, the District Court erred in failing to consider whether a combination of easement 
by necessity and private condemnation would provide the best and most reasonable access to the 
Backman Property. For the reasons set forth, above, the District C o w  could find an easement 
by necessity over the old Modig parcel. Private condemnation is reasonably necessary as the 
Backman Property is landlocked. Based upon the trial testimony of Dr. Folsom and the 
Backman Roads Investigation, there was no historical access road to the Backman Property, 
except through Section 7. Plaintiffs' Exhibit 42. For the reasons set forth in the section 
analyzing Backmans' private condemnation claim, there is no alternative access avaiIable to 
Backmans. 
Defendants did not present and the District Court did not cite any authority requiring 
access to property to be confined to a single legal theory. A combination of legal theories to 
provide access would not be unprecedented as people frequently travel some combination of 
public roads, private roads, easements and licenses to reach their properties. This Court should 
reverse the District Court's decision declining to combine the theories of easement by necessity, 
prescriptive easement andlor private condemnation, and hold that combining theories to provide 
access is permissible. The case should then be remanded to the District Court for a 
determination as to the theories that should be used and the scope of the access based on the facts 
and circumstances ofthis case. 
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IV. 
CONCLUSION 
The Backman Property is landlocked and at the mercy of the adjacent landowners who 
have rehsed to grant Backmans an easement. Public policy in Idaho supports the use of 
property. The Disttict Court erred in denying Backmans' easement by necessity, private 
condemnation and prescriptive easement claims. The District Court also erred in declining to 
combine such theories to provide access to the Backman Property. This Court should reverse the 
District Court's decision and hold that Backmans are entitled to a prescriptive easement or 
easement by necessity, or to condemn an easement to access their landlocked property. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 26" day of August 2008. 
MEULEMAN MOLLERW LLP 
w- 
Attornevs For Auwellants 
Bob Backman a;& Rhonda Backman 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
Docket No. 33473 
M. DALE BECKSTEAD and GAYLE ) 
BECKSTEAD, husband and wife, ) 
) 
Plaintiffs-Counterdefendants- Respondents, ) Pocatello, April 2008 Term 
) 
v. ) 2008 Opinion No. 84 
BLAINE PRICE, JOANN PRICE, LAZY E., j Filed: June 17,2008 
LLC, an Idaho limited liability company, and ) 
JOHN DOES 1-10, ) Stephen W. Kenyon, Clerk 
) 
Defendants-Counterclaimants-Appellants. ) 
Appeal from the District Court of the Sixth Judicial District, State of Idaho, 
Oneida County. Hon. Don L. Warding, District Judge. 
District court order on prescriptive easement, affirmed in part, vacated in part and 
remanded. 
Lowell N. Hawkes, Chtd., Pocatello, for appellants. Lowell N. I-lawkes and Ryan 
Scott Lewis argued. 
Maguire & Kress, Pocatello, for respondents. David R. Kress and Matthew Luke 
Kinghorn argued. 
BURDICK, Justice 
Appellants Blaine Price, JoAnn Price, Lazy E., LLC, and John Does 1-10 (collectively 
the Prices) appeal a district court order which decrees the existence of a prescriptive easement 
over their land in favor of Respondents M. Dale and Gayle Beckstead. On appeal, the Prices 
raise several issues including whether the district court erroneously concluded the Becksteads 
have a prescriptive easement, whether the determination of the scope of the easement was 
erroneous, and whether the Prices' right to due process was violated. We affirm in part, vacate 
in part, and remand. 
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
The Becksteads own approxilnately 760 acres of land (the Beckstead Property) in Oneida 
County. The Becksteads purchased the Beckstead Property in 1996. The Prices own two parcels 
of property: the Price Property and the Frederickson Property. Off of the paved highway, there is 
a road that runs across the Price Property and the Frederickson Property and then connects to the 
Beckstead Property. The road is not a driveway, but leads to a fork in the road that turns right 
into the driveway going to the Prices' residence or left up to the Beckstead Property. 
The Becksteads and the Prices had a friendly relationship until about 2001. After some 
contentious encounters and trouble with gates that the Prices placed on the road, the Becksteads 
initiated a quiet title suit. After a three-day court trial, the district court ruled the Becksteads met 
the prescriptive easement requirements. The Prices appeal. 
11. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
A determination that a claimant has established a prescriptive easement involves 
entwined questions of law and fact. Hughes v. Fisher, 142 Idaho 474,479, 129 P.3d 1223, 1228 
(2006). When this Court reviews a lower court's decision, it determines whether the evidence 
supports the findings of fact and whether the findings of fact support the conclusions of law. 
Anderson v. Larsen, 136 Idaho 402,405, 34 P.3d 1085, 1088 (2001). "A trial court's findings of 
fact in a bench trial will be liberally construed on appeal in favor of the judgment entered, in 
view of the trial court's role as trier of fact." Id. Findings of fact based on substantial and 
competent evidence will not be overturned on appeal even in the face of conflicting evidence. 
Benninger v. DeriJeld, 142 Idaho 486, 489, 129 P.3d 1235, 1238 (2006). It is the province of 
the district court to weigh conflicting evidence and testimony and to judge the credibility of the 
witnesses. Id. 
"[Wle exercise free review over the lower court's conclusion of law to determine whether 
the trial court correctly stated the applicable law, and whether the legal conciusions are sustained 
by the facts found." Anderson, 136 Idaho at 406,34 P.3d at 1089. 
111. ANALYSIS 
The Prices argue that the Becksteads failed to establish they acquired a prescriptive 
easement and that the scope of the easement granted is excessive. The Prices also argue the 
district court erred by failing to award them contribution and by ordering the locking and 
removal of various gates. The Prices further argue they were denied due process and that the 
district court entered an erroneous order when considering the Becksteads' second contempt 
motion. Both parties assert they are entitled to an award of attorney fees on appeal. We address 
each issue in turn. 
A. Existence of the Prescriptive Easement 
After the district court's grant of summary judgment to the Becksteads, the Prices moved 
for reconsideration. The district court decided it would consider the information submitted 
during the trial before ruling on the motion for reconsideration. After the three-day court trial, 
the courl made written factual findings and concluded as a matter of law that based on those 
findings, the Becksteads had a prescriptive easement. The Prices contend the facts do not 
support a conclusion that the Becksteads have established any of the prescriptive easement 
elements. 
The requirements for a prescriptive easement have been clearly established in Idaho: 
A party seeking to establish the existence of an easement by prescription 
"must prove by clear and convincing evidence use of the subject property, which 
is characterized as: (1) open and notorious; (2) continuous and uninterrupted; (3) 
adverse and under a claim of right; (4) with the actual or imputed knowledge of 
the owner of the servient tenement (5) for the statutory period." Hodgins v. Sales, 
139 Idaho 225, 229, 76 P.3d 969, 973 (2003). The statutory period in question is 
five years. I.C. 5 5-203; Weaver v. Sfafford, 134 Idaho 691, 698, 8 P.3d 1234, 
1241 (2000). A claimant may rely on his own use, or he "may rely on the adverse 
use by the claimant's predecessor for the prescriptive period, or the claimant may 
combine such predecessor's use with the claimant's own use to establish the 
requisite five continuous years of adverse use." Hodgins, 139 Idaho at 230, 76 
P.3d at 974. Once the claimant presents proof of open, notorious, continuous, 
uninterrupted use of the claimed right for the prescriptive period, even without 
evidence of how the use began, he raises the presumption that the use was adverse 
and under a claim of right. Wood v. Hoglund, 131 Idaho 700, 702-03, 963 P.2d 
383, 385-86 (1998); Marshall v. Blair, 130 Idaho 675, 680, 946 P.2d 975, 980 
(1997). The burden then shifts to the owner of the servient tenement to show that 
the claimant's use was permissive, or by virtue of a license, contract, or 
agreement. Wood, 131 Idaho at 703,963 P.2d at 386; Marshall, 130 Idaho at 680, 
946 P.2d at 980. The nature of the use is adverse if "it runs contrary to the 
servient owner's claims to the property." Hodgins, 139 Idaho at 231, 76 P.3d at 
975. The state of mind of the users of the alleged easement is not controlling; the 
focus is on the nature of their use. Id. at 231-32,76 P.3d at 975-76. 
Akers v D.L. White Consru., Inc., 142 Idaho 293,303, 127 P.3d 196,206 (2005). "A prescriptive 
right cannot be obtained if the use of the servient estate is by permission of the landowner." 
Brown v. Miller, 140 Idaho 439, 443, 95 P.3d 57, 61 (2004) (quoting Wood, 131 Idaho at 702, 
963 P.2d at 385). 
The Prices assert the district court should have only considered the continuous and 
uninterrupted use of the roadway by Dale Beckstead; the Prices argue Gayle is not an owner of 
the property and that her use or the use of any other nonowners cannot he used to establish the 
prescriptive easement. However, this argument ignores the extensive body of Idaho law that 
considers various users of the easement to the degree they show the easement was being used by 
the landowner. See, e.g., Benninger, 142 Idaho at 490, 129 P.3d at 1239 (use by visitors and 
emergency service providers); Anderson, 136 Idaho at 406,34 P.3d at 1089 (use by neighbor and 
his grandson, who were hired to cut grass on the property). 
An easement "is the right to use the land of another for a specific purpose that is not 
inconsistent with the general use of the property by the owner." Luce v. Marble, 142 Idaho 264, 
273,127 P.3d 167,176 (2005) (quoting Abbolt v. Nampa Sch. Dist. No. 131, 119 Idaho 544,548, 
808 P.2d 1289, 1293 (1991)) (internal quotations omitted). The district court found the 
Becksteads used the land for recreational purposes, for grazing cattle, and for making 
improvements to the Beckstead Property. Those types of uses will naturally include ingress and 
egress for visitors and people hired to perform work on the property. Thus, the district court did 
not err by considering the use of nonowners to the degree those nonowners showed use of the 
easement by the landowner. 
The district court found that the Becksteads continuously used the property each year 
from 1996 through 2005, that the Becksteads at no time sought permission to use the road, and 
that nearly all the use of the road can be observed from the Prices' residence. It is the province 
of the district court to weigh conflicting evidence and testimony and to judge the credibility of 
the witnesses. Benninger, 142 Idaho at 489, 129 P.3d at 1238. Here, the judge's weighing of 
evidence and judgment on the credibility of the witnesses resulted in a favorable judgment for 
the Becksteads. Though the Prices presented conflicting evidence, there is trial testimony that 
sufficiently supports the district court's findings. Therefore, we hold the district court's factual 
findings were supported by substantial and competent evidence. Next, we must determine 
whether the factual findings support the conciusions of law. 
The district court concluded the Becksteads established they had a prescriptive easement 
"for the purpose of ingress and egress to the Beckstead Property." "A party seeking to establish 
the existence of an easement by prescription 'must prove by clear and convincing evidence use 
of the subject property, which is characterized as: (1) open and notorious; (2) continuous and 
uninterrupted; (3) adverse and under a claim of right; (4) with the actual or imputed knowledge 
of the owner of the servient tenement (5) for the statutory period."' Akers, 142 Idaho at 303, 127 
P.3d at 206 (quoting Hodgins, 139 Idaho at 229,76 P.3d at 973). 
The factual findings support a conclusion that the Becksteads' use of the road was open 
and notorious, continuous and uninterrupted,' with the actual knowledge of the Prices, and for 
the statutory period. Thus, the Becksteads raised the presumption their use was adverse. See id. 
The burden then shifted to the Prices to show that the Becksteads' use was permissive, or by 
virtue of a license, contract, or agreement. See id. (citing Wood, 131 Idaho at 703, 963 P.2d at 
386; Marshall, 130 Idaho at 680, 946 P.2d at 980). The district court determined the Prices 
failed to present any "credible evidence that any person ever obtained or received permission 
from [the Prices] . . . ." It was for the district court to determine the credibility of the witnesses, 
Benninger, 142 Idaho at 489, 129 P.3d at 1238, and there is substantial and competent evidence 
in the record to support a determination that the Becksteads never asked for nor received 
permission to use the road. The factual findings by the district court sufficiently support its 
conclusion that the Becksteads acquired a prescriptive easement. 
The Prices nonetheless put forth other theories to support their contention that the 
Becksteads did not show their use was adverse and under a claim of right. 
1. The Hunter Rule 
First, the Prices argue there was evidence the Becksteads' predecessors used the road by 
permission. The Prices assert once there is permissive use, the use continues to be presumed 
permissive unless there is unequivocal conduct which gives the servient estate owner notice of 
hostile and adverse use and cite to Hunter v. Shields, 131 Idaho 148, 152, 953 P.2d 588, 592 
(1998). We need not get to Hunter because here there was no evidence the Becksteads' 
predecessors used the road by permission. 
Shirlee Ward and her husband (the Wards) owned the Beckstead Property from 1980 to 
1996. The Wards accessed the Beckstead Property from 1980 to 1985 without any leased 
interest on land surrounding the Beckstead Property and without asking or receiving permission. 
Between 1985 and the early 1990s the Wards leased the Price Property; the Wards never leased 
the Frederickson Property. The Wards stopped leasing the Price Property in 1993 but continued 
to access the Beckstead Property. 
' The Prices claim because the Becksteads' use was only seasonal, it was not continuous and uninterrupted. First, 
the cases cited by the Prices do not support their contention because they are factually dissimilar. See Brown, 140 
Idaho at 443,95 P.3d at 61; Anderson, 136 Idaho at 406, 34 P.3d at 1089. Second, it is generally accepted that the 
"continuous and unintempted" element does not require daily use or even monthly use. 25 Am. Jur. 2d Easements 
Thus, there is evidence that during the time of the lease, the Wards had permission to use 
the road to access the Price Property. However, prior to the lease, during the lease, and after the 
lease, the Wards also owned the Beckstead Property and used the road to access that parcel of 
land. There is no evidence showing the lease of the Price Property gave them permission to use 
the road to access the Beckstead Property. Nor was there evidence that the road running through 
the Price Property and the Frederickson Property was ever used permissively to access the 
Beckstead Property. There is only evidence that there was permission to use the road to access 
the Price Property, and here the Price Property is not the dominant estate. Hence, this evidence 
does not show the claimant's use was permissive. 
2. Use in Common 
Second, the Prices argue that the Becksteads' use was merely in common with the Prices 
and thus, a permissive use presumption arises rather than an adverse use presumption. In Idaho, 
the adverse use presumption has been rebutted by evidence of "use of a driveway in common 
with the owner and the general public, in the absence of some decisive act on the user's part 
indicating a separate and exclusive use . . . ." Marshall, 130 Idaho at 680, 946 P.2d at 980 
(quoting Simmons v. Perkins, 63 Idaho 136, 144, 118 P.2d 740,744 (1941)) (emphasis removed); 
see also Hughes v. Fisher, 142 Idaho 474,481, 129 P.3d 1223, 1230 (2006). 
A second exception to the adverse use presumption has been applied in Idaho: when "a 
landowner 'constructs a way over [the land] for his own use and convenience, the mere use 
thereof by others which in no way interferes with his use will be presumed to be by way o f .  . . 
permission."' Hughes, 142 Idaho at 481, 129 P.3d at 1230 (quoting Simmons, 63 Idaho at 144, 
118 P.2d at 744) (alteration in original). In Hughes, the parties cited these exceptions and argued 
over whether the presumptions applied, whether the burdens shifted, and whether the latter 
exception applies when the owner did not construct the way over the land. Id. This Court held 
those two rules were simply an approach to determining whether the claimant had met the 
elements for a prescriptive easement by clear and convincing evidence. Id. The Court stated a 
desire to "disentangle Idaho prescriptive easement law" and "emphasize[d] the need for courts to 
streamline their analysis by focusing simply on whether the five prescriptive easement elements 
have been satisfied based on the facts before them." Id. Here, the district court found that the 
and Licenses $ 61 (2004). The acquisition of a prescriptive easement requires continuous use "according to the 
nature of the use and the needs of the claimant." Id. 
Becksteads did not seek or obtain permission from the Prices to use the road and that the Prices 
recognized the Becksteads' right to use the road. There was evidence the Becksteads' use of the 
road was adverse and under a claim of right. To the degree there was conflicting evidence, it 
was the province of the district court to weigh that evidence. Benninger, 142 Idaho at 489, 129 
P.3d at 1238. The district court's findings are supported by substantial and competent evidence. 
Therefore, we hold the district court correctly concluded based on the facts before it that 
the Becksteads met all of the prescriptive easement elements, and we affirm the district court's 
conclusion that the Becksteads have a prescriptive easemenL2 
B. Scope of the Easement 
The Prices argue the scope of the easement is excessive as to uses and number of people. 
The Prices argue the easement does not cover the use of certain types of vehicles, that the 
easement does not extend to people invited by the Becksteads to the Beckstead Property, and that 
Gayle Beckstead does not own the property and thus, cannot have a prescriptive easement. 
Recognizing that "[plrescription acts as a penalty against a landowner[,]" this Court has 
stated prescriptive rights "should be closely scrutinized and limited by the courts." Gibbens v. 
Weisshaupt, 98 Idaho 633,638, 570 P.2d 870,875 (1977). The scope of a prescriptive easement 
is fixed by the use made during the prescriptive period. Elder v. Northwest Timber Co., 101 
Idaho 356, 359, 613 P.2d 367, 370 (1980); Gibbens, 98 Idaho at 638, 570 P.2d at 875 (quoting 
Bartholomew v. Staheli, 195 P.2d 824, 829 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1948)). The holder of the 
prescriptive easement "may not use it to impose a substantial increase or change of burden on the 
servient tenement." Gibbens, 98 Idaho at 638, 570 P.2d at 875 (quoting Bartholomew, 195 P.2d 
at 829). 
As to use, the Prices assert that during the prescriptive period there was no continuous 
use of the various means of transportation named in the Becksteads' complaint: trucks, campers, 
livestock trailers, four-wheelers, pedestrian traffic, and heavy equipment needed to improve the 
Thus, it is unnecessiuy to decide whether the district court's grant of summary judgment to the Becksteads was 
procedurally proper. Below, the court granted summary judgment to the Becksteads as to the existence of the 
prescriptive easement. However, after the Prices' motion to reconsider, the court allowed the issue to go to trial and, 
based on findings made alter the hial, the district court concluded the Becksteads established the existence of a 
prescriptive easement. We affirm the decision the district wurt made after the trial; consequently, the issue of 
whether summary judgment was procedurally proper is moot. See Webb v. Webb, 143 Idaho 521, 524, 148 P.3d 
1267, 1270 (2006) (holding an issue is moot when a favorable judicial decision would not result in any relieo. 
Beckstead Property. In the past, this Court has not required the scope of the easement specify 
particular vehicles or types of vehicles that can use the easement; rather, we have characterized 
easement uses as residential, agricultural, or recreational. See Brown, 140 Idaho at 443-44, 95 
P.3d at 61-62. Thus, the scope of the easement should include any reasonable means of 
transportation for the character of use made during the prescriptive period. 
The district court found the Becksteads used the easement during the prescriptive period 
for recreational purposes, for grazing purposes, and for making improvements to the Beckstead 
Property. This conclusion is supported by substantial and competent evidence in the record. 
Though the district court gave specific examples of which vehicles might use the road for the 
purposes of recreation, grazing cattle, and making improvements, it did not express an intention 
to limit the scope to those means of travel. We affirm the district court's finding that the 
easement can be used for recreational purposes, grazing purposes, and for making improvements. 
Furthermore, we clarify that the use of the easement is not limited to any specific vehicles or 
types of vehicles and that the easement covers the use of any vehicles that would reasonably be 
used to access the Beckstead Property for egress and ingress, recreating, grazing cattle, or 
making improvements. 
As to number of people, the Prices argue the district court erred by stating the easement 
"extends to all of the Plaintiffs [sic] invitees . . . ."3 Instead, the Prices believe the district court 
should have ordered the Becksteads to give the names of everyone that will visit the Beckstead 
Property. 
There is a difference between easements appurtenant and easements in gross. West v. 
Smith, 95 Idaho 550,556,511 P.2d 1326, 1332 (1973). An easement appurtenant is attached to a 
dominant tenement. Id. A person does not hold an easement in gross by virtue of ownership in a 
particular parcel of land; rather, an easement in gross is a personal right to use the land of 
another. Id. An easement in gross is not assignable and applies to specific people and not to 
guests or assignees. Id. Contrarily, an easement appurtenant "serves the owner of the dominant 
estate in a way that cannot be separated from his rights in the land." Hodgins, 139 Idaho at 230, 
A review of the trial transcript shows that "invitee" was used broadly by the district court and the parties 
throughout trial to indicate any person the Becksteads invite to their property, whether to perform work or as a social 
guest. Therefore, the easement extends lo guests of theBecksteads coming to the property'for recreational purposes, 
grazing purposes, or to improve the property, and it is unnecessary to remand in order to determine whether the 
easement applies to invitees and licensees as defined by law. 
76 P.3d at 974. When such an easement is created, "it becomes fixed as an appurtenance to the 
real property, which is subject to the prescriptive use and may be claimed by a successor in 
interest." Id. "In cases of doubt, Idaho courts presume the easement is appurtenant." Id. 
Here, the easement the Becksteads acquired is not personal but is an easement 
appurtenant that serves the owner of the dominant estate in a way that cannot be separated from 
his rights in the land-it provides access to the Beckstead Property. Therefore, it is not 
necessary that the district court name specific people who can use the roadway to access the 
Beckstead Property. The quantity of people using the easement to access the Beckstead Property 
is not limited by names of people, but is limited by the swpe of the easement. To the degree the 
use of the easement may begin to exceed the use made during the prescriptive period, the parties 
can then litigate whether there has been an unlawful increase in the use of the easement. As 
described in the district court's order, the declared scope of the easement does not exceed the use 
made during the prescriptive period. 
Therefore, it is not necessary that the district court name the individuals that will use the 
easement, nor is it necessary that this Court "reverse the prescriptive easement granted to Gayle 
Beckstead." The evidence the Becksteads presented established a prescriptive easement; the 
prescriptive easement is appurtenant to the Beckstead Property and, thus, is attached to the land 
and not to  individual^.^ 
Nonetheless, because the district court did not set out the width and length of the 
easement, we remand the case back to the district court. "[Ilt is well settled under Idaho law that 
any judgment determining the existence of an easement must also specify the character, width, 
length and location of the easement. This Court does not hesitate to remand cases because of an 
inadequacy in the district court's description of an easement." Schneider v. Howe, 142 Idaho 
767, 774, 133 P.3d 1232, 1239 (2006) (internal citations omitted). On remand it will not be 
necessary for the district court to specify the character of the easement, since it has already done 
so. The determination of the width and length of the easement should take into account the 
factual findings already made by the district court as those findings are supported by substantial 
and competent evidence. Those findings include that during the prescriptive period the 
Moreover, regardless of whether Gayle is an actual owner of the Beckstead Property, we note that Dale clearly 
owns the land and, thus, had standing to bring the quiet title suit. See Tungsten Holdings Inc., v. Drake, 143 Idaho 
Becksteads used the easement for trucks, camper trailers, livestock trailers, four-wheelers, and 
transportation of necessary equipment and materials to make improvements on the Beckstead 
Property and to the Frederickson road including a dump truck and grader. 
In conclusion, we hold the district court did not err in pronouncing the scope of the 
easement to be used for recreational purposes, grazing cattle purposes, and to make 
improvements on the Beckstead Property. We also hold it is not necessary that the district court 
order the Becksteads to provide names of everyone that will use the easement to access their 
property. Finally, we remand the case to the district court for the limited purpose of setting out 
the width and length of the easement. 
C. Contribution for Maintenance 
The Prices counterclaimed for contribution for their maintenance of the roadway. On 
appeal, the Prices contend the district court erred in failing to consider their contribution claim 
and that they are entitled to an award of contribution. 
The owner of the servient estate does not have a duty to maintain the easement. Walker 
v. Boozer, 140 Idaho 451,455,95 P.3d 69,73 (2004). The owner of the dominant estate has the 
duty to maintain the easement even when the servient estate landowner uses the easement. Id. at 
456, 95 P.3d at 74. "That duty requires the easement owner maintain, repair, and protect the 
easement so as not to create an additional burden on the servient estate or an interference that 
would damage the land, such as flooding of the servient estate." Id. However, the dominant 
estate owner's duty to maintain does not require the dominant estate "to maintain and repair the 
easement for the benefit of the servient estate." Id. When a servient estate owner seeks 
contribution they must show the dominant estate owner's maintenance created an additional 
burden or an interference that would damage the servient estate. Id. 
[Albsent a showing that the easement owners' maintenance of the easement 
created an additional burden or interference with the servient estate, the servient 
estate cannot dictate the standard by which the easement should be maintained, 
expend funds to maintain it to the level desired by the servient estate and then 
seek reimbursement for those expenditures and contribution for future 
expenditures from the easement owners. 
Id. 
69, 72, 137 P.3d 456,459 (2006) ("Only the owner of the dominant estate has standing to quiet title to an easement 
appurtenant to that estate."). 
There was evidence presented throughout the trial that the Prices expended money to 
maintain the road. However, the Prices fail to make any arguments or point the Court to any 
evidence showing the Becksteads' maintenance or lack thereof created an additional burden or 
an interference causing damage to the Prices' land. The district court found the Becksteads 
maintained the road and this is supported by testimony given throughout the trial.' Since the 
Prices fail to show the Becksteads' maintenance of the road created an additional burden or 
interference with the servient estate causing the Prices to then perform maintenance, we hold the 
Prices are not entitled to contribution for their maintenance of the road. 
D. Gates 
The Prices argue the district court erred in ordering the Prices to replace their wire gates 
with metal swing gates, in ordering the locking of the front gate, and in ordering that a certain 
gate be removed. 
This Court has affirmed district court orders preventing the servient estate from 
constructing or maintaining gates in a way which interferes with or limits the use of the 
prescriptive easement by the dominant estate. See Lovitt v. Robidearn, 139 Idaho 322, 328-29, 
78 P.3d 389, 395-96 (2003); Gibbens, 98 Idaho at 640, 570 P.2d at 877. In Gibbens, this Court 
held it was proper to impose on the dominant estate owners the expense of constructing and 
maintaining gates necessary to protect the easement. Id. at 640, 570 P.2d at 877. However, 
Gibbens does not require that all expenses associated with gates on the easement be absorbed by 
the dominant estate owners. Rather, Gibbens looked at the specific facts of the case. See id. ("It 
would seem proper in this case to require" the dominant estate to construct and maintain the 
necessary gates). In Lovitt, this Court looked at whether the district court's order preventing the 
servient estate from limiting the use of the easement by a locked gate was reasonable. 139 Idaho 
at 328, 78 P.3d at 395. The Court noted the servient estate owner may choose to construct a gate 
across an easement hut "[uJse of a gate, or any other method of regulating an easement, by the 
owner of the servient estate must, however, be reasonable." Id. There, the district court's 
Thus, the Prices' contention that the Becksteads have not maintained the easement lacks merit. Furthennore, there 
is no support for the Prices' contention that maintenance of an easement requires the dominant estate owners to 
insure or pay taxes on the easement. See Sinnett v. Werelus, 83 Idaho 514, 520, 365 P.2d 952, 955 (1961) (it is 
necessaxy to pay taxes in order to adversely possess land, hut paying taxes is not necessary in order to acquire an 
easement). 
finding of reasonableness was affirmed when it was supported by substantial and competent 
evidence. Id. at 329,78 P.3d at 396. 
The district court's order includes the following: 
The Court does recognize that the [Prices] do have a right to protect and 
use their property, and as such the [Prices] may construct those gates which are 
necessary for the use of the [Prices'] land. However, hased on the facts, it is 
evident that the gate the [Prices] have placed near the gate leading to the 
Beckstead Property has no purpose hut to harass and make it more difficult for the 
[Becksteads] to access their property. As such the [Prices] [are] hereby 
ORDERED to remove the gate. 
Furthermore, it is evident that the high tension wire gates with the spikes 
in the posts that the [Prices] have placed on the road serve no purpose other than 
to harass and prevent the [Becksteads] from accessing their land and since there 
has been no showing that a high tension wire gate is better than a metal swing 
gate, it is ORDERED that these wire gates he removed and metal swing gates he 
placed in their stead. Also the [Prices] may not lock these gates unless they 
provide a key to the [Becksteads]. 
Finally, in order to prevent access or use of the road by those who are not 
parties or invitees of the parties, the parties shall at shared expense place a gate at 
the place where the road leaves the public highway, with a combination lock, 
which will remain locked at all times. The parties may share the code with their 
invitees. 
Though the order does not specify which party must replace the high tension wire gates 
with metal swing gates, apparently the Prices understood it was their responsibility to do so and 
complied with the order. On appeal, the Prices argue they should not have had to hear the 
expense of replacing the gates. However, the district court based its directive on finding that the 
Prices' placed the high tension wire gates on the road in order to harass the Becksteads and 
prevent them from using the easement to access their land. There is substantial and competent 
evidence to support this finding. Therefore, we hold ordering the Prices to replace the high 
tension wire gates with swing gates was reasonable. 
The Prices contend that the district court's order that "the gate the [Prices] have placed 
near the gate leading to the Beckstead Property" be removed was hased on post-trial facts and 
thus, was not an issue at trial. Blaine Price acknowledges this gate was constructed just a few 
days afier the trial was completed. The existence of the gate was brought to the district court's 
attention in the Becksteads' written proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law. This 
memorandum was filed June 30, 2006, after the Prices filed their proposed findings of fact and 
conclusions of law. However, the Prices filed supplemental findings of fact and conclusions of 
law on July 12, 2006, as well as a written closing argument. Though the Prices address issues 
surrounding gates, they did not respond to the Becksteads' allegation that they had constructed a 
new gate after trial. Below, the Prices failed to raise the issue of whether the district court should 
consider the post-trial allegation that they built a new gate. Therefore, they have waived the 
right to raise this issue on appeal. See Combs v. Kelly Logging, 115 Idaho 695, 698, 769 P.2d 
572,575 (1989) (issues cannot be raised for the first time on appeal). 
Finally, the Prices argue the district court erred in ordering that the gate placed where the 
road leaves the public highway be locked at all times. The Prices assert this order is erroneous 
because no party asked that those gates be locked at all times and because in the winter it is 
difficult to open and close the gates and thus, preferable to leave the gate open. The district 
court's order regarding this gate and that it remained locked does not indicate on which factual 
findings it is based. There is no evidence in the trial transcript indicating the parties had 
problems with people using the road that were not invited by either the Prices or the Becksteads. 
Therefore, we vacate the portion of the order stating that this gate must remain locked at all 
times. 
E. Due Process 
The Prices assert the easement claimed by the Becksteads is void as an unlawful taking in 
violation of due process. The Prices argue that because there was a taking, they are entitled to 
compensation. 
The U.S. Constitution provides that private property shall not be taken for public use 
without just compensation. U.S. Const. amend. V. The Fifth Amendment is made applicable to 
the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. Texaco, Inc. v. Short, 454 U.S. 516, 523, n.11 
(1982). The Idaho Constitution provides that "[plrivate property may be taken for public use, 
but not until a just compensation, to be ascertained in the manner prescribed by law, shall be paid 
therefor." Idaho Const. art. I, 5 14. 
The Prices do not assert their property has been taken for public use and the evidence 
would not support any such assertion. Rather, the Prices quote the Fifth Amendment and state 
"Defendants contend herein that a private individual has an even gveater right to be protected by 
due process from any taking without compensation." There is no support that the acquisition of 
a private easement as between private parties requires the sewient estate owner be compensated, 
and we do not now adopt any such rule. 
The Prices do not make any argument that their due process rights were violated other 
than by their failure to receive compensation for the easement. Nonetheless, we note that they 
were afforded an opportunity to he heard in a timely manner. See Powers v. Canyon County, 108 
Idaho 967,969,703 P.2d 1342,1344 (1985). 
F. Contempt Motion 
The Prices argue the district court's minute entry and order regarding the Becksteads' 
second contempt motion should be reversed. In September 2006, the Becksteads made a motion 
to hold the Prices in contempt. At the hearing, the parties stated they had reached a temporary 
agreement and would pursue mediation. In April 2007, the Becksteads made another contempt 
motion. In May 2007, the district court entered a minute entry and order stating that it heard 
testimony on the second motion and that for the time being certain locks were to be removed and 
that there were to be no rocks or anything else blocking the roadway. The district court then 
stated that it would go up to the property, view the road, decide whether any gates or fences were 
to be removed, and render a written decision. It is the May 2007 order mandating that certain 
locks were to be temporarily removed that the Prices seek to have reversed. 
However, in June 2007, the district court entered a subsequent order denying the second 
motion for contempt. It held that the Becksteads failed to comply with the requirement that their 
motion for non-summary contempt be supported with an affidavit specifying facts alleging the 
violations of the court's orders. There is nothing to indicate the May 2007 minute entry and 
order is still in effect after the district court entered its order ultimately denying the motion. The 
final order on the Becksteads' April 2007 contempt motion dismissed the motion and, thus, was 
decided in favor of the Prices. Here, the ultimate order is not adverse to the Prices and, 
therefore, is not reviewable. See De Los Santos v. J.R. Simplot Co., Inc., 126 Idaho 963, 969, 
895 P.2d 564, 570 (1995) (stating this Court does not review an alleged error on appeal unless 
the record discloses an adverse ruling forming the basis for the assignment of error). 
Additionally, whether the district court erroneously entered the minute entry and order is moot. 
See Webb, 143 Idaho at 524, 148 P.3d at 1270 (noting an issue is moot when a favorable judicial 
decision would not result in any relief). 
Therefore, we decline to consider whether the May 2007 minute entry and order should 
be reversed. 
G. Attorney Fees on Appeal 
Both the Prices and the Becksteads request an award of attorney fees on appeal pursuant 
to I.C. $ 12-121. That statute allows an award of "reasonable attorney's fees to the prevailing 
party . . . ." I.C. $ 12-121. Attorney fees are awarded to the prevailing party if "the Court 
determines that the action was brought or pursued frivolously, unreasonably or without 
foundation." Baker v. Sullivan, 132 Idaho 746, 751, 979 P.2d 619, 624 (1999). An award of 
attorney fees under this statute is appropriate if the appeal simply invites this Court "to second- 
guess the trial court on conflicting evidence." Hogg v. Wolske, 142 Idaho 549, 559, 130 P.3d 
1087, 1097 (2006). 
Many of the Prices' arguments are without basis and merely invite this Court to second- 
guess the trial court on conflicting evidence. However, since we remand the case based on the 
district court's failure to state the dimensions of the easement, the Prices' appeal was not entirely 
frivolous. Therefore, we decline to award either party attorney fees on appeal. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
We affirm the district court's decision that the Becksteads acquired a prescriptive 
easement and that the scope of that easement is for the purposes of ingress and egress, recreation, 
grazing cattle, and making improvements to the Beckstead Property. However, we remand the 
case to the district court for the limited purpose of determining the dimensions of the easement. 
Additionally, we hold the Prices were not entitled to contribution for their maintenance of the 
easement. We affirm the district court's order regarding the Prices' removal and replacement of 
various gates, but we vacate the portion of the order stating the gate to be placed near the 
highway always remain locked. We further hold the Prices were not denied due process and 
decline to address the issue regarding the district court's minute entry. Finally, we decline to 
award either party attorney fees on appeal. Costs to Respondents. 
Chief Justice EISMANN and Justices W. JONES, HORTON and KIDWELL, J., pro tem, 
CONCUR. 
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SUMMARY 
Landowners brought a quiet title action against their 
neighbors, asserting an easement by necessity over 
defendants' property. The trial court entered judgment 
in favor of defendants, ruliug that an easement of 
necessity could not arise, since the common owner of 
the two properties when they were originally 
conveyed was the federal government. (Superior 
Court of Calaveras County, No. CV23054, John E. 
Martin, Judge.) 
The Court of Appeal reversed the judgment and 
remanded with directions to the trial court to enter a 
new judgment that plaintiffs had an easement by 
necessity across defendants' property. The court held 
that plaintiffs established the requisite conditions for 
an easement by necessity across defendants' property, 
since they established that there was a strict necessity 
for the right-of-way, and that the dominant and 
servient tenements were under the same ownership at 
the time of the conveyance giving rise to the 
necessity. Plaintiffs established that the federal 
government originally conveyed both parcels of land, 
and the court held that a way of necessity may arise 
from lands that were originally owned and conveyed 
by the federal government. Plaintiffs also established 
a strict necessity for the right-of-way, since the 
evidence showed their property was landlocked at the 
time of the original conveyance, and that the 
necessity continued to exist at the time of trial. 
(Opinion by Kolkey, J., with Sims, Acting P. I., and 
Raye, J., concurring.) 
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A patent is a grant made by a government that 
confers on an individual fee simple title to public 
lands, the official document of such a grant, or the 
land so granted. 
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Questions of fact concern the establishment of 
historical or physical facts; their resolution is 
reviewed under the substantial evidence test. 
Questions of law relate to the selection of a rule; their 
resolution is reviewed independently. Mixed 
questions of law and fact on appeal concern the 
application of a rule to facts and the consequent 
determination whether the rule is satisfied. If the 
pertinent inquiry into a mixed question of fact and 
law requires application of experience with human 
affairs, the question is predominantly factual, and its 
determination is reviewed under the substantial 
evidence test. If, by contrast, the inquiry requires a 
critical consideration, in a factual context, of legal 
principles and their underlying values, the question is 
predominantly legal, and its determination is 
reviewed independently. 
[See 9 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (4th ed. 1997) Appeal, 
9 319.1 
(3J Easements and Licenses in Real Property 9 6-- 
Easements--Creation--Ways of Necessity. 
An easement by way of necessity arises by operation 
of law wl~en it is established that (1) there is a strict 
necessity for the right-of-way, as when a claimant's 
property is landlocked, and (2) the dominant and 
servient tenements were under the same ownership at 
the time of the conveyance giving rise to the 
necessity. A way of necessity is of common law 
origin, and is supported by the rule of sound public 
policy that lands should not be rendered unfit for 
occupancy or successful cultivation. A way of 
necessity is the result of the application of the 
presumption that, whenever a party conveys property, 
he or she conveys whatever is necessary for the 
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beneficial use of that property, and retains whatever 
is necessary for the beneficial use of land he or she 
still possesses. The legal basis of a way of necessity 
is the presumption of a grant arising from the 
circumstances of the case; this presumption of a 
grant, however, is one of fact, and whether a grant 
should be implied depends upon the terms of the deed 
and the facts in each particular case. The law never 
imposes an easement by necessity contrary to the 
express intent of the parties, since it is based on an 
inferred intent arising from the strict necessity of 
access for the conveyed property. A way of necessity, 
having been created by the necessity for its use, 
cannot be extinguished so long as the necessity 
exists. An easement by necessity may persist even 
though the original grantor and grantee no longer 
own the properties in question. 
a, 2, &) Easements and Licenses in Real Property 
$ 6--Easements-- Creation--Ways of Necessity-. 
Federal Govenunent as Common Original Grantor. 
In a quiet title action by landowners against their 
neighbors, the trial court erred in ruling that plaintiffs' 
alleged easement of necessity could not arise on the 
ground that the common owner of the two properties 
when they were originally conveyed was the federal 
government. Plaintiffs established the requisite 
conditions for an easernent by necessity across 
defendants' property, since they established that there 
was a strict necessity for the right-of-way, and that 
the dominant and servient tenements were under the 
same ownership at the time of the conveyance giving 
rise to the necessity. A way of necessity may arise 
from lands that were originally owned and conveyed 
by the federal government; the public policy 
underlying easements by necessity is not served by 
the creation of a categorical exception for the federal 
government as common grantor. Plaintiffs also 
established a strict necessity for the right-of-way, 
since the evidence showed their property was 
landlocked at the time of the original conveyance, 
and that the necessity continued to exist at the time of 
trial. 
[See Annot., What Constitutes Unitv of Title or 
Ownershiu Sufficient for Creation of an Easement by 
Implication or Way of Necessitv (1979) 94 A.L.R.3d 
a West's Key Number Digest, Easements 
&18(1).] 
(5a, &) Easements and Licenses in Real Property 5 
6--Easements-- Creation--Ways of Necessity--Right 
Passing to Remote Grantee--Continuing Necessity-- 
Burden of Proof. 
In the absence of unusual circumstances, the failure 
or delay of a grantee to assert or exercise a right-of- 
way by necessity over the grantor's adjoining 
premises does not preclude either the original or a 
remote grantee from subsequently asserting such 
right. Because an easement by way of necessity is 
imputed on the basis of the presumption that a party 
conveys whatever is necessary for the property's 
beneficial use, and is founded on the policy against 
pennitting land to remain in perpetual idleness, the 
right to a way of necessity may lie dormant through 
several transfers of title, and yet pass with each 
transfer as appurtenant to the dominant estate, and be 
exercised at any time by the holder of the title. 
Although a strict necessity at the time of conveyance 
can create an easement by way of necessity, it does 
not preserve it for all time. The party proposing that 
strict necessity for easement no longer exists bears 
the burden of proof on that issue. 
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KOLKEY, J. 
Plaintiffs Theodore and Sylvia Kellogg (the 
Kelloggs) were gifted a landlocked parcel, which 
requires that they use a private road that crosses their 
neighbors' properties in order to gain access to the 
property. Defendants Ronald and Judith Garcia (the 
Garcias) deny that the Kelloggs have a right to use 
the private road that traverses their property for 
purposes of such access. The Kelloggs sued to quiet 
title, claiming an implied or express easement over 
the Garcias' and their other neighbors' properties. 
Following trial, the trial court ruled in favor of the 
Garcias. 
Under the law, "[aJn easement by way of necessity 
arises ... when it is established that (1) there is a strict 
necessity for the right-of-way, as when the claimant's 
property is landlocked and (2) the dominant and 
servient tenements were under the same ownership at 
the time of the conveyance giving rise to the 
necessity." (Moores v. Walsh (1995) 38 Cal.Apu.4th 
1046,1049145 Cal.Rptr.2d 3891(Mooves).) 
Relying on Bullv Hill Cuuuer Mining &Sineltine Co. 
v. Bruson (1906) 4 c a 1 . A ~ ~ .  180187 P. 2371(Bully 
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Hill), the trial court ruled in this case that an 
easement by way of necessity cannot arise where the 
only common owner of the two subsequently 
colrveyed properties was the federal government. 
We disagree and shall reverse. Current case law holds 
that the federal government may be the common 
owner of the properties whose conveyance gives rise 
to the strict necessity that justifies an easement by 
way of necessity. (See Moore.9. suura. 38 
Cal.App.4th at p. 1049, fn. I.) Colmnentators and 
courts alike have opined that this conclusion is 
consistent with the public policy that underlies the 
establishment of an easement by necessity, which is 
to promote the productive use of land. Such a policy 
makes no distinction between landlocked parcels 
originally owned by a public, rather than a private, 
party. Accordingly, we conclude that the Kelloggs 
have established the requisite conditions for an 
easement by necessity across the Garcias' property so 
that they can reach their parcel. 
FNl A patent is defined as: "2.a. A grant 
made by a government that confers on an 
individual fee-simple title to public lands. b. 
The official document of such a grant. c. 
The land so granted." (American Heritage 
Dict. (3d ed. 1992) p. 1326.) 
FN2 The Garcias' brief states: "The CHINO 
QUARTZ MINE was originally granted to 
F. NOVELLA by the UNITED STATES 
government by patent in 1878. At that time, 
all of the surrounding land, including the 
land owned at trial by all of the parties[,] 
was owned by the UNITED STATES 
government." 
In 1944, plaintiff Sylvia Kellogg's parents purchased 
the Chino Quartz Mine. By 1945, the Kellogg family 
was using the north road to travel between the Chino 
Quartz Mine and Jurs Road. 
Factual and Procedural Background In 1957, the federal government transferred the Wild 
Rose Mine by patent to Sylvia Kellogg's parents. The 
I. The Facts Wild Rose Mine surrounded the Chino Quartz Mine. 
At the time of trial, the Kelloggs were owners of a 
property in Calaveras County, known as the Chino 
Quartz Mine. A road ran north (the north road) *SO0 
from the Chino Quartz Mine across another property 
owned by the Kelloggs (know~l as the Wild Rose 
Mine), and then over several properties owned by 
other private parties-the Rollinses, the Walshes, the 
Stones, and the Garcias-before it reached Jurs Road, 
a county road. The Garcias own the property adjacent 
to Jurs Road. 
(L) (See fn. 1.) The evidence at trial showed that in 
1878, the United States conveyed the Chino Quartz 
Mine by patent to F. Novella. m' The property 
surrounding the Chino Quartz Mine, including the 
property currently owned by the Garcias, was federal 
land-a point that the Garcias concede in their brief. 
FN2 Any roads that would have existed in the area- 
including any road across what is now the property of 
the Walshes, the Stones, and the Garcias-would have 
been on land owned by the federal government. No 
evidence, however, suggested that the north road 
existed in 1878 or indicated how access was obtained 
in 1878 from the Chino Quartz Mine to any public 
road. 
In 1987, as a result of a gift from Sylvia Kellogg's 
father, the Kelloggs (with their son, Craig Kellogg) 
became the owners of the Chino Quartz Mine. And in 
1991, the KelIoggs and their son beca111c the owuc~s 
of the Wild Rose Mine in the same manner. The total 
property is 42 acres, with the Chino Quartz Mine 
accounting for 10 acres and the Wild Rose Mine for 
32 acres. 
11. The Lawsuit 
The Kelloggs brought a quiet title action, claming a 
right-of-way easement over the north road from the 
Chino Quartz Mine to Jurs Road. They *SO1 sued all 
the property owners of the land traversed by that 
road, except the Rollinses, who had granted the 
Kelloggs an easement. ';N3 
FN3 The Kelloggs subsequently filed two 
amended complaints also naming, as 
additional defendants, property owners lying 
to the south of their property, as another 
road runs south from the Chino Quartz Mine 
to Fay Street, which road crosses property 
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owned by the Moores. The trial court found 
that there was insufficient evidence to 
impose an easement over the Moores' 
property under any legal theory. That ruling 
has not been challenged in this appeal. 
At trial, the Kelloggs advanced several theories to 
support the existence of the easement, including an 
easement by way of necessity. After a bench trial, the 
court ruled in favor of the Garcias on all theories, 
rejecting, among other things, the Kelloggs' claim of 
an easement by way of necessity. 
Because we shall reverse that part of the court's 
ruling addressing the Kelloggs' right to an easement 
by way of necessity, we shall only recite the court's 
findings on that issue. The court made the following 
factual findings relevant to that theory: 
"(1) No evidence was presented as to whether the 
United States of America [I was the common owner 
of all of the land between the CHINO QUARTZ 
MINE parcel and the land where JURS ROAD is 
now located at the time said mine was granted to F. 
NOVELLA. 
"(2) No evidence was presented as to whether either 
JURS Road or the north road across the land now 
owned by defendants WALSH, STONE[,] and 
GARCIA existed at the time the CHINO QUARTZ 
MINE was granted to F. NOVELLA. 
"(3) No evidence was presented as to where any 
access to the CHNO QUARTZ MINE was located 
prior to 1944. 
"(4) Evidence was presented to show that the CHINO 
QUARTZ mine was in active production after the 
grant from the UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
and prior to 1944. 
"(5) Apart from the original public ownership by the 
UNITED STATES, no evidence was presented to 
show that there was any common ownership of the 
parcels of real property owned by the plaintiffs and 
the parcels of real property owned by defendants 
WALSH, STONE[,] and GARCIA. 
"(6) Evidence was presented as to the existence of the 
north road at the time of the grant of the WILD 
ROSE MINE to [Sylvia Kellogg's father], but there 
was no common ownership of the parcel conveyed to 
[her father] and the parcels owned by defendants 
WALSH, STONE[,] and GARCIA at the time of that 
conveyance." *SO2 
The court then made its legal conclusions concerning 
the Kelloggs' failure to establish an easement by way 
of necessity: 
"(2) An easement by necessity can exist when a 
landowner sells one of two or more parcels and the 
parcel sold is completely landlocked by the 
remaining property of the grantor, or partly by the 
land of the grantor and partly by the land of others. In 
that case, the law will create an easement across the 
remaining land of the grantor in order to benefit and 
provide access to the property conveyed. [Citation.] 
"(3) Original ownership by the United States does not 
constitute the necessary unity of ownership to support 
an easement by implication or necessity (Bullv Hill 
supra, 4 Cal.Aoo. at P. 1831, and 94 [A.L.R.3d] 502, 
i17-518)." 'N'
FN4 The full annotation cited by the court 
is: Atmotation, What Constitutes Unitv of 
Title or Ownershio Sufficient for Creation of 
an Easement by lmolication or Way of 
Necessitv (1979) 94 A.L.R.3d 502.517-518. 
$ 9[c]. The annotation cites Bullv Hill, 
supra. 4 Cal.App. 180. 
The court also rejected the Kelloggs' alternative 
theories for an easement. 
The Kelloggs filed a timely appeal from the judgment 
entered in favor of the Garcias. 
Discussion 
I. Standard ofReview 
@) The trial court's decision that the Kelloggs did not 
have an easement by way of necessity presents a 
mixed question of fact and law for purposes of our 
review. This requires that we review the court's 
factual findings under the substantial-evidence test 
and the court's legal reasoning de novo: 
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"Questions of fact concern the establishment of 
historical or physical facts; their resolution is 
reviewed under the substantial-evidence test. 
Questions of law relate to the selection of a rule; their 
resolution is reviewed independently. Mixed 
questions of law and fact concern the application of 
the rule to the facts and the consequent determination 
whether the rule is satisfied. If the pertinent inquiry 
requires application of experience with human 
affairs, the question is predominantly factual and its 
determination is reviewed under the substantial- 
evidence test. If, by contrast, the inquiry requires a 
critical consideration, in a factual context, of legal 
principles and their underlying values, the question is 
predominantly legal and its determination is reviewed 
independently." (*803Crocker National Bank v. San 
Francisco (1989) 49 Cal.3d 881. 8881264 Cal.Rptr. 
139, 782 P.2d 278](Crocker); accord, In re Marriaee 
ofLehman (1998) 18 Caldt l~ 169. 184174 Cal.Rutr.2d 
825.955 P.2d 4511.1 
The trial court's detennination that an easement by 
necessity did not exist because "[o]riginal ownership 
by the United States does not constitute the necessary 
unity of ownership to support an easement by ... 
necessity" presents a Legal question. We review it 
independently. The pertinent inquiry requires critical 
consideration of legal principles and their underlying 
values. (Crocker, si~ra. 49 ~ a l . 3 d  at u. 888: see~also 
Ghirardo v. Antonioli (1994) 8 Cal.4th 791, 799- 
801135 Cal.Rptr.2d 418, 883 P.2d 9601.1 
On the other hand, the trial court's finding that there 
was no evidence that the federal government was the 
common owner of all the property between the Chino 
Quartz Mine and Jurs Road in 1878 is a factual 
question, which we review to dctermine if it is 
supported by substantial evidence. (Crocker. suura, 
49 Cal.3d at P. 888; 9 Witkiu, Cal. Procedure (2002 
supp.) Appeal, 9 319, p. 87; see also Western States 
Petroleum Assn. v. Su~er ior  Court (1995) 9 Cal.4th 
559,571138 Cal.Rutr.2d 139.888 P.2d 12681.) 
11. Elements of an Easement by Way ofNecessily 
(3) The circumstances For the creation of an easement 
by necessity in California are well known: "An 
easement by way of necessity arises by operation of 
law when it is established that ( I )  there is a strict 
necessity for the right-of-way, as when the claimant's 
property is landlocked and (2) the dominant and 
servient tenements were under the same ownership at 
the time of the conveyance giving rise to the 
necessity." (Moores, supra. 38 Cal.App.4th at u. 
1049: accord, Roemer v. Pauaas (1988) 203 
Cal.Apu.3d 201, 205-2061249 Cal.Rptr. 
~ (Roemer) ;Davwal t  v. Walker (1963) 217 
Cal.Auu.2d 669. 672131 Cal.Rntr. 
w(Daywalt);Reese v. Borehi (1963) 216 
Cal.Auu.2d 324.332-333130 Cal.Rutr. 8681(Reese).) 
A way of necessity " 'is of common-law origin arid is 
supported by the rule of sound public policy that 
lands should not be rendered unfit for occupancy or 
successful cultivation. Such a way is the result of the 
application of the presumption that whenever a party 
conveys property, he conveys whatever is necessary 
for the bel~eficial use of that property and retains 
whatever is necessary for the beneficial use of land 
he still possesses. Thus, the legal basis of a way of 
necessity is the presumption of a grant arisingfvom 
the circumstances of the case. This presumption of a 
grant, however, is one of fact, and whether a grant 
should be implied depends upon the terms of the deed 
and the facts in each particular case.' " 
("804Daywalt. suura, 217 Cal.App.2d at PU. 672- 
a italics added by Daywalt, citing 17A Am.Jur. 
(1957) Easements, 9 58, pp. 668-669.) 
Hence, the law " 'never imposes ... an easement by 
necessity contrary to the express intent of the parties' 
" since it is based on an inferred intent arising from 
the strict necessity of access for the conveyed 
property. (Daywalt, suura, 217 Cal.App.2d at P. 673.) 
In addition, "[a way of necessity], having been 
created by the necessity for its use, cannot be 
extinguished so long as the necessity exists." (Blum 
v. Weston (1894) 102 Gal. 362, 369136 P. 7781.) An 
easement by necessity !nay persist even though the 
original grantor and grantee no longer own the 
properties in question: An "easement of necessity 
may be asserted by remote grantees in the chain of 
title long after the easement was created by the 
original common grantor, despite the failure of a 
prior grantee to exercise the right; and the 5-yeat 
statute of limitations on quiet title actions [Code Civ. 
Proc., 61 318) does not apply." (4 Witkin, Summary 
of Cal. Law (9th ed. 1987) Real Property, 5 459, p. 
637, citing Lichtv v. Sicke2.s (1983) 149 Cal.App.3d 
696,700-7011197 Cal.Rutr. 137](Lichty).) 
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However, " 'a right of way of necessity ceases when 
the owner of the way acquires a new means of access 
to his estate, as where he acquires other property of 
his own over which he may pass, or where a public 
way is laid out which affords access to his premises; 
and the fact that a former way of necessity continues 
to he the most convenient way will not prevent its 
extinguishment when it ceases to be absolutely 
necessary.' " (Daywalt, supra. 217 Cal.Aop.2d at PP. 
576-677: accord, Moores. supra. 38 Cal.Auu.4th at o. 
U B u t  the burden of proof that an easement by 
way of necessity has ceased is on the party opposing 
the easement "to show by acceptable evidence that a 
new right of way was in fact made available to the 
plaintiff." (Daywalt, suura. 217 Cal.Auo.2d at 0. 
677.) 
(&) We now turn to whether the two elements of an 
easement by way of necessity-(I) a strict necessity 
for the right-of-way, and (2) common ownership of 
the servient and dominant tenements at the time of 
the conveyance giving rise to the necessity-were 
satisfied here. 
111. The Element of Common Ownership 
As noted, one of the elements of an easement by way 
of necessity is that the dominant and servient 
tenements were under the same ownership at the time 
of the conveyance that gave rise to the necessity. 
(Moores. suora, 38 Cal.Aou.4th at P. 1049.1*805 
fact that there [was] no other way to reach the lands 
or property of defendants" (ibid.), the appellate court 
in Bully Hill refused to sustain the defendants' claim 
of an easement by necessity. It concluded: "[Tlhe 
facts essential to the existence of a way of necessity 
were not establisl~ed by the evidence or found by the 
court. 'The right of way from necessity must be in 
fact what the tern naturally imports and cannot exist 
except in cases of strict necessity. It will not exist 
when a man can get to his property over his own 
land. That the way over his own land is too steep or 
too narrow or that other and like difficulties exist, 
does not alter the case, and it is only when there is no 
way through his own land that a grantee can claim a 
right over that of his grantor. It must also appear that 
the grantee has no other way.' [Citation.]" (Ibid) 
However, the court in Bully Hill also noted that 
"[t]here is nothing in this record to show that the 
relation of grantor and grantee ever existed between 
the plaintiff and any of the defendants. The mere fact 
that all of the land was originally part of the public 
domain and hence owned by a common grantor, 
cannot confer the peculiar right out of which a way of 
necessity arises. If, however, it be fully conceded that 
all other basic facts essential to a way from necessity 
existed, the vital fact that there is no other way to 
reach the lands or property of defendants is lacking." 
(Bullv Hill, supra, 4 Cal.Auu. at P. 183J 
ln this case, the trial court and the Garcias rely on the 
Bullv Hill court's statement that "ltlhe mere fact that 
In this case, the trial court found that the common all bf the land was originally part of the public 
ownership condition was not satisfied, because the domain and hence owned by a common grantor, 
original owner of the properties in question was the cannot confer the peculiar right out of which a way of 
federal government. Relying on Bullv Hill, supra. 4 necessity arises" (Bullv Hill, supra. 4 Cal.Apu. at 0. 
Cal.Auo. at page 183. the trial court ruled that to bar an easement by way of necessity here. 
...A m, 
"[olriginal ownership by the United States does not =avo 
constitute the necessary unity of ownership to support 
an easement by ... necessity." 
In Bully Hill, the defendants claimed an easement by 
necessity for a three-mile wagon road that crossed the 
plaintiffs land. Although that road was the only 
manner by which the defendants could reach, by team 
or wagon, their hotel from any public road 
Hill, suura. 4 Cal.Anp. at P. 1822 the Court of 
Appeal stated that "this is far Gom saying that 
another road to the mines and buildings cannot be 
constructed over said defendant[sIt lands." (Id. at p. 
183,)Because the defendants did not show "the vital 
But Bully Hill did not cite any authority for that 
proposition. Nor did it rely on that statement to reject 
defendants' claim of an easement by necessity. 
Instead, it focused on defendants' failure to establish 
strict necessity, namely, that there was no other way 
to reach defendants' hotel. 
Moreover, Bully Hill is in conflict with the current 
trend in the law and recent California case law. 
In Moores, suura. 38 Cal.App.4th 1046, the 
California Court of Appeal for the First Appellate 
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District reached the opposite conclusion from that 
suggested in Bully Hill (although it did not discuss 
that case specifically). Mr. and Mrs. Moores (the 
Mooreses) claimed an easement by necessity to cross 
property owned by William Walsh, which easement 
was necessary to reach Highway 1 from their 
property. (Id. at p. 1048,)Evidence was presented that 
the federal government had once owned both 
properties.(Ibid.) The parcel now owned by the 
Mooreses had been previously conveyed by the 
federal government to the State of California as a 
"school lands" grant in 1873, which had left it 
landlocked on all sides by federal land. (Ibid.) The 
state had subsequently transferred the land to the 
Regents of the University of California, who had sold 
it to the Mooreses. (Ibid.) The Walsh property 
consisted of parcels which the federal government 
had transferred to private owners. (Ibid.) After a 
court trial, judgment was entered for Walsh.(Ibid.) 
In analyzing the Mooreses' claim that an easement by 
necessity existed, the appellate court ruled that an 
easement by way of necessity may arise from lands 
owned by the federal government. But it concluded 
that "because the State of California and later [t]he 
Regents had the power of eminent domain there was 
no strict necessity for an easement over the lX&h 
parcel." (Moores, suura. 38 Cal .A~~.4 th  at D. 
1050.)In coming to the conclusion that the power of 
eminent domain allowed the state to create its own 
access, it addressed Walsh's contention that "common 
ownership must be by other than the federal 
government in order to satisfy the [other] prong of 
the easement by necessity test" (id. at p. 1049, fn. I), 
which would have avoided the need to reach the issue 
of necessity. The court ruled: "More recent cases ... 
make it clear that this is not the case. [Citation.] An 
easement by necessity may exist across lands owned 
by the federal government. [Citation.]" (Ibid.) 
In reaching this conclusion, the Moores court cited 
two federal cases that found that an easement by 
necessity could arise where the federal government 
conveyed a property landlocked by other federal 
land: State o f  Utah v. Andrus (D. Utah 1979) 486 
F.SUDD. 995. 1002, and Kinscherff v. United States 
(10th Cir. 1978) 586 F.2d 159. 161."807 
Moreover, numerous other cases share that view. 
(See Bruce & Ely, The Law of Easements and 
Licenses in Land (2001) Creation of Easements by 
Implication, ch. 4, i j  4:7, pp. 4-19 to 4-20, fn. 25 
(hereinafter Bruce & Ely), collecting cases.) 
Commentators have likewise concluded that the 
federal government should be treated the same as a 
private common owner: "Such an approach is 
consistent with both theories underlying the 
easement-of-necessity concept. It Eurthers the public 
policy of promoting productive use of land and also 
is in harmony with the presumption that the parties 
intended to grant or to reserve an easement to benefit 
the landlocked parcel." (See Bruce & Ely, supra, i j  
4:7, pp. 4-19 to 4-20; 4 Powell on Real Property 
(2001) Easements and Licenses, $ 34.07 141, pp. 34- 
59 to 34-60 [cases permitting easements by necessity 
over fedeml land represent the "wiser holding" 
because the "public policy favoring land utilization 
applies to cases where ownership was in the state as 
well as where the original unity was in a private 
person"]; Tiffany, The Law of Real Property (3d ed. 
1939) 9: 793, p. 290 [it is not clear "why a 
conveyance by the government should be subject to a 
different rule ... from a conveyance by a private 
individual" when, inter alia, "the same considerations 
of public policy in favor of utilization of the land 
apply in both cases"].) 
We agree. Since an easement by way of necessity is 
based on the presumption that a conveyance seeks to 
transfer " 'whatever is necessary for the beneficial use 
of that property' " (-d 
at D. 673). there is absolutely no reason to impute a 
different intention to the federal govemment when 
conveying western lands (failing an expression of 
intent to the contrary). After all, particularly in the 
19th century-when the West was being settled-the 
federal government had no reason to render the land 
it conveyed unfit for occupancy or cultivation. Quite 
the opposite. "During most of the 19th century, our 
public land policy was basically one of disposal [of 
lands owned by the United States] into non-Federal 
ownership to encourage settlement and development 
of the country. Those lands most favorably situated 
for mineral development, agriculture, and townsites 
were settled first." (U.S. Public Land Law Review 
Com., One Third of the Nation's Land, A Report to 
the President and to the Congress (1970) p. 28; see 
also Yale, Legal Titles to Mining Claims and Water 
Rights, in California, Under the Mining Law of 
Congress, of July, 1866 (1867) pp. iv-v, 10-13.) 
Indeed, California case law recognizes that the 
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doctrine of easements by necessity "is founded upon 
the salutary policy against permitting land to remain 
in perpetual idleness." (Roemer. supra. 203 
Cal.Aop.3d at p. 207. original italics; Lichty, supra. 
149 Cal.Aoo.3d at P. 703:Reese. Supra, 216 
Cal.App.2d at o. 331:Dawalt, supra. 217 
Cal.Awp.2d at D. 672.)Accordingly, looking at both 
the rationale underlying the doctrine of easement 
*SO8 by necessity and the general purposes of federal 
conveyances in the 19th century, no reason exists 
why the conveyance by the federal government in 
this case should not be given the same presumption 
afforded other parties, namely, that a conveyance 
includes whatever is necessary for the beneficial use 
of the land. (See Davwalt, suora. 217 Cal.Aop.2d at 
ep. 672-673J 
Indeed, the trial court in this case found that "the 
CHINO QUARTZ mine was in active production 
after the grant from the UNITED STATES OF 
AMERICA and prior to 1944." It would make no 
sense that the federal government would convey title 
to an active mine to a private party without illtending 
to give the new owner access to the property. 
Thus, we agree with the commentators and the Court 
of Appeal in Moores that common ownership by the 
federal govemment satisfies the requirement of 
common ownership under the doctrine of easements 
by necessity. Neither the public policy nor rationale 
underlying easements by necessity is served by the 
creation of a categorical exception for the federal 
government. 
FN.5 The opposing concern is that an 
easement by necessity over former federal 
land "would permit every remote grantee of 
a portion of the public domain to have an 
easement by way of necessity over 
surrounding lands. This argument overlooks 
the special terminability aspect of easements 
by necessity upon a change of 
circumstances. The changed circumstances 
effectively eliminate the necessity." (4 
Powell on Real Property, supra, Easements 
and Licenses, 5 34.07[4], p. 34-60, fns. 
omitted.) 
IV. Application ofthe Common Ownership 
Requirement 
This does not quite end our consideration of the 
matter, however. We must now determine whether 
the federal govemment owned all the surrounding 
land at the time that the Chino Quartz Mine was 
conveyed such that it gave rise to a strict necessity 
for a right-of-way. As mentioned, the trial court 
found that "[nlo evidence was presented as to 
whether the United States of America[] was the 
common owner of all of the land between the CHINO 
QUARTZ MINE parcel and the land where JURS 
ROAD is now located at the time said mine was 
granted to F. NOVELLA." 
The parties agree, however, that this finding is not 
supported by substantial evidence and that the federal 
government was the common owner of all the land in 
1878. Indeed, the trial court's finding is seemingly 
inconsistent with its other finding that "[alpart from 
the original public ownership by the UNITED 
STATES, uo evidence was presented to show that 
there was any common ownership of the parcels of 
real property owned by the plaintiffs and the parcels 
of real property owned by defendants WALSH, 
STONE[,] and GARCIA." (Italics added.) And the 
Garcias concede in their brief that "[tlhe CHINO 
QUARTZ MINE was originally granted to F. 
NOVELLA by *SO9 the UNITED STATES 
government by patent in 1878. At that time, all of the 
surrounding land, including the land owned at trial by 
all of the parties[,] was owned by the UNITED 
STATES govemment." 
And there was substantial evidence that the Eederal 
govemment owned all the land between the Chino 
Quartz Mine and Jurs Road in 1878. Frank Harrison, 
a title investigator who had researched the chain of 
title of the Kellogg, Walsh, Stone, and Garcia 
properties, testified that in I878 "the property now 
owned by Garcia, now owned by Stone, now owned 
by Walsh, was still all owned by the United States 
Government." Harrison further agreed that at the 
time, any roads that existed in the area, "for instance, 
from Jurs Road ... currently going through the Garcia 
property, through the Stone propeny, through the 
Walsh property, would have been on Uuited States 
Government land." Harrison also testified that prior 
to the 1957 patent, the Wild Rose Mine "was held in 
the name of the United States Government," and this 
property surrounded the Chino Quartz Mine. 
Accordingly, substantial evidence supports the 
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parties' concession that the land between the Chino 
Quartz Mine and Jurs Road was owned by the federal 
government at the time of the 1878 patent. The 
court's contrary finding is simply not supported by 
substantial evidence. 
Hence, we conclude that the corn erred in its finding 
that the United States was not the common owner of 
ail the relevant parcels in 1878 and in its ruling that 
the Kelloggs could not make out a claim of a11 
easement by necessity based on the federal 
government's original common ownership of the 
Kelloggs' and the Garcias' land. 
V. Strict Necessity 
Nonetheless, to establish an easement by necessity, 
the Kelloggs also had to show that a strict necessity 
for access existed at the time of the conveyance, i.e., 
that the property was landlocked. (Davtvalt, suuya, 
217 Ca l .A~~ .2d  at u. 672;Lichtv. supra. 149 
Cal.A~u.3d at u. 699:Roemer. supra. 203 Cal.Au~.3d 
at u. 206;Moores. supra. 38 Cal .A~~.4th at D. 
W T h e  court made no finding on that point. 
However, we have already identified evidence in the 
record showing that the Chino Quartz Mine was 
landlocked by federal land after it was conveyed in 
1878, and the Garcias do not contend otherwise, 
conceding that all of the surrounding land was owned 
by the federal government at the time of the 1878 
patent. There was a strict necessity for a right-of- 
way. 
At oral argument, however, the Garcias argued that 
the absence of any evidence that the north road 
existed or joined Jurs Road in 1878 precludes an 
easement by necessity. We reject this argument. 
*810 
@) " '[A] way of necessity does not rest on a pre- 
existing use but on the need for a way across the 
granted or reserved premises.' " (Reese, supra. 216 
Cal.Auu.2d at D. 331.1 " '[Alt least in the absence of 
unusual circumstances, the failure or  delay of a 
grantee to assert or exercise a right of way by 
necessity over his grantor's adjoining premises, where 
he cannot reach a highway Crom his property except 
over lands privately owned, does not preclude him, 
or a remote grantee, fvom subsequently asserting 
such right. The questiol~ has arisen most frequently 
where the original grantee failed to assert his right of 
way by necessity, and thereafter a remote grantee 
sought to exercise it.' " (Lichty, suora, 149 
Cal.Auu.3d at D. 700, italics added by Lichty, quoting 
h o t .  (1941) 133 A.L.R. 1393.)Because an 
easement by way of necessity is imputed on the basis 
of the presumption that a party conveys whatever is 
necessary for the property's beneficial use (Dawalt, 
suora. 217 Cal.Auu.2d at DD. 672-6731 and is 
founded on the policy against permitting land "to 
remain in perpetual idleness" (Lichty, at p. 703), "the 
right to a way of necessity may lie dormant through 
several transfirs of title and yet pass with each 
transfer as appurtenant to the dominant estate and be 
exercised at any time by the holder of the title. 
[Citation.]' " (Id, at p. 701, italics added by Lichty.) 
Still, although a strict necessity at the time of 
conveyance can create an easement by way of 
necessity, it does not preserve it for all time. As noted 
earlier, an easement by necessity will exist only so 
long as the necessity exists. (Lichtv. supra. 149 
Cal.Auu.3d at D. 699;Davwalt. suora. 217 
CaI.Auu.2d at DD. 676-677;Moores. supra. 38 
Cal.Auu.4th at u. 1051.1 
a) The evidence in the record here indicates that the 
Kelloggs bad no access to a public road solely over 
their own land or over another's land through an 
alternative easement. They remained landlocked at 
the time of trial. 
Admittedly, a map in the record appears to show that 
the Kelloggs' Wild Rose Mine property on its 
southern boundary came near Fay Street, located in 
the Lynn Park Acres subdivision. At trial, Dennis 
Wiebe, a land surveyor, initially testified that his 
examination of a subdivision map showed that the 
Kelloggs' property touched Fay Street and that a 
driveway could be constructed to the street. But 
Wiebe then testified that a county assessor's map 
showed a parcel between the Kelloggs' land and Fay 
Street. And he testified that Fay Street was located in 
Lynn Park Acres, a private subdivision, and that the 
Kelloggs would have to obtain an easement for a 
right of way across the subdivision's streets from the 
owners of the property along those streets, perhaps as 
many as 50 of them. Further, Wiebe testified that 
when he did a "811 boundary survey for one of the 
property owners between the Kelloggs' property and 
Fay Street, he determined that "the existing road did 
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not go into the Kellogg property." 
In sum, it was not established that the necessity for an 
easement no longer existed because of the availability 
of another route affording access from Fay Street to 
the property. To the contraty, the trial court held that 
there was insufficient evidence that the Kelloggs had 
an easement to Fay Street across the property of the 
Moores-a ruling not challenged on appeal. 
a) The party proposing that strict necessity no 
longer exists bears the burden of proof on that issue 
(Dawalt, supra. 217 Cal.Awp.2d at P. 677)-a burden 
which none of the defendants carried. We also note 
that none of the defendants argued in their posttrial 
briefs that the necessity had ceased to exist, and the 
Garcias do not so contend on appeal. 
(a) Accordingly, the only reasonable conclusion that 
can be drawn from the evidence is that a strict 
necessity existed for a right-of-way: The Chino 
Quartz Mine was landlocked by federal land when 
conveyed by patent in 1878 and continued to be 
landlocked through trial. 
VI. Conclusion 
Since the Kelloggs' property was landlocked at the 
time it was conveyed to their predecessor-in-interest, 
and the dominant and sewient tenements were under 
the same ownership at the time of the conveyance 
(that of the federal government), an easement by way 
of necessity arose. And since there was no evidence 
that the necessity ceased to exist, the Kelloggs are 
entitled to an easement by way of necessity through 
the existing roadway that crosses the Garcias' 
property so that they can access their landlocked 
property. Of course, if the Kelloggs' necessity ever 
ceases. the Garcias can seek relief from the easement. 
Disposition 
The judgment is reversed and the case remanded to 
the trial court with directions to enter judgment that 
the Kelloggs have an easement by necessity *812 
across the Garcias' urouerty. The Kelloges shall 
recover their costs od  aipeai. (Cal. Rules ;?Court. 
rule 26(a).) m6 
FN6 In light of our decision that the 
Kelloggs have an easement by necessity 
over the Garcias' property for access to Jurs 
Road, we decline to address their alternative 
theories in support of the same easement. If 
that necessity were ever to cease, it would 
only be because the Kelloggs have obtained 
an alternative route to their property. 
Sims, Acting P. J., and Raye, J., concurred. "813 
Cal.App.3.Dist. 
Kellogg v. Garcia 
102 Cal.App.4th 796, 125 Cal.Rptr.2d 817, 02 Cal. 
Daily Op. Sew. 10,146, 2002 Daily Journal D.A.R. 
11,551 
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UNITED STATES of America, the State of New 
Mexico, the Pueblo of Santa Ana, Mark IV 
Enterprises, a New Mexico Corporation, E. M. 
Riebold and H. E. Leonard, Appellees. 
No. 77-1083. 
Argued Aug. 8, 1978. 
Decided Nov. 1, 1978 
Property owners brought quiet title action seeking 
declaratory relief and damages against the United 
States and others, and claiming right to use road. The 
United States District Court for the District of New 
Mexico, H. Vearle Payne, J., dismissed cause, and 
property owners appealed. The Court of Appeals held 
that: (I) plaintiffs interest in public road would not 
be any more than any other member of public and as 
such did not constitute an "i~~terest" under statute 
authorizing suits against United States in quiet title 
action to real property in which governmellt claims 
an interest and which requires in part that plaintiff set 
forth nature of "interest" which plaintiff claims in 
real property, and (2) complaint stated cause of action 
as to existence of implied easement of necessity, its 
extent, or whether road was such an easement. 
Set aside and remanded. 
West Headnotes 
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*I59 Hartley B. Wess, Miller & Melton, Ltd., 
Albuquerque, N. M. (Robert E. Melton, Miller & 
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Carl Strass, Atty., Dept. of Justice, Washington, D. 
C. (James W. Moorman, Acting Asst. Atty. Gen., 
Edmund B. Clark, James '160 R. Amold, and Larry 
A. Boggs, Attys., Dept. of Justice, Washington, D. 
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Before SETH, Chief Judge, and BARRETT and 
LOGAN, Circuit Judges. 
PER CURIAM. 
This is a quiet title action under 28 U.S.C. s 2409a, 
seeking declaratory relief and damages against the 
United States and others. The complaint alleges that 
the United States had built a road on its land to reach 
a dam site, and that it continues to control the use of 
this road. The road is asserted to be the only access 
plaintiffs have to their property. Plaintiffs are seeking 
to develop their land, but the United States would not 
let them use the road, which is adjacent to the 
property, to bring in equipment, machinery, or 
material. 
Plaintiffs seek to establish a right to use the road for 
all purposes as members of the public, and also as a 
way of necessity. The land of plaintiffs was patented 
to their predecessors in interest. 
The trial court dismissed as to the defendant, State of 
New Mexico, as to the Pueblo of Santa Ana, and as to 
several individuals who were residents of New 
Mexico. Subsequently the court also dismissed the 
cause as to the United States for failure to state a 
cause of action under 28 U.S.C. s 2409a, and this 
appeal was taken. 
LLI On this appeal the plaintiffs argue that this is 
properly an action to quiet title. The statute, 28 
U.S.C. s 2409a, in permitting suits against the United 
States in quiet title actions to real property in which 
the Government claims an interest, requires in part 
that the plaintiff" . . . set forth with particularity the 
nature of the right, title, or interest which the plaintiff 
claims in the real property, the circumstances under 
which it was required, and the right, title, or interest 
claimed by the United States."28 U.S.C. s 2409a(c), 
Thus plaintiffs assert that they have a real property 
interest in the Jemez Dam Road as members of the 
public entitled to use public roads pursuant to 
N.M.S.A. s 55-1-1 Et seq. (1953 Comnp.), and as an 
owner of land abutting a public highway, and under 
43 U.S.C. s 932. This "interest" in plaintiffs, we must 
hold, is not an interest in real property contemplated 
by 28 U.S.C. s 2409a. If it exists, it is vested in the 
public generally. The legislative history of & 
refers to the historical development of Quia 
timet suits in the courts of equity in England, and to 
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quiet title suits as developed in this counuy. 
U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News, 1972, Vol. 3, p. 
4547. It thus must be assumed that Congress intended 
to permit to be brought against the United States the 
typical quiet title suit, as it has developed in the 
various states in this country through statutory and 
case law. 
121 The plaintiffs, on this point, do not assert that 
their interest is an easement or any similar right; 
instead, as mentioned above, the right is claimed by 
them as members of the public. The substantive law 
in New Mexico for quiet title actions recites the 
notion that the public has a real property interest in 
public roads. A quiet title action may be brought by 
anyone claiming an interest in t l ~e  real 
property.Marquez v. Maxwell Land Grant Co.. 12 
N.M. 445, 78 P. 40. The interest, however, must be 
some interest in the title to the property.Rock Island 
Oil & ref in in^ Co. v. Simmons, 73 N.M. 142. 386 
P.2d 239. An attempt to remove a cloud from title 
presupposes that the plaintiff has some title to 
defend.Weathers v. Salman. 86 N.M. 203, 521 P.2d 
1152. 
Members of the public as such do not have a 
"title" in public roads. To hold otherwise would 
signify some degree of ownership as an easement. It 
is apparent that a member of the public cannot assert 
such an ownership in a public road. Plaintiffs"l61 
argue also that the general provisions for highways, 
N.M.S.A. s 55-1-1 Et seq. (1953 Comp.), confer on 
the public a real property interest in public roads. 
Plaintiffs misconstrue the statute because it does no 
more than define public highways, determine 
maintenance responsibility, and provide an 
administrative process for abandoning public roads. 
Indeed, section 55-1-5 provides that rights of way 
vest in the State of New Mexico after a state highway 
has been open to the public for one year. 
Thus the "interest" plaintiffs seek to assert as part of 
the public is not of such a nature to enable them to 
bring a suit to quiet title. 
Plaintiffs also claim an interest by virtue of an 
implied easement of necessity, as successor in 
interest to a grantee of the United States by patent in 
1936. Easements are real property interests subject to 
quiet title actions. The legislative history of 28 
U.S.C. s 2409a indicates that Congress intended 
easements to be included in the real property rights 
adjudicated in a quiet title action. The House Report 
states: "The quieting of title where the plaintiff 
claims an estate less than a fee simple an easement or 
the title to minerals is likewise included in the terms 
of the proposed statute."H.R.Rep.No. 92-1559, 92d 
Cong., 2d Sess. reprinted in (1972) U.S.Code Cong. 
& Admin.News 4552. 
An easement of necessity for some purposes 
could possibly have arisen when the United States 
granted the patent to plaintiffs' predecessor in 
interest. The complaint so asserts. 'while nothing 
ordinarily passes by implication in a patent, &I& 
v. United States. 415 F.2d 121 (10th Cir.), an implied 
easement may arise within the scope of the 
patent.Superior Oil Co. v. United States, 353 F.2d 34 
(9th. In Superior Oil, which involved an alleged 
implied right of access over a road on Hopi land to 
the plaintiff's leasehold, the court stated: "The scope 
and extent of the right of access depends . . . upon 
what must, under the circumstances, be attributed to 
the grantor either by implication of intent or by 
operation of law founded in a public policy favoring 
laud utilization," (citing 2 Thompson, Real Property, 
s 3621.353 F.2d at 36. In United States v. DUM. 478 
F.2d 443 (9th Cir.), the court held that defendants 
were entitled to a hearing to determine whether their 
patent included an implied easement to construct an 
access road across federal land. 
f6J With the dismissal on motion the issues as to the 
existence of an implied easement of necessity, its 
extent, or whether this road is such an easement, were 
not considered. These are each mixed issues of fact 
and law. The allegations in the complaint adequately 
raised the claim of easement of necessity in the lands 
of the United States, and an easement of such nature 
is an interest which can be properly raised in a quiet 
title action under 28 U.S.C. s 2409a. The facts thus 
must be developed. We, of course, express no 
opinion as to whether such an easement here exists, 
nor its extent. 
121 Similarly, the limitation issue is a mixed question 
of fact and law as to whether the patentee or a 
successor in interest knew or should have known of 
the Govenunent's claim of no easement or of a 
limited easement. Again we express no opinion as to 
such limitation period, and the facts pertinent to the 
commencement of the limitation period must be 
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developed. 
Thus by reason of the factual issues raised, but not 
before the trial court, as to the easement and the 
period of limitation, the case must be remanded. 
We fmd no error as to the dismissal of the several 
defendants nor in the way it was done. The plaintiffs 
had adequate opportunity at the hearing to set aside 
the orders to present their position. 
The order of dismissal is set aside, and the case is 
remanded for further proceedings. 
END OF DOCUMENT 
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h a t e  of Utah v. Andrus 
D.C.Utah, 1979. 
United States District Court, D. Utah, Central 
Division. 
The STATE OF UTAH, by and through its Division 
of State Lands, Plaintiff, 
v. 
Cecil D. ANDRUS, Individually and as Secretary of 
the United States Department of the Interior; Frank 
Gregg, Individually and as Director of the Bureau of 
Land Management within the Department of the 
Interior; William Whalen, Individually and as 
Director of the National Park Service within the 
Department of the Interior; Robert S. Bergland, 
Individually and as Secretary ofthe United States 
Department of Agriculture; and John McGuire, Chief 
of the Forest Service within the Department of 
Agriculture, Defendants. 
UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff, 
v. 
COTTER CORPORATION, a subsidiary of 
Commonwealth Edison, Defendant. 
STATE of UTAH, by and through its Division of 
State Lands, Defendant-in-Intervention. 
Nos. C 79-0037. C 79-0307. 
Oct. 1, 1979 
United States filed suit seeking a temporary 
restraining order to prevent lessee of state school 
trust lands, encircled by federa! land, from engaging 
in any construction, road building, leveling land, or 
destroying primitive, scenic and wildlife 
characteristics on the federal land. State of Utah, 
which intervened as a party defendant, filed an 
answer and counterclaim alleging that, by denying its 
lessee access to the school hunst lands, the United 
States violated a compact with the state and 
interfered with its right to hl ly  utilize the school trust 
of Land Management may regulate federal public 
lands so as to prevent impairment of wilderness 
characteristics, hut such authority is subject to uses 
which were existing on October 21, 1976, the date 
Federal Land Policy Management Act was enacted, 
and (2) lessee's right to gain access was not an 
existing use on the date of enactment of the Federal 
Land Policy Management Act and, therefore, the 
lessee's activity could he regulated so as to prevent 
wilderness impairment, but such regulation could not 
be so restrictive as to constitute a taking. 
Orders in accordance with opinion 
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317W1 k. Effect of Reservation and Grant 
to State in General. Most Cited Cases 
Generally, land grants by the federal government are 
constmed strictly, and nothing is held to pass to the 
grantee except that which is specifically delineated in 
the instrument of conveyance; however, legislation 
dealing with school trust land has always been 
liberally construed. 
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to State in General. Most Cited Cases 
One of Congress' primary purposes in enacting the 
state school land grant legislation was to place the 
states on an "equal footing" with the original 13 
colonies and to enable the state to produce a fund, 
accumulated by sale and use of the trust lands, with 
which the state could support 12le common schools. 
Public Lands 317 -51 
3 17 Public Lands 
31711 Survey and Disposal of Lands of United 
States 
317II(E) School and University Lands 
k. Effect of Reservation and Grant 
to State in General. Most Cited Cases 
Given the rule of liberal construction of legislation 
dealing with school trust land and given the 
congressional intent of enabling the state to use 
school lands as a means of generating revenue, 
Congress must have intended that the state of Utah, 
or its lessees, have access to school lands encircled 
by federal land. Act July 16, 1894,28 Stat. 107. 
Deeds 120 -118 
120 Deeds 
120111 Construction and Operation 
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I20III(B) Property Conveyed 
k. Evidence. Most Cited Cases 
Under the common law, it was assumed that a grantor 
intended to include in the conveyance whatever was 
necessary for the use and enjoyment of the land. 
J.5J Easements 141 -16 
141 Easements 
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1411 Creation, Existence, and Termination 
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141k15 Implication 
k. Severance of Ownership of 
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141k15 Implication 
141k18 Ways of Necessity 
141k18(2) k. Grant of Tract Partly or 
Entirely Surrounded by Grantor's Land. Most Cited 
Cases 
When a grantor conveys only a portion of his land, 
and the land received by the grantee is surrounded by 
what the grantor has retained, it is generally held that 
the grantee has an easement of access, either by 
implication or necessity, across the grantor's land. 
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3 17 Public Lands 
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States 
317II1E) School and University Lands 
3171t51 k. Effect of Reservation and Grant 
to State in General. Most Cited Cases 
State of Utah and its lessee had a right to cross 
federal land, encircling state school trust land, to 
reach the school land. 
J7J Public Lands 317 -96 
3 17 Public Lands 
-
Survey and Disposal of Lands of United 
States 
317INI) Proceedings in Land Office 
317k96 k. Authority and Duties of Officers 
in General. Most Cited Cases 
Only by looking at the overall use of the public lands 
can one accurately assess whether or not the Bureau 
of Land Management is carrying out the broad 
purposes of the Federal Land Policy and 
Management Act; if one's view is expanded to the 
complex entirety of land management decisions, then 
the statute is not necessarily internally inconsistent. 
Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976, $' 
102(a)(X, l2), 43 U.S.C.A. 5 1701(a)f8, 12). 
181 Public Lands 317 -96 
3 17 Public Lands 
-
Survey and Disposal of Lands of United 
States 
3171I(I) Proceedings in Land Office 
317k96 k. Authority and Duties of Officers 
in General. Most Cited Cases 
Bureau of Land Management is not required to 
immediately balance the mineral values against the 
wilderness values of a particular piece of land prior to 
designating the land a wilderness study area; the 
BLM may, consistent with the Federal Land Policy 
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and Management Act, look first at potential 
wilderness characteristics and then proceed to study 
the area for all its potential uses prior to formulating 
its final recommendations to the executive. Federal 
Land Policy and Management Act of 1976, S: 6031% 
c), 43 U.S.C.A. 5 1782(a, c); Wilderness Act, S: 2 et 
seq., 16U.S.C.A. 6 1131 etseq. 
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361 Statutes 
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Construction and Operation 
361VI(A) General Rules of Construction 
Extrinsic Aids to Construction 
Executive Construction 
361k219(1) k. In General. Most 
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Generallv, interpretation of a statute by those charged 
with its execution is entitled to great deference 
JpJ Environmental Law 149E -44 
Environmental Law 
149EII Land Use and Conservation 
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(Formerly 199k25.5(9) Health and Environment) 
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317II(I) Proceedings in Land Office 
k. Authority and Duties of Officers 
in General. Most Cited Cases 
Under the terms of the Federal Land Policy and 
Management Act, the Bureau of Land Management 
has authority to manage public lands so as to prevent 
impairment of wilderness characteristics, unless those 
lands are subject to an existing use; in the latter case, 
BLM may regulate so as to prevent unnecessary or 
undue degradation of the environment. Federal Land 
Policy and Management Act of 1976, $ 603(c), 43 
U.S.C.A. 6 1782(c). 
JJlJ Public Lands 317 -96 
3 17 Public Lands 
-
317II Survey and Disposal of Lands of United 
States 
317II(I) Proceedings in Land Office 
317k96 k. Authority and Duties of Officers 
in General. Most Cited Cases 
Under provision of the Federal Land Policy and 
Management Act requiring the Bureau of Land 
Management, during the period of wilderness review, 
to manage the public land "in a manner so as not to 
impair the suitability of such areas for preservation as 
wilderness * * *," the mandate that existing uses 
continue in the "same manner and degree" as being 
conducted on October 21, 1976, the date of the Act's 
enactment, refers to activity that was actually taking 
place on that date; when the statute refers to existing 
uses being carried out in the same manner and 
degree, it is referring to actual uses, not merely a 
statutory right to use. Federal Land Policy and 
Management Act of 1976, S: 603(c), 43 U.S.C.A. 6 
1782(c). 
Mines and Minerals 260 -92.5(1) 
260 Mines and Minerals 
-
Operation of Mines, Quarries, and Wells 
2601II(A) Statutory and Official Regulations 
260k92.5 Federal Law and Regulations 
260k92.5(11 k. In General. Most Cited 
- Cases 
(Formerly 260k92.5) 
Provision of the Federal Land Policv and 
Management Act does amend the Mining Law of 
1872 and subjects rights thereunder to the Bureau of 
Land Management's authority to regulate so as to 
prevent wilderness impairment. Federal Land Policy 
and Management Act of 1976, $9 302(b), 603, 43 
U.S.C.A. 66 1732(b), 1282; 30 U.S.C.A. 6 22. 
Jl3J Public Lands 317 -96 
317 Public Lands 
-
a Survey and Disposal of Lands of United 
States 
317II(I) Proceedings in Land Office 
317k96 k. Authority and Duties of Officers 
in General. Most Cited Cases 
Provision of the Federal Land Policy and 
Management Act does not mandate that the Bureau 
of Land Management allow all potential uses to take 
place on a particular portion of land regardless of 
wilderness characteristics. Federal Land Policy and 
Management Act of 1976, 9 201, 43 U.S.C.A. 5 
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States 
317II(I) Proceedings in Land Office 
k. Authority and Duties of Officers 
in General. Most Cited Cases 
Bureau of Land Management's authority is limited to 
preventing permanent impairment of potential 
wilderness values; although it is not explicitly 
provided for in the Federal Land Policy and 
Management Act, it is consistent with Congress' 
attempt to balance competing interests and with the 
Wilderness Act which provides the legislative 
backdrop for the relevant section of FLPMA to find 
that if a given activity will have only a temporary 
effect on wilderness characteristics and will not 
foreclose potential wilderness designation, then that 
activity should be allowed to proceed. Federal Land 
Policy and Management Act of 1976, 5 603, Q 
U.S.C.A. 6 1782; Wilderness Act, 5 2 et seq., 16 
U.S.C.A. 5 1131 et seq. 
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149Ek44 k. Forest and Wilderness 
Management. Most Cited Cases 
(Formerly 199k25.5(4) Health and Environment) 
Definition of wilderness provided for in the 
Wilderness Act and incorporated by reference into 
the Federal Land Policy and Management Act 
contemplates that some human activity can take place 
in wilderness areas as long as the area generally 
appears to have been affected primarily by the forces 
of nature, with the imprint of man's work 
substantially unnoticeable. Federal Land Policy and 
Management Act of 1976, $ 603(a), 43 U.S.C.A. $ 
Wilderness Act, $ 2(c), 16 U.S.C.A. 8 
m. 
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3171I(I) Proceedings in Land Office 
k Authority and Duties of Officers 
in General. Most Cited Cases 
Bureau of Land Management is authorized under the 
Federal Land Policy and Management Act to manage 
public lands "by regulation or otherwise"; thus, the 
agency's authority is not dependent on the issuance of 
formal regulations. Federal Land Policy and 
Management Act of 1976, $5 302(b), 603(c), Q 
U.S.C.A. 66 1732(b), 17X2(c). 
1111 Administrative Law and Procedure 15A 
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15A Administrative Law and Procedure 
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Judicial Remedies Prior to or Pending 
Administrative Proceedings 
I5Ak229 k. Exhaustion of Administrative 
Remedies. Most Cited Cases 
There is an exception to the doctrine of exhaustion 
when it appears that efforts to find relief within the 
agency would be futile. 
1181 Public Lands 317 -55 
317 Public Lands 
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-
States 
School and University Lands 
k. Leases by State. Most Cited 
Lessee of state school trust lands, against whom the 
United States filed suit seeking a temporary 
restraining order to prevent the lessee from engaging 
in any road building or destroying wildlife 
characteristics on federal land encircling the school 
land, would not be required, before seeking relief 
from the court to first "exhaust its administrative 
remedies" by applying for a right-of-way, having 
such right-of-way denied, and appealing to the 
Interior Department's system of land board review, 
since there was little chance that the agency would do 
anything but deny the lessee's application, and the 
court would not require the lessee to engage in a 
useless exercise. 
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O 2008 Thomson ReutersiWest. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. 
486 F.Supp. 995 
486 F.Supp. 995, 10 Envtl. L. Rep. 20,570 
States 
- School and University Lands 
k. Leases by State. Most Cited 
Cases 
Doctrine of primary jurisdiction was inapplicable to 
suit brought by the United States against lessee of 
state school trust lands, seeking a temporary 
restraining order to prevent the lessee from engaging 
in "any construction, road building, leveling land, or 
destroying primitive, scenic and wildlife 
characteristics" on federal land encircling the school 
lands. 
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State had to be allowed access to state school trust 
lands, encircled by federal lands, so that those state 
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Because it was the intent of Congress to provide 
school trust lands to the state of Utah so that the state 
could use them to raise revenue, the access rights of 
the state to said lands, which were encircled by 
federally owned land, could not be so restricted as to 
destroy the economic value of the school trust lands; 
that is, the state had to be allowed access which was 
not so narrowly restrictive as to render the lands 
incapable of their full economic development. Act 
July 16, 1894,28 Stat. 107. 
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Control. Most Cited Cases 
Public Lands 317 -96 
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Survey and Disposal of Lands of United 
States 
317n(I) Proceedings in Land Office 
k. Authority and Duties of Officers 
in General. Most Cited Cases 
Under the Constitution, Congress has the authority 
and responsibility to manage federal lands, and 
through statute, Congress has delegated this authority 
to agencies such as the Bureau of Land Management. 
U.S.C.A.Const.art.4.63.cl.2. 
p3J Puhlic Lands 317 -51 
3 17 Public Lands 
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School and University Lands 
k. Effect of Reservation and Grant 
to State in General. Most Cited Cases 
Nothing in the school land grant program indicates 
that, when Congress developed the school land grant 
scheme, it intended to abrogate its right to control 
activity on federal land. U.S.C.A.Const. art. 4. 6 3. cl. 
2. 
- 
jZ4J Puhlic Lands 317 -51 
317 Public Lands 
3171I Survey and Disposal of Lands of United 
States 
317IffE) School and University Lands 
k. Effect of Reservation and Grant 
to State in General. Most Cited Cases 
As regards state school trust land encircled by 
federally owned land, it is consistent with common- 
law property principles to find that the United States, 
as the holder of the servient tenement, has the right to 
limit the location and use of the state's easement of 
access to that which is necessary for the state's 
reasonable enjoyment of its right. 
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Public Lands 317 -55 
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Bureau of Land Management can regulate the method 
and route of access to state school trust lands 
31 7 Public Lands encircled by federal land, and this regulation may be 
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Survey and Disposal of Lands of United done with a view toward preventing impairment of 
States wilder~less characteristics, assuming no existing use; 
317II1E) School and University Lands however, the regulation may not prevent the state or 
k. Leases by State. Most Cited its lessee from gaining access to its land, nor may it 
Cases be so prohibitively restrictive as to render the land 
Although the state of Utah or its lessee must be incapable of full economic development. 
- 
allowed access to state school trust lands encircled by 
federal land, the United States may regulate the 
manner of access under statutes such as the Federal 
Land Policy and Management Act. Federal Land 
Policy and Management Act of 1976, $ 102 et seq., 
43 U.S.C.A. 6 1701 et seq. 
p6J Statutes 361 -223.4 
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a Construction and Operation 
361VI(A) General Rules of Construction 
Construction with Reference to 
Other Statutes 
361k223.4 k. General and Special 
Statutes. Most Cited Cases 
Under statutory rules of construction, when "special 
acts" conflict with acts that deal with the same 
subject matter in a more general way, the special acts 
are to prevail, regardless of whether the special acts 
were passed prior to or after the general act; but this 
rule does not apply if there is some indication that 
Congress intended to modify the special act. 
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1281 Eminent Domain 148 -2.1 
148 Eminent Domain 
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1481 Nature, Extent, and Delegation of Power 
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What Constitutes a Taking; Police and 
Other Powers Distinguished 
k. In General. Most Cited Cases 
(Formerly 148kZ(1)) 
While a government can regulate without engaging in 
a taking, regulation that reaches the point of seriously 
impinging on "investmeut-backed expectations" can 
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Public Lands 317 -96 
317 Public Lands 
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317II(I) Proceedings in Land Office 
k. Authority and Duties of Officers 
in General. Most Cited Cases 
Utah has the right of access to state school trust 
lands, which right is subject to federal regulation 
when its exercise requires the crossing of federal 
property; however, such regulation cannot prohibit 
access or be so restrictive as to make economic 
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development competitively unprofitable; 
furthermore, the Bureau of Land Management may 
regulate federal public lands so as to prevent 
impairment of wilderness characteristics, but such 
authority is subject to uses which were existing on 
October 21, 1976, the date Federal Land Policy and 
Management Act was enacted. Act July 16, 1894,28 
Stat. 107; Const.Utah art. 10, 66 3, 1; Federal Land 
Policy and Manaeement Act of 1976, $ 603(a), 4.2 
U.S.C.A. 6 17116); Wilderness Act, 6 2 et seq., l.6 
U.S.C.A. 4 1131 et seq. 
Public Lands 317 -55 
317 Public Lands 
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Survey and Disposal of Lands of United 
States 
317II(E1 School and University Lands 
k. Leases by State. Most Cited 
In respect to state school trust lands encircled by 
federal land, state lessee's right to gain access was not 
an existing use on October 21, 1976, the date of 
enactment of the Federal Land Policy and 
Management Act and, therefore, the lessee's activity 
could be regulated so as to prevent wilderness 
impairment, but such regulation could not be so 
restrictive as to constihlte a taking. Acl July 16, 1894, 
28 Stat. 107; ConstUtah art. 10, 68 3, 1; Federal 
Land Policy and Management Act of 1976, $ 603(a), 
43 U.S.C.A. 6 1711(a); Wilderness Act, $ 2 et seq., 
I6 U.S.C.A. 6 I t31 et seq. 
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MEMORANDUM OPINION, DECREE AND 
INJUNCTION 
(In Lieu of Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, 
and Order, under Rule 52. F.R.C.P.) 
ALDON J. ANDERSON, Chief Judge. 
This is a case of first impression involving important 
questions concerning the administration and use of 
public lands. Plaintiff, the United States, filed suit on 
May 25, 1979, seeking a temporary restraining order 
to prevent Cotter Corporation (hereinafter Cotter) 
from engaging in "any construction, road building, 
leveling land, or destroying primitive, scenic and 
wildlife characteristics" on certain federal land. The 
court granted the 0 r d e r . m  
FN1. On June 1, 1979, Cotter filed a motion 
for dissolution of the restraining order 
claiming that the proposed road was 
necessary to gain access to mineral leases on 
a section of state school land and would not 
cause permanent darnage. Argument was 
heard and the motion was denied. On June 4, 
1979, the court extended the temporary 
restraining order until June 15 when 
argument could be heard on the motion for 
preliminary injunction. 
The State of Utah moved to intervene as a party 
defendant. It was unopposed and the motion was 
granted by the court. Thereafter, Utah filed an answer 
to the complaint and a counterclaim, alleging that by 
denying Utah's lessee (Cotter) access to certain state 
school trust land (section 36) the United States 
violated a compact with the state and interfered with 
its right to fully utilize the school trust land. This was 
followed with a motion for summary judgment. On 
June 6, 1979, the state filed a motion to consolidate 
this case with Utah v. Andrus, C 79-0037, (D.Utah, 
filed January 16, 1979). On finding that consolidation 
would serve the interests of judicial economy and 
would not prejudice the parties, the motion was 
g r a n t e d . m  
FN2. On June 15 oral argument was heard 
on all motions. At that time the parties 
agreed that if the court would hear 
arguments on a request for permanent 
injunction that neither the United States nor 
Cotter would take any further action with 
regard to the land in question. This included 
O 2008 Thomson ReutersIWest. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works 
486 F.Supp. 995 
486 F.Supp. 995, 10 Envtl. L. Rep. 20,570 
agreement by the United States to withhold 
any decision on whether or not the area 
should be designated a wilderness study 
area. 
On July 12, 1979, argument was heard on the request 
for permanent injunction and the matter was fully 
submitted, with final briefs filed thereaf te r .mThe  
court has carefully considered the matters presented 
and is ready to rule. 
FN3. Amicus Curiae briefs were submitted 
-
by the Mountain States Legal Foundation 
and the American Mining Congress. 
FACTS 
This case involves access to mining claims located on 
both federal and state 1 a n d . W T h e  state land is 
surrounded by land in *I000 federal ownership and 
land access to section 36 is possible only by crossing 
federal property. The state land was granted to Utah 
by the United States under the Utah Enabling Act 
(Act of July 16, 1894, 28 Stat. 107). The major 
portion of the land in territorial Utah, at the time of 
statehood, was in federal ownership. In order to 
provide a tax base for the new state, the federal 
government granted to Utah certain sectio~ls of land 
In each township specifically, sections 2, 16, 32 and 
36. But this grant was not unconditional nor was it a 
unilateral gift. In order to receive the grant, Utah, like 
other states, was required to use the proceeds of the 
granted lands for a permanent state school trust fund. 
Utah met all the conditions of the federal grant 
and, upon statehood, received the sections of 
1 a n d . m  
FN4. In Cotter's initial letter to the Bureau 
of Land Management informing the agency 
of its intent to commence road building, 
Cotter indicated that the purpose of the road 
was to gain access to the state school 
section. (Complaint, Exhibit A,) Cotter 
continued to assert this puvose in its motion 
to dissolve the temporary restraining order. 
Later in the proceedings, however, Cotter 
argued not only for its right of access to 
state school lands, but also to its federal 
mining claims. Therefore, the court has 
treated the case as if it involved both issues 
since both issues were subsequently argued 
by the parties. 
FN5.Utah Const.. Art. X, ss 3,Z. 
FN6. For a more detailed history of the 
school land grant as it applied to Utah, see 
Utah v. Kleuue, 586 F.2d 756 (10th Cir. 
1978), cert. granted, 442 U.S. 928. 99 S.Ct. 
2857.61 L.Ed.2d 296 (1979). 
As a result of the state school land grants, the pattern 
of property ownership in much of Utah represents a 
checkerboard, with sections of school trust laud 
interspersed within federal land. Since nearly two- 
thirds of Utah's land is in federal o w n e r s h i p , m  
and since this land frequently surrounds state school 
sections, the question of access rights and activity on 
state school and federal land is of utmost importance 
to both Utah and the United States. In most 
situations, neither sovereign can take any action with 
regard to its land holding without impacting the 
other's land. 
FN7. See One Third of the Nation's Land 
(Public Land Law Review Commission) at 
23 (1970). 
On October 21, 1976, the United States Congress 
passed the Federal Land Policy and Management Act 
(FLPMA) intended to provide, in part, a new 
statutory base for the Bureau of Land Management's 
(BLM) administration of the lands within its 
jurisdiction. Only a few are pertinent here. Under 
section 201(a) (43 U.S.C. s 1711(a) (Suuu.197911, the 
ELM is directed to conduct an inventory of all 
BLM managed lands and their resource and other 
values. LJnGer s 603(a) (43 U.S.C. s 1782(a> 
fSuup.I979Q, BLM is directed to examine all 
roadless areas of 5000 acres or more which have been 
identified during the inventory process as having 
wilderness characteristics. Based on this review BLM 
is to recommend to the President whether or not each 
such area should be preserved as wilderness 
according to the provisions of the Wilderness Act (s 
U.S.C. s 1131 et sea. (1974D. During this period of 
review BLM is to manage the lands so as to prevent 
impairment of wilderness characteristics and 
umecessary and undue degradation of the 
e~lvironment. (Section 603(c), 43 U.S.C. s 1782(cl 
fSuuu.1979~. It was against this historical and 
statutory backdrop that Cotter located its mining 
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claims and began building a road to gain access to 
those claims. 
FNs. The Act gives the Secretary of the 
Department of Interior authority to c m y  out 
its provisions. In fact this authority has been 
delegated to the Bureau of Land 
Management. For the sake of simplicity, the 
terms "Secretary" and "Bureau of Land 
Management" are used interchangmbly. 
Cotter Corporation is a uranium mining and 
exploration company wholly o w e d  by 
Commonwealth Edison, a public utility serving 
Northern Illinois. (Affidavit of Erik Bmer ,  filed 
June 11, 1979.) Between January and Jme, 1976, 
Cotter acquired additional federal claims and the state 
mineral lease on section 36.(Id. ) The federal claims 
were located pursuant to the Mining. Law of 1872 &Q 
U.S.C. s 22 et seq. ). 
During that last six months of 1977, Cotter conducted 
roadless areas of 5000 acres or more which 
have wilderness characteristics. These areas 
are then designated Wilderness Study Areas 
(WSAs), and BLM studies each area to 
determine the suitability of the area for 
inclusion in the Wilderness System. At this 
point in its planning, BLM looks at all the 
potential uses of an area, including the 
potential for mineral development. After 
completion of this phase BLM reports to the 
President its recommendation as to each 
area's suitability (or lack thereof) for 
inclusion in the Wilderness System. The 
President then makes his recommendations 
to Congress, which makes the final 
determination. 
FN10. Memorandum Supplementing the 
Initial Memorandum In Support of Plaintiffs 
Motion for Preliminary Injunction and 
Opposing Utah's Motion for Summary 
Judgment, filed June 8, 1979, at 3. 
drilling operations on federal land to the nonth and to 
the south of the lands at issue here. These operations When BLM became aware of Cotter's road building 
indicated a "trend" of uranium ore b e t w m  the two activity in June, 1978, it contacted Cotter personnel 
drilling points. Subsequent drilling operations and advised them of BLM's interest in the area and 
confirmed the trend. In order to conduct these requested that the road building activity be brought to 
operations, Cotter constructed access r o d s  (Bruner a halt. Cotter agreed to this request and ceased all 
affidavit), but did not notify BLM of the wans%uctiou construction activity for approximately one year. 
activity. In June, 1978, Cotter began to m s m c t  a (Bruner affidavit.) On May 24, 1979, Cotter notified 
road across the lands in question here inn order to BLM of its intention to begin construction of a road 
hrther its exploratory drilling. to gain access to section 36 (Complaint, Exhibit A). 
BLM then instituted this proceeding. 
"1001 In the meantime, BLM proceeded with the 
inventory and wilderness area examination required 
by FLPMA. During the review, ELM identified a 
portion of roadless unit UT-05-236 as being 
appropriate for designation as a Wilderness Study 
Area ( W S A 1 . m  The proposed sudy unut includes 
the lands in question here. In April, 1979, BLM 
published the proposed area in the Federd Register 
and has received public comment on the proposal 
(Affidavit of Donald C. Pendleton, filed May 25, 
1979). As yet BLM has not finally decided to 
designate the area a formal WSA. The court IS 
informed that in all likelil~ood lhe mea will be so 
designated.- 
FN9. The BLM procedue for cana~ring out 
the wilderness review poeions of FLPMA is 
as follows: First, the agency idmtifies 
OPINION 
At stake here are three very important and conflicting 
interests. The state of Utah has a clear interest in 
protecting its rights under the grant of school trust 
lands and in being able to use those lands so as to 
maximize the funds available for the public schools. 
Cotter, of course, has an interest in developing its 
claims in the most economical way possible. Finally, 
the United States bas an interest in preserving for 
hture generations the oppomtnity to experience the 
solitude and peace that only an undisturbed natural 
setting can provide. As noted herein, these public 
interests conflict. This is reflected in the more narrow 
questions of statutory interpretation and 
reconciliation posed for decision. In order to resolve 
the issues and effect a balance of interests, it is 
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important to examine each interest and its statutory of the school trust lands would fail. Without access 
base. the state could not develop the trust lands in any 
fashion and they would become economically 
I. State School Trust Land worthless. This Congress did not intend. 
As previously explained, the state school land grants 
were not unilateral gifts made by the United States 
Congress. Rather, they were in the nature of a 
bilateral compact entered into between two 
sovereigns. In return for receiving the federal lands 
Utah disclaimed all interest in the remainder of the 
public domain, agreed to forever hold federal lands 
immune from taxation, and agreed to hold the granted 
lands, or the proceeds therefrom, in trust as a 
common school fund. Thus, the land grants involved 
here were in the nature of a contract, with a 
bargained-for consideration exchanged between the 
two governments. See Utah v. K l e ~ ~ e ,  586 F.2d 756, 
758 (10th Cir. m, cert. granted442 U.S. 928, 99 
S.Ct. 2857.61 L.Ed2d296 (19791. 
W Recognition of the special nature of the school 
land grants is important both in determining the 
Congressional intent behind the grant and in 
understanding judicial treatment of similar grants. 
Generally, land grants by the federal government are 
construed strictly, and nothing is held to pass to the 
grantee except that which is specifically delineated in 
the instrument of conveyance. E. g., United States v. 
Union Pacific Railroad Co.. 353 U.S. 112. 116. 77 
S.Ct. 685, 687, 1 L.Ed.2d 693 (1957). But the 
legislation dealing with school trust "1002 land has 
always been liberally construed. Wvomin~ v. United 
States. 255 U.S. 489, 508. 41 S.Ct. 393, 399, 65 
L.Ed. 742 (19211; Utah v. Kleppe, supra at 
761.Furthe1, it is clear that one of Congress' primary 
purposes in enacting the legislation was to place the 
new states on an "equal footing" wit11 the original 
thirteen colonies and to enable the state to "produce a 
fund, accumulated by sale and use of the trust lands, 
with which the State could support the (common 
schools)".Lassen v. Arizona ~ i e h w a v  ~ d p t . ,  385 
U.S. 458. 463. 87 S.Ct. 584. 587, 17 L.Ed.2d 515 
m. 
Further, traditional property law concepts 
support Utah's claimed right of access. Under the 
common law it was assumed that a grantor intended 
to include in the conveyance whatever was necessary 
for the use and enjoyment of the land in question. 
Mackie v. United States. 194 F.Supp. 306. 308 
/D.Minn.l9611. When a grantor conveys only a 
portion of his land, and the land received by the 
grantee is surrounded by what the grantor has 
retained, it is generally held that the grantee has an 
easement of access, either by implication or 
necessity, across the grantor's land. E. g.. United 
States v. Dunn. 478 F.2d 443, 444 & n.2 (9th Cir. 
m. Although this common law presumption might 
not ordinarily apply in the context of a federal land 
grant, the liberal rules of construction applied to 
school trust land allow for the consideration of this 
common law principle and justify its application 
h e 1 e . W  
FNII. The case of Leo Sheep Co. v. United 
States, 440 U.S. 668, 99 S.Ct. 1403. 59 
L.Ed.2d 677 (19791 is not apposite. In that 
case the United States Supreme Court held 
that the government had not reserved an 
access easement in a particular land grant 
because the government had the power to 
condemn the land in question. The 
defendants in this case have no such power. 
M Therefore, the court holds that the state of Utah 
and Cotter Corporation, as Utah's lessee, do have the 
right to cross federal land to reach section 36, which 
is a portion of the school trust lands. The extent and 
nature of that right, however, remain to be 
determined. In order to reach that decision the court 
must examine the character and extent of BLM's 
authority under the Federal Land Policy and 
Management Act. 
Given the rule of liberal const~uction and the 11. Federal Land Policy and Management Act 
Congressional intent of enabling the state to use the 
school lands as a means of generating revenue, the 121 FLPMA represents an attempt on the part of 
court must conclude that Congress intended that Utah Congress to balance a variety of competing interests, (or its lessees) have access to the school lands. including those enumerated above. To some extent, 
Unless a right of access is inferred, the very purpose the statute appears to be internally inconsistent, 
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reflecting different concerns of environmentalists, 
miners, and ranchers. For example, in section 102 (Q 
U.S.C. s 1701(aK8) (Suoo.19792) outlining the 
Congressional declaration of policy, the statute 
declares it to be the policy of the United States to 
manage the public lands. 
in a manner that will protect the qmiity of scientific, 
scenic, historical, ecological, envirotux~ental, air and 
atmospheric, water resource, md archeological 
values; . . . that will provide food a d  habitat for fish 
and wildlife and domestic animals, and that will 
provide for outdoor recreation and b m a n  occupancy 
and use . . . 
The same section declares nation& policy to be the 
management of public lands in a manner 
(that) recognizes the Nation's need [or domestic 
Cotter contends that BLM must take all potential 
values into account when it designates an area as a 
WSA. The statute, however, envisions a dynamic 
process, not a static one-time-only decision. FLPMA 
is addressed in part to solving the problem of the lack 
of a comprehensive plan for the use, preservation and 
disposal of public lands. %Rep. No. 94-583, 94th 
Cong., 1st Sess. 35-6 (1975), U.S.Code Cong. & 
Admiu.News 1976, p. 6175. The purpose of the 
inventory and the wilderness review is to enable 
BLM to ascertain the character of the lands within its 
jurisdiction, and the best use to which particular 
portions of land can be put given such things as 
wilderness characteristics, mineral values, and the 
nation's needs for recreation, energy, etc. BLM is 
entitled to address this oroblem one steo at a time. E. 
g., Williamson v. Lee dotical CO.. 348 U.S. 483.489, 
75 S.Ct. 461,465.99 L.Ed. 563 (1955). 
sources of kinerals, food, timber and fiber from the 
public lands including implementation of (the Mining 181 BLM is not required to immediately balance the 
and Minerals Policy Act of 1970) section 21a of Title mineral values against the wilderness values of a 
30 as it pertains to the public lands. (Sec. (12)) 
-
particular piece of land prior to designating the land a 
WSA. BLM mav. consistent with FLPMA. look first 
.. 
*I003 On their face these two provisions appear at potential wilderness characteristics and then 
contradictory. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine how proceed to study the area for all its potential uses 
an agency is both to encourage minim or logging and prior to formulating its final recommendations to the - . . 
preserve land in its natural conditiozn:~ is only when executive 
the statute is viewed in a dynamic rather than a static 
context, and is viewed as applying to all public lauds, 
that the conflict can be resolved. I f& the competing 
demands reflected in FLPMA were focused on one 
particular piece of public laud, ia m y  instances 
only one set of demands could be satisfied. A parcel 
of land cannot both be presewad in its natural 
character and mined. Thus, it wodd be impossible 
for BLM to carry out the purposes off the Act if each 
particular management decision were evaluated 
separately. It is only by looking at dane overall use of 
the public lands that one can accurately assess 
whether or not BLM is carrying out the broad 
purposes of the statute. If one's view is expanded to 
the complex entirety of land management decisions, 
then the statute is not necffsahily internally 
inconsistent. Some lands can be slreserved. while 
A. BLM's Authority Under FLPMA 
Under section 603(c) (43 U.S.C. s 1782(c) 
[Suoo.1979)), BLM is required, during the period of 
wilderness review, to manage the pubfic land 
in a manner so as not to impair the suitability of such 
areas for preservation as wilderness, subject, however 
to the continuation of existing mining . . . uses . . . in 
the manner and degree in which the same was being 
conducted on October 21, 1976: Provided, That, in 
managing the public lauds (BLM) shall by regulation 
or otherwise take any action required to prevent 
unnecessary or undue degradation of the lauds and 
their resources or to afford environmental protection. 
others, more appropriately, can be &ed. BLM is not (Emphasis added in part.) 
required to fully implement section 21a of Title 30 
each time it makes a decisiora wider FLPMA. 
Consequently, BLM is not obliged to, and indeed Cotter argues that this language authorizes only one 
cannot, reflect all the purposes of FLPMA in each management standard: preventing undue or 
management action. unnecessary degradation of the environment. It is Cotter's position that the use of the word 
"impair""merely gives direction to the existing 
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authority of (BLM) to manage with a view toward 
enviromental protection."(Supplementary 
Memorandum of Defendant Cotter Corporation In 
Opposition to Injunction, filed June 25, 1979, at 20.) 
The United States, on the other hand, argues that 
under section 603(c) there are two management 
standards: one that applies to uses of the land existing 
on October 21, 1976, and one that applies to uses 
coming into existence after that date. Under this 
interpretation, existing uses are to be regulated only 
to the degree required to "1004 prevent unnecessary 
and undue degradation. New uses, however, may be 
(indeed, must be) regulated to the extent necessary to 
prevent impairment of wilderness 
charac te r i s t ics .~Obvious ly ,  the latter standard 
is more strict. 
FN12. Initially, there was some argument in 
this case as to whether or not the area in 
question could ever meet the definition of 
wilderness under 16 U.S.C. s 1131 (19741. 
After the first hearings, however, that 
argument was not actively pursued by either 
party. Assuming that the question of the 
existence of wilderness characteristics is still 
at issue, the court holds that the government 
has presented more than sufficient evidence 
to show that the land in question meets the 
criteria of 16 U.S.C. s 1131 (19741. Cf. 
Parker v. United States. 309 F.SUDD. 593 
(D.Colo.1970), aft'd, 448 F.2d 793 (10th 
Cir. 19711, cert. den., sub nom.Kaibab 
Industries v. Parker. 405 U.S. 989, 92 S.Ct. 
1252.31 L.Ed.2d 455 (1972). 
The Solicitor of the Department of Interior has 
issued an opinion dated September 5, 1978, 
(hereinafter referred to as "Solicitor's Opinion") 
which interprets the effect of section 603(c). Under 
this interpretation, section 6031~) does indeed 
mandate two standards, the first of which governs 
regulation of uses not in existence on October 21, 
1976, and the second of which governs uses existing 
on that date. (Solicitor's Opinion, pp. 11, 16.) 
Generally, the interpretation of a statute by those 
chareed with its execution is entitled to great 
d 6 1 6  (1965); Red Lion 
find no reason not to give such deference in this case. 
Further, the Solicitor's interpretation fmds support in 
the Act's legislative history. In the Report 
No. 94-1163, 94th Cong.2d Sess. 17 (19761, 
U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 1976, p. 6175) 
accompanying the House version of what was to 
become FLPMA, the language of section 603(c) was 
described as follows: 
While tracts are under review, they are to be 
managed in a manner to preserve their wilderness 
character, subject to continuation of existing grazing 
and mineral uses and appropriation under the mining 
laws. The Secretary will continue to have authority to 
prevent unnecessary and undue degradation of the 
lands, including installation of minimum 
improvements, such as wildlife habitat and livestock 
control improvements, where needed for the 
protection or maintenance of the lands and their 
resources . . . (Emphasis added.) 
1t appears to the court that the above passage 
indicates that the authority to manage lands so as to 
prevent impairment of wilderness characteristics was 
meant to he a new addition to the Secretary's 
continuing authority to regulate all uses so as to 
prevent undue degradation. Other parts of the 
legislative history confirm this view. 
The Senate version of FLPMA contained no specific 
wilderness review section. Rather, it included several 
sections indicating that the inventory and review 
process would not, in themselves, either change or 
prevent change in land use management. The Senate 
Report accompanying this version indicates that the 
Committee drafting the bill was concerned that 
existing uses not be terminated and that firture uses, 
including use as wilderness, not be foreclosed by new 
activity. %Rep. No. 94-583, supra at 44,U.S.Code 
Cong. & Admin.News 1976, p. 6175. It appears that 
the Senate and the House were concerned about 
devising a way to protect both existing uses and 
wilderness values present on tracts not subject to 
existing uses. As interpreted by the Solicitor, section 
6031~) reflects that concern. The Secretary's authority 
to preserve wilderness is subject to existing uses 
which may not be arbitrarily terminated, nor 
regulated solely with a view to preserving wilderness 
characteristics. But the Secretary may continue to 
regulate such uses in order to prevent unnecessary or 
O 2008 Thomson ReutersIWest. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works 
486 F.Supp. 995 
486 F.Supp. 995, 10 Envtl. L. Rep. 20,570 
undue degradation. On the other hand, activity on 
lands with potential wilderness value which are not 
subject to existing uses may be regulated more 
stringently so as to preserve wilderness 
characteristics. The Solicitor's interpretation is 
consistent with the Act's legislative history and 
reflects the full measure*1005 of Congressional 
intent in the adoption of 603(c). Cotter's 
interpretation reflects only one of Congress' concerns, 
i. e., protection of existing uses. 
Finally, the Solicitor's interpretation is supported by 
the language and structure of the statute itself. The 
word "impair" would prevent many activities that 
would not be prevented by the language of 
"unnecessary or undue degradation." W F o r  
example, commercial timber harvesting, if conducted 
care&lly, would not result in unnecessary or undue 
degradation of the environment. See, One Third of 
the Nation's Land (Public Land Law Review 
Commission) 102 (1970). But the same activity 
might well impair wilderness characteristics as those 
are defined in 16 U.S.C. s 1131 (19711. Compare 
Parker v. United States, 309 F.Sum. 5 9 3  
{D.Colo.19701, affd, 448 F.2d 793 (10th Cir. 19711, 
ce~t .  den. sub nom., Kaibab Industries v. Parker. 405 
U.S. 989.92 S.Ct. 1252.31 L.Ed.2d455 119721, with 
Minnesota Public Interest Research Group v. Butt, 
541 F.2d 1292 (8th Cir. 19761. Further, if Congress 
had not intended to mandate two standards, it wonld 
merely have indicated that the Secretary was to 
continue to manage all lands so as to prevent 
unnecessary degradation. If one takes the position 
that this is what Congress intended, then the language 
of impairment must be mere surplusage. Statutory 
rules of construction are against such a 
finding.[FNI41WiIderness Society v .  Morton. 156 
U.S.Aov.D.C. 121. 135. 479 F.2d 842. 856 
(D.C.Cir.19731, cert. den., 411 U.S. 917, 93 S.Ct 
1550.36 L.Ed.2d 309 (19781. 
FN13. As stated in the amicus brief of the 
-
American Mining Congress: 
A reasonable interpretation of the word 
"unnecessary" is that which is not 
necessary for mining. "Undue" is that 
which is excessive, improper, imtnodetate 
or unwarranted. 
Brief of Amicus American Mining 
Congress in Opposition to the United 
States' Request for Permanent Injunction, 
filed July 6, 1979, at 9. 
FN14. There is further indication within 
FLPMA itself that the Congress intended 
two management standards. Section 302(b) 
provides: 
Except as provided in 1744, 1781(f) and 
1782 (section 603) of this title and in the 
last sentence of this paragraph, no 
provision . . . shall in any way amend the 
Mining Law of 1872 . . . . 
The last sentence of 302(b) is as folfows: 
In managing the public lands the 
Secretary shall, by regulation or 
otherwise, take any action necessary to 
prevent unnecessary or undue degradation 
of the lands. 
If the standard of undue degradation were 
not separate and distinct from the 
impairment standard contained in section 
603(c), there would have been no need to 
include both the last sentence and 
reference to section 603(c) in section 
302(b). By making distinct reference to 
both standards in 302(b), Congress 
indicated its intent to formulate two 
different approaches to management of 
the public lands. 
Moreover, legislative history confirms that the 
language of impairment was not surplusage. Initial 
drafts of the bill in the House did not contain this 
language; it was added at the suggestion of 
Congressman Dellenback who stated that the purpose 
of the language was to keep the Secretary from 
"changing anything." Its purpose was to maintain the 
existing character and use of public lands whether 
that use was wilderness or developed recreation. 
(Solicitor's Opinion, p. 16). 
Therefore, the court holds that under the terms 
of FLPMA the BLM has the authority to manage 
public lands so as to prevent impairment of 
wilderness characteristics, unless those lands are 
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subject to an existing use. In the latter case BLM may 
regulate so as to prevent unnecessary or undue 
degradation of the environment. 
B. Cotter's Rights Under FLPMA 
Given that there are two standards by which BLM 
can manage the public lands, it remains to he 
determined what standards apply to Cotter's activity. 
Cotter argues that its activity falls within the existing 
use provision of 603(c). The main thrust of Cotter's 
argument is as follows: 
1) under the Mining Law of 1872, Cotter has a right 
of access to its unpatented claims; 
2) Cotter, as Utah's lessee, also has a right of access 
to state school land; 
3) these rights, even though not exercised prior to 
Octoher, 1976, constitute existing uses under 
FLPMA. 
1111*1006 Section 603(c) mandates that existing uses 
mav continue in the "same manner and deeree" as 
limited to, rights of ingress and egress. (Emphasis 
added.) 
Cotter enlphasizes only the latter portion of this 
section and from this argues that no provision of 
FLPMA can he taken to amend the Mining Law of 
1872. On its face, however, this section makes clear 
that section 603 does amend the Mining Law of 
1872. Rights under that law, including rights of 
ingress and egress, can be impaired by virtue of 
section 603. Moreover, the Mining Law itself makes 
clear that rights of access to mining claims are not 
absolute, Such rights are subject to regulation under 
30 U.S.C. s 22 (1971). 
It might also he argued that section 201 (43 U.S.C. s 
1711 (Supp.1979)) acts as a limitation on BLM's 
right to restrict Cotter's right of access to its federal 
claims. Section 201 provides in pertinent part: 
The preparation and maintenance of such inventory 
or the identification of such areas (of critical 
ellvironmental concern) shall not, of itself, change or 
prevent change of the management or use of public 
lands. 
heihg conducted on Octoher 21, 1976. ~ n i e s s  the 
statute is referring to activity that was actually taking The argument is that since, prior to BLM's inventory, 
place on that date, there is no way to give meaningful this land was open to all mining activity, section 201 
context to the "manner and degree" laneuaee. In prevents BLM from changing the use to which the - - - 
order to determine whether or not a eiven overation is land was being put if such change is based solely on 
- 
heine conducted in the same manner and degree as it the results of the inventory - - 
was formerly heing conducted, there must he some 
former activity against which the extent of the 
present operation can he measured. Presumably, 
when the statute refers to existing uses heing carried 
out in the same manner and degree it is referring to 
actual uses, not merely a statutoryright to use. 
1121 Cotter next points to section 302(h) as an 
indication that its rights of access camlot he denied 
under FLPMA. Cotter's emphasis in quoting 302(b) 
is, however, selective. Section 302(h) provides in 
pertinent part: 
Except as provided in 1744, 1781(f) and 1782 
(section 603) of this title and in the last sentence of 
this paragraph no provision of this section or any 
other section of this Act shall in any way amend the 
Mining Law of 1872 or impair the righ~s of any 
locators of claims under that Act, including, hut not 
In the Report accompanying the Senate version of 
FLPMA (S.Rep. No. 94-58, supra at 44), section 201 
is explained as follows: 
The purpose of this statement is to insure that, under 
no circumstances will the pattern of uses on the 
national resource land he frozen, or will uses be 
automatically terminated during the preparation of 
the inventory and identification of areas possessil~g 
wilderness characteristics. Equity demands that the 
Secretary uot he barred from considering and 
permitting new uses during the lengthy inventory and 
identification processes. On the other hand, the "of 
itself' language is not meant to he license to continue 
to allow or disallow uses as if no inventory and 
identification process were being conducted. The 
Committee fully expects that the Secretary, wherever 
possible, will make management decisions which will 
insure that no future use or combination of uses 
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which might be discovered as appropriate in the 
inventory or identification process . . . will be 
foreclosed by any use or combination of uses 
conducted after enactment of S.507, but prior to the 
completion of those processes. (Emphasis added.) 
It is clear that the Congress intended to 
provide a balanced solution to the problem *I007 of 
land management during the inventory process. 
While Congress did not intend the use of public lands 
to be Frozen pending the outcome of the inventory 
process, neither did it want f ume  uses to be 
foreclosed by the impact of present activity. Further, 
the Congress recognized that it might not be possible 
to both allow present uses and prevent foreclosure of 
certain other future uses. 
Fn15. While the legislative history quoted 
here is from the Senate Report, the IHouse 
version of the hill contained no similar 
language. The language was adopted in the 
conference committee, but without any 
further indication as to the Congressional 
intent behind the language. Thus, it is 
possible to assume that the Senate Report 
accurately reflects the irntent of the 
Congress, there being rpo contrary 
indication. 
This is consistent with the decision in Parker v. 
United States, supra. In that case, involving the 
Wilderness Act, the court held that the Department of 
Agriculture could not take any act& that would 
foreclose Congressional consideration of an area's 
potential for wilderness d e s i g n a t i o i ~ . m I n  this 
case, if BLM could not prevent activity that would 
permanently impair wilderness characteristics, then 
those characteristics could he destroyed before either 
BLM or the Congress had the chance to evaluate an 
area's potential uses. This Congress dud not intend. 
E&&. Amicus American Mining Congress 
has cited a portion of legislative history 
indicating that Congress inswed section 201 
into FLPMA with the inteat of overruling 
the Parker case. See, Brief of Amicus 
American Mining Congress na Opposition to 
the United States' Request tor Permanent 
Injunction, supra. It shodd he noted, 
however, that the statement quoted hy the 
amicus is from the Senate Committee Report 
on Senate Bill 424, a bill that was debated 
some time p r i ~ r  to the debate and passage of 
FLPMA. Perhaps more important, the final 
statement of the Senate intent behind 
including section 201 (or section 102 as it 
was in the initial version) contains language 
almost identical to that quoted by the 
amicus, but does not include any reference 
to the Parka  case. The fact that this 
language was omitted from subsequent 
statements of legislative intent argues that 
Congress, in fact, did not intend to overrule 
Parker. Certainly, without a more definitive 
statement, this: court will not assume that 
Congress set out to undo that decision. 
Therefore, the court holds that I)  BLM may 
regulate activity on fderal  land so as to prevent 
impairment of potential wilderness characteristics; 2) 
the authority to so regulate is subject to uses actually 
existing on October 21, 1976; 3) section 603 does 
amend the Mining Law of 1872 and subjects rights 
thereunder to BLM's authority to regulate so as to 
prevent wilderness impairment; 4) section 201 does 
not mandate that BLM allow all potential uses to take 
place on a particular portion of land regardless of 
wilderness characteristia. 
&iJ BLM's authority is, however, limited to 
preventing permanemi impairment of potential 
wilderness values. Mthough it is not explicitly 
provided for in FLPMA, it is consistent with 
Congress' attempt to Mance  competing interests and 
with the Wilderness Act which provides the 
legislative backdrop for section 603 to find 
that if a given activit,y will have only a temporary 
effect on wilderness characteristics and will not 
foreclose potential wijbdemess designation then that 
activity should he allowed to proceed. 
Opiniam of the Solicitor of the United 
States Department of Interior, September 5, 
1978, at 4. 
&$j The definition of wilderness provided for in the 
Wilderness Act (16 U.S.C. s 1131(cU and 
incorporated by reference into FLPMA in section 
603(a) contemplates ehat some human activity can 
take place in wildemss areas as long as the area 
"generally appears to [save been affected primarily by 
the forces of nature, with the imprint of man's work 
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substantially unnoticeable. . . ."m 
Further, the draft statement of BLM's Interim 
Management Policy and Guidelines for Wilderness 
Study Areas (January 12, 1979, at 9) recognizes that 
temporaty activities, the negative impacts of which 
could he substantially reversed through appropriate 
reclamation procedures, would not impair wilderness 
characteristics under the terms of 603(c). 
There has been a great deal of argument in this case 
over whether or not the effects of Cotter's proposed 
road and drilling operations can he successfully 
reclaimed. Unfortunately*1008 the factual matters 
inherent in such an argument have not been 
sufficiently addressed. At the July 12 hearing on the 
motion for permanent injunction, Cotter proffered, 
for the first time, its reclamation plan. BLM has not 
had the opportunity to review the plan nor to make a 
comparison of the costs and feasibility of reclamation 
of a land access route over the cost and effect of other 
forms of access. 
1161117111811191 In view of the court's findings and 
conclusious of law, the BLM must he given the 
opportunity to review and respond to Cotter's 
reclamation plan. BLM has no formal regulations for 
review of proposed activity within potential WSA. 
But BLM is authorized under FLPMA to manage the 
public lands "by regulation or otherwise . . . ." See 
sections 302(h) and 603(c). Thus, the agency's 
authority is not dependent on the issuance of formal 
r e g u 1 a t i o n s . w  Further, in a lawsuit involving 
issues of the magnitude and importance as those 
involved here, it is imperative that all parties have the 
opportunity to respond to critical factual issues. 
Moreover, the question of the adequacy of a 
reclamation plan is precisely the kind of question to 
which the expertise of an administrative agency is 
most relevant: Cf Izaak Walton League of - h e &  
v. St. Clair, 497 F.2d 849, 852 (8th Cir.), cert. den., 
419 U.S. 1009.95 S.Ct. 329.42 L.Ed.2d 284 (19741. 
The court is ill-eauioued at this stage of the litigation 
. A. - - 
to make a factual determination on the comnlex 
question of the comparative "1009 costs and 
feasihility of reclamation efforts over other forms of 
access. Thus, the court orders that BLM must be 
given the opportunity to expeditiously review Cotter's 
reclamation plan with a view to determining whether 
or not the impact of the proposed road will he 
temporaly or permanent and with a view toward 
comparing the cost and feasihility of reclamation 
with the cost and feasibility of alternative forms of 
access. 
BLM has argued strenuously that 
Cotter should he required to "exhaust its 
administrative remedies" by applying for a 
right-of-way, having such right-of-way 
denied, appealing through the Interior 
system of land board review, and then 
applying to the court for relief. BLM has 
also argued that the doctrine of primary 
jurisdiction ought to apply and that this 
court should forego action until Interior has 
had the chance to formally act in the matter. 
The court does not agree with either 
argument. 
In the first place, there is considerable 
question as to whether or not a) Cotter is 
required to apply for a right of way orb)  
if it is so required, that there is any 
procedure by which it could have done so. 
Although BLM now argues that such a 
procedure exists and that knowledge of 
the procedure was available to the public, 
ELM employees previously told Cotter 
that no such apphcation was required. 
Further, BLM aud Cotter have been 
negotiating this road for over a year and 
Cotter was never told to complete a right- 
of-way application during that time. If no 
procedure for exhausting administrative 
remedies exists, [hen Cotter cannot be 
penalized for not pursuing such remedies. 
Further, there is an exception to the 
doctrine of exhaustion when it appears 
that efforts to find relief within the agency 
would he futile.Bendure v. United States, 
554 F.2d 427 (Ct.Cl.1977). Given 
Interior's position in this case, there is 
little chance that the agency would do 
anything but deny Cotter's application. 
The court will not require Cotter to 
engage in a useless exercise. 
As to the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, 
the court finds that it does not apply in 
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this case. As defined by the U. S. Supreme 
Court 
"Primary jurisdiction" . . . .=Pies where a 
claim is originally cogmhble in the 
courts, and comes into play whenever 
enforcement of the claim requires the 
resolution of issues, ~hhch, under a 
regulatory scheme, have been placed 
within the special co-nce of an 
administrative body; in suck a case the 
judicial process is suspamdied pending 
referral of such isaws to the 
administrative body for its views. 
United States v. Western Pacific Railroad 
Co., 352 U.S. 59. 63-4. 77S.Ct. 161. 165, 
1 L.Ed.2d 126 (1956) (emphasis added). 
In this case, there is no regdatory scheme 
beyond the broad provisim of FLPMA. 
Cf. Izaak Walton Lea~ue  of America v. 
St. Clair. 497 F.2d 849 (8th Cir. 1974). 
That is, BLM has no pdblushed adopted 
urocedure through which tit would handle 
alleged failure to exhaust administrative 
remedies nor on the doctrine of primary 
jurisdiction. 
If BLM should decide that the effects of the road 
will, indeed, be permanent, then the parties (and 
probably this court) may be required to conhont this 
and other disputed issues. In the interest, however, of 
giving this judgment finality for the purposes of 
appeal and for purposes of the parties' own pl'tmning, 
the court chooses not to keep jurisdiction over the 
lawsuit. The court is aware that should BLM delay 
reviewing the reclamation plan or make a &cision 
contrary to Cotter's interest, that the parties may need 
to institute a new lawsuit in order to obtain, a final 
resolution of their dispute. In that event, the court 
will give the new lawsuit the highest priority amrd will 
handle the matter as expeditiously as pwssible. 
However, in light of the possibility that further 
litigation will be necessary, and in light of the fact 
that throughout the litigation BLM has assumed that 
the effects of the road would be permanent and thus 
has put the questions of regulation of access to 
federal and state land at issue, the court will address 
~ ~ 
cotter's claim. The doctrim would seem the questions remaining in the lawsu~t. 
to assume an administra@ive mechanism 
through which primary jmldydliction could 
be exercised. In this case t k r e  is no such 
mechanism. Further, in initwang this suit, 
ELM did not ask that Caaaos be enjoined 
pending BLM's processing of any 
application that Cotter might make. It 
asked the court to permanently enjoin 
Cotter or to enjoin C&er pending a 
Solicitor's opinion on the state school land 
issue. Apparently BLM is not as 
concerned about the oowt's taking 
jurisdiction of this case wi&out any prior 
Interior action, if the cawit rules in its 
favor and permanently eqieoojoins Cotter 
from any further activity. Under these 
circumstances, the court Ends that the 
doctrine of primary jurisdiion does not 
apply in this case. The o~qpomity  given 
BLM to review the r e c l d o n  plan is 
based solely on the court's p s p t i o n  that 
BLM should be given the .@pportunity to 
respond to the fachlal issues raised by the 
reclamation plan and that ik court is not 
equipped to decide this issue raised by the 
plan at this time. It is not b d  on Cotter's 
111. FLPMA and the State School Lauds 
12411211 The state must be allowed access to the state 
school trnst lands so that those lands can be 
developed in a manner that will provide funds for the 
common schools. Further, because it was the intent of 
Congress to provide these lands to the state so that 
the state could use them to raise revenue, Lassen v. 
Arizona Highway Dept., supra, the access rights of 
the state cannot be so restricted as to destsoy the 
lands' economic value. That is, the state must be 
allowed access which is not so narrowly restrictive as 
to render the lands incapable of their full economic 
development. 
1221123112411251 The state's right of access is not, 
however, absolute. Under the Constitution Congress 
has the authority and responsibility to manage federal 
laud. U.S.Const. Art. IV, s 3. c1.2. Through statute 
Congress has delegated this authority to agencies 
such as the Bureau of Land Management. Gammon v. 
United States. 252 U.S. 450. 459-60, 40 S . . a  410, 
412. 64 L.Ed. 659 (1920). There is nothing in the 
school land grant program that would indicate that 
when Congress developed the school land grant 
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scheme ia intended to abrogate its right to control 
activity OD federal land. Further, it is consistent with 
common h w  property principles to find that the 
United Stabes, as the holder of the sewient tenement, 
has the right to limit the location and use of Utah's 
easement of access to that which is necessary for the 
state's reasonable enioyment of its right. See, e. g., * .  
United Sbtes v. Huehes. 278 F.Suuu. 733 
(E.D.Tentm.1967). Thus, the court holds that, although 
the state of Utah or its lessee must be allowed access 
to sectiom 36, the United States may regulate the 
manner ofiaccess under statutes such as FLPMA. 
The United States has argued here that not only can 
the United States regulate Utah's route across federal 
land, it c m  also prevent access if it finds that such 
access woald impair wilderness characteristics. The 
state couneers by arguing that if such access can be 
preventedlunder FLPMA, then the statute violates the 
Fifth Amendment by accomplishing taking of 
property without just compensation. 
The court has already rejected the argument 
made by the government based on an analysis of the 
Congressional intent behind the school land grants. 
The couct further finds that the school land grants 
were accomplished under what is termed "special" 
legislatiout Under statutory rules of construction, 
when "special acts" conflict with acts which deal 
with the same subject matter in a more general way, 
the special acts are to prevail, regardless of whether 
the special acts were passed prior to or *I010 after 
the general act. See Utah v. Kleppe, supra at 768- 
69.0f cowse, this rule does not apply if there is some 
indication) that Congress intended to modify the 
special act. There is, however, no such indication in 
the legisrative history of FLPMA. Indeed, the terms 
of FLPMA itself would indicate that Congress did 
not intend to amend rights under the school land 
grant program. See section 701(g)(6) (codified at $3 
U.S.C.A..s 1701 note (Supp.1979)). 
Thus, the court finds that 1) ELM can regulate 
the method and route of access to state school trust 
lands; 2)) bhis regulation may be done with a view 
toward preventing impairment of wilderness 
characteristics (assuming no existing use); 3) 
the regulation may not, however, prevent the state or 
its lessee from gaining access to its land, nor may it 
be so prohibitively restrictive as to render the land 
incapable of full economic development. 
FN20. The Court had also assumed, and 
now holds, that Utah's right of access to the 
state school land is not, in this case, an 
existing use since the right was not 
exercised prior to October 21, 1976. 
IV. FLPMA and Access Rights Over Federal Land 
Section 701(h) (codified at 43 U.S.C.A. s 1701 note 
(Supp. 1979)) of FLPMA provides: 
All actions by the Secretary concerned under this Act 
shall be subject to valid existing rights. 
The Solicitor has interpreted this section to mean that 
valid existing rights cannot be taken pursuant to 
section 603. (Solicitor's Opinion, p. 32)- The 
court agrees with this interpretation. The court has 
also found, however, that Cotter's right of access to 
both its federal and state claims can be regulated. 
FN21. The Solicitor also states that such 
-
rights may not be condemned. Without 
further explanation, the court cannot 
determine why such rights could not be 
condemned, assuming just compensation 
was paid. Certainly, there does not seem to 
be anything on the face of section 701(h) 
that would prevent condemnation of and 
payment for existing rights. Thus, the court 
does not adopt this portion of the Solicitor's 
opinion. 
The parties have stipulated that "Cotter's proposed 
road appears to be the only feasible and least 
environmentally disruptive land access for Cotter to 
its targeted drilling sites and for entry into state 
section 36 . . ." (Joint Pretrial Stipulation, filed July 
9, 1979; emphasis added in pan). Thus, in this case, 
regulation to prevent wilderness impairment could 
result in total prohibition of land access. BLM has 
contended that helicopter access is available, feasible 
and acceptable to the agency. Cotter contends that 
such access would be prohibitively expensive and 
would not result in any substantial saving of the 
environment. This issue was not, however, the 
subject of live testimony with full cross-examination. 
The court is not, therefore, provided with sufficient 
information on which to base a ruling. To further 
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complicate the case, it is not clear that the entire 
proposed road is necessary for Cotter to gain access 
to section 3 6 . m T h i s  is important because 
different criteria may be applied to judge the 
propriety of regulation of state, as opposed to federal, 
access rights. It 111ay be that requiring helicopter 
access to section 36 would be sufficiently expensive 
so as to render minerals on that section incapable of 
*I011 economic development. Therefore, requiring 
such access and denying land access would violate 
the intent of the school trust grant. It may be, 
however, that requiring such access to federal claims 
would not be so expensive as  to constitute a taking 
under 701(h). If the entire road is not necessaly to 
gain access to section 36, then it a u l d  be that 
substantial parts of it could be prohibited, while other 
parts could not. Unfortunately, on the record as it 
now stands, this matter is far from clear. 
FN22. Cotter has asserted h i  because of 
-
the section's terrain it cannot cut across the 
section. Rather, it must elnber from two 
points: one on the north, the other on the 
south. See Affidavit of Erik Bruner, filed 
June 11, 1979. This is, however, a mere 
conclusory allegation. Wuthout further 
information it is impossible to h o w  whether 
it would be more expensive to cut through 
section 36 from north to south, prohibitively 
expensive, or physically impossible to do so. 
Even if it would be physically impossible, 
there still remains the queslion of whether 
access to one portion of the section is 
sufficient to prevent an abrogation of Utah's 
access rights. 
It is also true that the p&es stipulated 
that the proposed road was the only 
feasible route to the f edad  claims and 
section 36. It is not c t w  from this 
stipulation, however, that the United 
States agreed that the emtire road was 
necessary to gain access ao section 36 
alone. Further, the govement  now 
vigorously contends that it was unaware 
of the extensions to section 36 until this 
lawsuit began. 
Finally, the record contains very linle factual 
information relevant to the taking issue. The court 
recognizes that a government can regulate without 
engaging in a taking. The court also recognizes, 
however, that when regulation reaches the point of 
seriously impinging on "investment-hacked 
expectations," it can constitute a taking. Pennwlvania 
Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393. 43 S.Ct. 158, 67 
L.Ed. 322 (1922); Goldblatt v. Hempstead. 364 U.S. 
590, 82 S.Ct. 987. 8 L.Ed.2d 130 (1962). Given its 
current information, the court feels that there is a 
substantial question of a taking in this case if access 
to federal claims are indefinitely prohibited or if 
alternative access is unreasonably expensive. The 
facts in this case are not, however, sufficientty clear 
at this time for the formulation of a ruling on this 
matter. 
In sum, the court holds that Utah does have 
a right of access to state school trust lands. That right 
is subject to federal regulation when its exercise 
requires the crossing of federal property. Such 
regulation cannot, however, prohibit access or be so 
restrictive as to make economic development 
competitively unprofitable. Further, the court holds 
that BLM may regulate federal public land so as to 
prevent inrpaiment of wilderness characteristics. 
Such authority is, however, subject to uses which 
were existing on October 21, 1976. These uses must 
have been actually existing on that date. Cotter's right 
to gain access was not an existing use on October 21, 
1976. Therefore, Cotter's activity may be regulated so 
as to prevent wilderness impairment. But such 
regulation cannot be so restrictive as to constitute a 
taking. Accordingly, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, 
DECREED AND DECLARED that the State of 
Utah, and Cotter Corporation as its lessee, have a 
right of access to state school section 36, which 
section is more precisely described in Exhibit A of 
the complaint filed herein. That right is subject to 
reasonable regulation by the United States 
Department of the Interior to prevent impairment of 
wilderness characteristics, but without damaging the 
competitive economic development of it. The United 
States may not, in carrying out such regulation, 
prohibit access. But the United States may, within the 
limits of the state school land grants and the Due 
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, review and 
regulate the proposed nature and location of access 
roads. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED, 
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DECREED AND DECLARED that Cotter 
Corporation, as the owner of certain unpatented 
mining claims on federal land, more precisely 
described in the complaint filed herein, has a right of 
access to its mining claims. That right is subject to 
regulation by the United States Department of the 
Interior to prevent impairment of wilderness 
characteristics. In canying out such regulation the 
United States may not permanently deprive Cotter 
Corporation of access to its claims. But the United 
Stales may, within the limits of the Due Process 
Clause of the Fifth Amendment, prescribe the mode 
of access and the location of access roads, if any. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDEmD, ADJUDGED, 
DECREED AND DECLARED that the United States 
Department of the Interior must he given the 
opportunity to review Cotter Corporation's proposed 
reclamation plan and the necessity of constructing the 
entire proposed road to gain access to section 36. 
Therefore, Cotter Corporation is hereby enjoined 
from engaging in any coi~struction, road building, 
leveling land or destroying primitive, scenic and 
wildlife characteristics on certain federal land as 
described in the complaint filed *I012 herein until 
such time as the Department of the Interior has 
reviewed the reclamation plan and the proposed 
extensions of the road into section 36 and rendered a 
decision thereon. At such time as the Department's 
decision is rendered, the parties may pursue such 
firther remedies before this court as they deem 
necessary. 
D.C.Utah, 1979. 
State of Utah v. Andrus 
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EXHIBIT A 
Map Identifving Roads Used To Access 
The Backman Properq 
[See, Attached.] 
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EXHIBIT B 
Chain Of Title To The Backman Property 
ie., S 112 of the NW 114 and the 
S 112 of the NW ?4 of the NW 114 of 
Section 8, Township 57 North, Range 2 West, 
Boise Meridian 
[The defined termslreferences used in this Exhibit A have the 
same meanings as assigned to them in Appellants' Brief.] 
Humbird owned the Backman Property until 1945, when it conveyed the property to 
Wert. Plaintiffs' Exhibit4. In 1952, Wert conveyed the Backman Property to Brown. 
Plaintiffs' Exhibit 5. In 1969, Brown conveyed the Backman Property to Long Lake Lumber 
Company ("Long Lake"). Plaintiffs' Exhibits 6-7. In 1980, Pack River Company, a subsidiary 
of Long Lake, conveyed the Backman Property to Pack River Management Company. 
Plaintiffs' Exhibit 8. In 1984, Pack River Management Company conveyed the Backman 
Property to Shamrock Investment Company ("Shamrock"). Plaintiffs' Exhibit 9. Shamrock 
conveyed the Backman Property to itself in 1990 to reflect a conversion in the company from a 
limited to a general partnership. Plaintiffs' Exhibit 10. 
Powers purchased the Backman Property in 1994. R. Vol. 11, p. 261; Plaintiffs' 
Exhibit 11. Powers conveyed the Backman Property to his mother, McGhee, a few weeks later. 
Plaintiffs' Exhibit 12. McGhee conveyed the Backman Property back to Powers in May 1995. 
Plaintiffs' Exhibit 13. Powers sold the Schrader Property to Schrader's predecessor-in-interest 
in 1995. R. Vol. 11, p. 261-62. Powers conveyed the Backman Property to Backmans in 2005. 
Plaintiffs' Exhibit 15. 
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